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5 Hawaii opinions name it 1 courts 1950–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Valentinegreen2 sentences2017Accordingly, the circuit court’s ambiguous instruction regarding second-degree methamphetamine trafficking, coupled with the absence of the definition of the “knowing” state of mind, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 Cf. State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 303-04 , 36 P.3d 1269, 1273-74 (2001) (concluding that the erroneous instruction was not harmless because it required the jury to find the defendant “guilty based on only one element of the offense so long as it was accompanied by the requisite state of mind”); State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai'i 199, 208 , 998 P.2d 479, 488 (2000) (con 2017Accordingly, the circuit court’s ambiguous instruction regarding second-degree methamphetamine trafficking, coupled with the absence of the definition of the “knowing” state of mind, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 Cf. State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 303-04 , 36 P.3d 1269, 1273-74 (2001) (concluding that the erroneous instruction was not harmless because it required the jury to find the defendant “guilty based on only one element of the offense so long as it was accompanied by the requisite state of mind”); State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai'i 199, 208 , 998 P.2d 479, 488 (2000) (con | 1 | 1 |
State v. Aganongreen2 sentences2017Accordingly, the circuit court’s ambiguous instruction regarding second-degree methamphetamine trafficking, coupled with the absence of the definition of the “knowing” state of mind, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 Cf. State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 303-04 , 36 P.3d 1269, 1273-74 (2001) (concluding that the erroneous instruction was not harmless because it required the jury to find the defendant “guilty based on only one element of the offense so long as it was accompanied by the requisite state of mind”); State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai'i 199, 208 , 998 P.2d 479, 488 (2000) (con 2017Accordingly, the circuit court’s ambiguous instruction regarding second-degree methamphetamine trafficking, coupled with the absence of the definition of the “knowing” state of mind, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 Cf. State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 303-04 , 36 P.3d 1269, 1273-74 (2001) (concluding that the erroneous instruction was not harmless because it required the jury to find the defendant “guilty based on only one element of the offense so long as it was accompanied by the requisite state of mind”); State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai'i 199, 208 , 998 P.2d 479, 488 (2000) (con | 1 | 1 |
Muckleshoot Tribe v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., City of Auburn, Washingtongreen1 sentence1997The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that “any party wishing to foreclose a suit for [allowable] fees must negotiate a provision waiving attorneys’ fees.... [I]f the defendant can provide clear evidence that demonstrates that an ambiguous clause was intended by both parties to provide for the waiver of fees, then the defendant is absolved of liability.” Muckleshoot Tribe v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 875 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Municipality of Anchorage v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc.green1 sentence1986See Municipality of Anchorage v. Sisters of Providence, 628 P.2d 22, 28 (Alaska 1981); 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra, § 49.11 at 415; cf. In Re Island Airlines, 47 Haw. 87, 123 , 384 P.2d 536 , 571 (1963) (legislative interpretation of an earlier law during the consideration of a subsequent *326 law receives no weight in determining the earlier law’s purpose). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ibuos
green
2 sentences2013Ibuos rejected that argument, and stated that 22 ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*** “we now clarify that the personal waiver requirement of Young applies to situations beyond the ambiguous waiver in Young.” Id. 2013Ibuos rejected that argument, and stated that “we now clarify that the personal waiver requirement of Young applies to situations beyond the ambiguous waiver in Young.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
James Richard Erdman v. Cochise County, Arizona and City of Douglas, Arizona
green
1 sentence1997“Any waiver or limitation of attorney fees in settlements ... must be clear and unambiguous.” Erdman v. Cochise County, Ariz., 926 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Application of Island Airlines, Incorporated
green
2 sentences1986See Municipality of Anchorage v. Sisters of Providence, 628 P.2d 22, 28 (Alaska 1981); 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra, § 49.11 at 415; cf. In Re Island Airlines, 47 Haw. 87, 123 , 384 P.2d 536 , 571 (1963) (legislative interpretation of an earlier law during the consideration of a subsequent *326 law receives no weight in determining the earlier law’s purpose). 1986See Municipality of Anchorage v. Sisters of Providence, 628 P.2d 22, 28 (Alaska 1981); 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra, § 49.11 at 415; cf. In Re Island Airlines, 47 Haw. 87, 123 , 384 P.2d 536 , 571 (1963) (legislative interpretation of an earlier law during the consideration of a subsequent *326 law receives no weight in determining the earlier law’s purpose). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples
neutral
1 sentence1950(See In re Peck’s Estate, 96 Vt. 183 , 118 Atl. 527 ; Singhi v. Dean, 119 Me. 287 , 110 Atl. 865 ; Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115 , 15 A. [2d] 1; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 633.) *507 The construction of mandatory power exercisable upon the death of the annuitants as urged by The Queen's Hospital renders the provision of gift to the issue of Albert valid and operative so as not to transgress the rule against perpetuities. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Millikin National Bank v. Wilson
neutral
2 sentences1950(See Milliken National Bank v. Wilson, 343 Ill. 55 , 174 N. E. 857 ; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 629.) Nevertheless, where as here the ambiguous clause of paragraph thirteen is fairly open to two possible constructions of opposite import, the one of discretionary power, turning as it does the provision of gift to the issue of Albert into an illegal perpetuity, will not be preferred over the other of mandatory power if such other upholds the validity of that provision consistently with the rule. 1950(See Milliken National Bank v. Wilson, 343 Ill. 55 , 174 N. E. 857 ; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 629.) Nevertheless, where as here the ambiguous clause of paragraph thirteen is fairly open to two possible constructions of opposite import, the one of discretionary power, turning as it does the provision of gift to the issue of Albert into an illegal perpetuity, will not be preferred over the other of mandatory power if such other upholds the validity of that provision consistently with the rule. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Singhi v. Dean
green
2 sentences1950(See In re Peck’s Estate, 96 Vt. 183 , 118 Atl. 527 ; Singhi v. Dean, 119 Me. 287 , 110 Atl. 865 ; Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115 , 15 A. [2d] 1; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 633.) *507 The construction of mandatory power exercisable upon the death of the annuitants as urged by The Queen's Hospital renders the provision of gift to the issue of Albert valid and operative so as not to transgress the rule against perpetuities. 1950(See In re Peck’s Estate, 96 Vt. 183 , 118 Atl. 527 ; Singhi v. Dean, 119 Me. 287 , 110 Atl. 865 ; Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115 , 15 A. [2d] 1; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 633.) *507 The construction of mandatory power exercisable upon the death of the annuitants as urged by The Queen's Hospital renders the provision of gift to the issue of Albert valid and operative so as not to transgress the rule against perpetuities. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
In re Peck's Estate
green
2 sentences1950(See In re Peck’s Estate, 96 Vt. 183 , 118 Atl. 527 ; Singhi v. Dean, 119 Me. 287 , 110 Atl. 865 ; Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115 , 15 A. [2d] 1; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 633.) *507 The construction of mandatory power exercisable upon the death of the annuitants as urged by The Queen's Hospital renders the provision of gift to the issue of Albert valid and operative so as not to transgress the rule against perpetuities. 1950(See In re Peck’s Estate, 96 Vt. 183 , 118 Atl. 527 ; Singhi v. Dean, 119 Me. 287 , 110 Atl. 865 ; Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115 , 15 A. [2d] 1; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 633.) *507 The construction of mandatory power exercisable upon the death of the annuitants as urged by The Queen's Hospital renders the provision of gift to the issue of Albert valid and operative so as not to transgress the rule against perpetuities. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.