8 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Christie, Mitchell and Mitchell Co. v. Selzgreen2 sentences2001Christi, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Selz , 313 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. Civ. 2001Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Selz, 313 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1958, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 42 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1931, writ ref'd); Marchman v. McCoy Hotel Operating Co., 21 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1929, no writ); Fort Worth Mut. | 2 | 2 |
Warner v. Stategreen2 sentences2009This was an ambiguous instruction, like the one given in Penry II, that, on its face, could be interpreted either as telling the jury (1) to take “mitigating evidence into account in determining their difficult standard which must be borne out by the trial record.”). 28 Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. 2009App. 2008). 29 Id. 30 Id. at 461-62 . | 1 | 1 |
Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp.green1 sentence2003Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e., 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.1985) (per curiam). *258 Issue one: Whether Lopez's September 25 Letter is Ambiguous In issue one, MPI challenges the trial court's legal conclusion that Lopez's September 25 letter, in which he stated, "I, personally, guaranty all outstandings and liabilities of Sacos Tubularies," was ambiguous. | 1 | 1 |
Marchman v. McCoy Hotel Operating Co.green1 sentence2001Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Selz, 313 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1958, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 42 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1931, writ ref'd); Marchman v. McCoy Hotel Operating Co., 21 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1929, no writ); Fort Worth Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.green1 sentence2001Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Selz, 313 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1958, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 42 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1931, writ ref'd); Marchman v. McCoy Hotel Operating Co., 21 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1929, no writ); Fort Worth Mut. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Addingtongreen1 sentence1985Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), on remand, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979), mandated that the standard for involuntary commitment in mental health cases must be the clear and convincing standard of proof. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte McManusgreen1 sentence1981Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Sup.1967); Ex Parte McManus, supra, at 793; Ex Parte Butler, 523 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ); Ex Parte Hart, 520 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1975, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re ALE
green
1 sentence2025Viewing the record as a whole, this evidence was far too weak to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude not only that Mother had used illegal substances but also that her use had risen to the level of a material and substantial change to her parental fitness or Peter’s circumstances so as to justify “the disturbing influence of re-litigation.” Knowles, 437 S.W.2d at 817 ; cf. In re L.Z.U., No. 04-21-00493-CV, 2022 WL 5047969 , at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding sufficient evidence of material and substantial change when mother admitted using multiple dru | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Knowles v. Grimes
green
1 sentence2025Viewing the record as a whole, this evidence was far too weak to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude not only that Mother had used illegal substances but also that her use had risen to the level of a material and substantial change to her parental fitness or Peter’s circumstances so as to justify “the disturbing influence of re-litigation.” Knowles, 437 S.W.2d at 817 ; cf. In re L.Z.U., No. 04-21-00493-CV, 2022 WL 5047969 , at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding sufficient evidence of material and substantial change when mother admitted using multiple dru | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Smith v. Texas
green
2 sentences2009In Penry II, the Supreme Court suggested that discussions during voir dire and closing arguments might be used to clarify that an ambiguous instruction was in fact a nullification instruction.35 In that case, the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel explained the instruction in nullification terms during voir dire, and defense counsel gave a similar explanation during closing 31 See Penry II, 532 U.S. at 798 (quoting the State’s brief; ellipses omitted). 32 Id. 33 Smith I, 543 U.S. at 47-48 ; Penry II at 799-800. 34 Smith I, 543 U.S. at 47-48 . 35 532 U.S. at 800-01 . 2009In Penry II, the Supreme Court suggested that discussions during voir dire and closing arguments might be used to clarify that an ambiguous instruction was in fact a nullification instruction.35 In that case, the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel explained the instruction in nullification terms during voir dire, and defense counsel gave a similar explanation during closing 31 See Penry II, 532 U.S. at 798 (quoting the State’s brief; ellipses omitted). 32 Id. 33 Smith I, 543 U.S. at 47-48 ; Penry II at 799-800. 34 Smith I, 543 U.S. at 47-48 . 35 532 U.S. at 800-01 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Penry v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2009In Penry II, the Supreme Court suggested that discussions during voir dire and closing arguments might be used to clarify that an ambiguous instruction was in fact a nullification instruction.35 In that case, the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel explained the instruction in nullification terms during voir dire, and defense counsel gave a similar explanation during closing 31 See Penry II, 532 U.S. at 798 (quoting the State’s brief; ellipses omitted). 32 Id. 33 Smith I, 543 U.S. at 47-48 ; Penry II at 799-800. 34 Smith I, 543 U.S. at 47-48 . 35 532 U.S. at 800-01 . 2009In Penry II, the Supreme Court suggested that discussions during voir dire and closing arguments might be used to clarify that an ambiguous instruction was in fact a nullification instruction.35 In that case, the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel explained the instruction in nullification terms during voir dire, and defense counsel gave a similar explanation during closing 31 See Penry II, 532 U.S. at 798 (quoting the State’s brief; ellipses omitted). 32 Id. 33 Smith I, 543 U.S. at 47-48 ; Penry II at 799-800. 34 Smith I, 543 U.S. at 47-48 . 35 532 U.S. at 800-01 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton
green
1 sentence2003Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e., 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.1985) (per curiam). *258 Issue one: Whether Lopez's September 25 Letter is Ambiguous In issue one, MPI challenges the trial court's legal conclusion that Lopez's September 25 letter, in which he stated, "I, personally, guaranty all outstandings and liabilities of Sacos Tubularies," was ambiguous. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences1985Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), on remand, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979), mandated that the standard for involuntary commitment in mental health cases must be the clear and convincing standard of proof. 1985Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), on remand, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979), mandated that the standard for involuntary commitment in mental health cases must be the clear and convincing standard of proof. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Fruhman v. Nawcas Benevolent Auxiliary
green
1 sentence1982Fruhman v. Nawcas Benevolent Auxiliary, 436 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ex Parte Butler
green
1 sentence1981Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Sup.1967); Ex Parte McManus, supra, at 793; Ex Parte Butler, 523 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ); Ex Parte Hart, 520 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1975, no writ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Ex Parte Hart
green
1 sentence1981Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Sup.1967); Ex Parte McManus, supra, at 793; Ex Parte Butler, 523 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ); Ex Parte Hart, 520 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1975, no writ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Ex Parte Slavin
green
1 sentence1981Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Sup.1967); Ex Parte McManus, supra, at 793; Ex Parte Butler, 523 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ); Ex Parte Hart, 520 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1975, no writ). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.