ambiguous clause in Louisiana

1987Succession of Levy, 207 La. 1062 , 22 So.2d 650 (1945); Sidney v. Frosch, 413 So.2d 966 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982).

1987Succession of Levy, 207 La. 1062 , 22 So.2d 650 (1945); Sidney v. Frosch, 413 So.2d 966 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982).

2006This court has recognized that even after the jury has retired, the trial court "may recall them to correct or withdraw an erroneous instruction, to clarify an ambiguous instruction, to inform them on a point of law, which should have been covered in the original instructions, or to give such further instructions as may be appropriate." Id.

2004The court, after giving notice to the parties, may recall the jury after they have retired: (1) To correct or withdraw an erroneous instruction. (2) To clarify an ambiguous instruction. (3) To inform the jury on a point of law which should have been covered in the original instructions. (4) To give such further instructions as may be appropriate. (emphasis added) [4] Copies of the proposed jury instruction are in the record. [5] Renz v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 138 So.2d 114 (La.App. 3 Cir.1962).

1989NOTES [1] We distinguish this case from Chrisman v. Chrisman, 487 So.2d 140 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986) in which there was an ambiguous clause waiving one party's rights against the community and the trial judge found that the wife's conduct both before and after the partition indicated that she had intended to waive her rights to her husband's retirement benefits.

1987Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 401 So.2d 600 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981); see also Light v. Crowson Well Service, Inc., 313 So.2d 803 (La.1975).

1987Succession of Levy, 207 La. 1062 , 22 So.2d 650 (1945); Sidney v. Frosch, 413 So.2d 966 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982).

1983Ericksen, Krentel and Barre v. Pizzolato Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 432 So.2d 386 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).

1982Succession of Levy, 207 La. 1062 , 22 So.2d 650 (La.1945); Succession of Griffin, 366 So.2d 1029 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1979).

1975Our case is also unlike Lemon Tree of Ruston, Inc. v. Harvey, La.App.1969, 227 So.2d 177 , which treated a written provision which referred to a loan without expressly making it a condition of the buy-sell agreement; there an ambiguous written clause was construed in the light of uncontradicted parol, while here we have neither an ambiguous clause nor uncontradicted parol.

1933In the matter of Liberty Oil Company, Limited, v. Miss Mary Joy and Miss Catherine Joy, 147 So. 375 , decided by us today, we held that the lease should be construed as placing upon the tenant the obligation of paying certain paving charges recorded against the demised property, and we so held because we were of the opinion that the tenant itself had so interpreted an ambiguous clause in the lease.