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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Washington Teachers' Union Local 6 v. District of Columbia Public Schoolsgreen1 sentence2021Sch., 77 A.3d 441, 456-57 (D.C. 2013) (“[T]he presumption in favor of arbitration becomes operative only where the court must interpret an ambiguous clause in the agreement.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lohmeiergreen2 sentences2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n 2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n | 1 | 1 |
cluster 599243green1 sentence2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n | 1 | 1 |
Proctor v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n | 1 | 1 |
Foreman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011The Court then concluded that, in reviewing a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction, the court must determine "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ("in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as the one at issue here [concerning admission of prior injury evidence in prosecution for murder of an infant child], we inquire `whether there is a reasonable likel 2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n | 1 | 1 |
Barnes v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n | 1 | 1 |
Martinez-Herrera v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n 2011D.C. 401, 403, 984 F.2d 1239, 1241 (1993)) (quoting Estelle, supra note 30 , 502 U.S. at 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ); accord, Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735, 741 (D.C.1996) ("the combined changes to the standard definition [of reasonable doubt] here created `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing Foreman and quoting Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1009 , 115 S.Ct. 1326 , 131 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995))). [32] See, e.g., Victor, supra n | 1 | 1 |
Masurovsky v. Greengreen1 sentence2007See Masurovsky v. Green, 687 A.2d 198, 202 (D.C.1996). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Franklin Delano Gipsongreen1 sentence1981Johnson, supra. See United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
2200 M STREET LLC v. MacKell
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Estelle v. McGuire
green
2 sentences2011The Court then concluded that, in reviewing a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction, the court must determine "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ("in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as the one at issue here [concerning admission of prior injury evidence in prosecution for murder of an infant child], we inquire `whether there is a reasonable likel 2011The Court then concluded that, in reviewing a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction, the court must determine "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ("in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as the one at issue here [concerning admission of prior injury evidence in prosecution for murder of an infant child], we inquire `whether there is a reasonable likel | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Victor v. Nebraska
green
2 sentences2011The Court then concluded that, in reviewing a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction, the court must determine "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard.” Id. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ("in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as the one at issue here [concerning admission of prior injury evidence in prosecution for murder of an infant child], we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likel 2011The Court then concluded that, in reviewing a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction, the court must determine "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 , 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) ("in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as the one at issue here [concerning admission of prior injury evidence in prosecution for murder of an infant child], we inquire `whether there is a reasonable likel | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hawkins v. United States
green
2 sentences1988In light of the government’s shift in legal theory “from one incident to two separate incidents after the jury began its deliberations coupled with the ambiguous instruction which may have resulted in a nonunanimous verdict”, id., 434 A.2d at 449 , we held there was plain error on a constitutional issue. 1988In light of the government’s shift in legal theory “from one incident to two separate incidents after the jury began its deliberations coupled with the ambiguous instruction which may have resulted in a nonunanimous verdict”, id., 434 A.2d at 449 , we held there was plain error on a constitutional issue. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Johnson v. United States
green
1 sentence1981Johnson, supra. See United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1977). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.