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52 California opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estelle v. McGuiregreen2 sentences2026J. “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220 ; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [“in reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution”].) “ ‘Jurors are presumed to be intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to the fact 2024“In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood or misapplied the instruction in a manner that violates the Constitution.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 906 .) That review is de novo (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ), and “[i]t is well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 (Estelle)). | 9 | 19 |
Stephen Ho v. Thomas L. Carey, Warden Attorney General of the State of Californiagreen2 sentences2014Gates v. Woodford (2003) 334 F.3d 803, 815 ]; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592 [court is not required to use the “reasonable likelihood” standard when jury instruction is not merely ambiguous, but flatly erroneous].) The United States Supreme Court set forth the reasonable likelihood standard in Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 . 2014Gates v. Woodford (2003) 334 F.3d 803, 815 ; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592 [court is not required to use the “ ‘reasonable likelihood’ ” standard when jury instruction is not merely ambiguous, but flatly erroneous].) The United States Supreme Court set forth the reasonable likelihood standard in Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 316 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 ] (Boyde). | 3 | 3 |
Melvin Meffery Wade v. Arthur Calderon, Warden of San Quentin Attorney General of Californiared2 sentences2014(Wade v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 1312, 1320-1321 [reasonable likelihood is the proper standard for determining the effect of an ambiguous instruction, but not where the instruction is unambiguous] [overruled on other grounds by Rohan ex rel. 2014(Wade v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 1312, 1320-1321 [reasonable likelihood is the proper standard for determining the effect of an ambiguous instruction, but not where the instruction is unambiguous], overruled on other grounds in Rohan ex rel. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Covarrubiasred2 sentences2024“In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood or misapplied the instruction in a manner that violates the Constitution.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 906 .) That review is de novo (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ), and “[i]t is well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 (Estelle)). 2022“In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood or misapplied the instruction in a manner that violates the Constitution.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 906 (Covarrubias).) Here, it is obvious that something is missing from the sentence which comprises the last paragraph of the instruction. 29 This is particularly clear from the written instruction, reproduced above. | 2 | 5 |
Middleton v. McNeilgreen2 sentences2016He relies on Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 , which states, “It is well established that [an] instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. [Citation.] In addition, in reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” (Accord, Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 .) Defendant contends the prosecutor made statements during closing argum 2013As with an ambiguous instruction, we ask whether there is a reasonable likelihood (Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 701 , 124 S.Ct. 1830 ]) the jury applied the instructions in a manner that deprived defendant of his constitutional rights. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Clairgreen2 sentences2013The proper focus for consideration of prior violent crimes in the penalty phase is on the facts of the defendant’s past actions as they reflect on his character, rather than on the labels to be assigned the past crimes . . . .” (Id. at p. 73.) Concerning the asserted ambiguity of the instruction, the United States Supreme Court has stated: “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction ... we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385 , 1 2013The proper focus for consideration of prior violent crimes in the penalty phase is on the facts of the defendant’s past actions as they reflect on his character, rather than on the labels to be assigned the past crimes . . . .” (Id. at p. 73.) Concerning the asserted ambiguity of the instruction, the United States Supreme Court has stated: “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction ... we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385 , 1 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2013(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ] [“in reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury *973 has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution”]; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1298 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 512 , 210 P.3d 1119 ] [same].) Defendant’s argument is untenable. 2013(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ] [“in reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury *973 has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution”]; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1298 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 512 , 210 P.3d 1119 ] [same].) Defendant’s argument is untenable. | 2 | 2 |
Boyde v. Californiagreen2 sentences2013The proper focus for consideration of prior violent crimes in the penalty phase is on the facts of the defendant‘s past actions as they reflect on his character, rather than on the labels to be assigned the past crimes . . . .‖ (Id. at p. 73.) Concerning the asserted ambiguity of the instruction, the United States Supreme Court has stated: ―[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . we inquire ‗whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way‘ that violates the constitution.‖ (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 ; People v. Clair ( 1996Thus, the trial court's instructions in this case, which did not identify or describe any target offenses, were somewhat ambiguous, because they left open the possibility that the jury might engage in unguided speculation. (8) The United States Supreme Court has held that "in reviewing an ambiguous instruction ..., we inquire `whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way' that violates the Constitution." ( Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385, 399 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ], quoting Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, | 1 | 8 |
People v. Prettymanred2 sentences2017Viewing the instructions as whole, then, the omission of the "mere presence" instruction created ambiguity as to whether merely being present constituted "conduct" as referenced in CALCRIM No. 1400. " '[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction ..., we inquire "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way" that violates the Constitution.' " ( Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 272 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827 , 926 P.2d 1013 , quoting Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 .) In a petition for rehearing, the At 2017Viewing the instructions as whole, then, the omission of the "mere presence" instruction created ambiguity as to whether merely being present constituted "conduct" as referenced in CALCRIM No. 1400. " '[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction ..., we inquire "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way" that violates the Constitution.' " ( Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 272 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827 , 926 P.2d 1013 , quoting Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 .) In a petition for rehearing, the At | 1 | 4 |
People v. Poseygreen2 sentences2024“In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood or misapplied the instruction in a manner that violates the Constitution.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 906 .) That review is de novo (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ), and “[i]t is well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 (Estelle)). 2023(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) “ ‘ “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 60 .) “ ‘When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in | 1 | 3 |
People v. Jenningsgreen2 sentences2013For example, we explained in People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 386 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 ], that “[t]he plain meaning of these instructions merely informs the jury to reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt. 2013For example, we explained in People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 386 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 ], that “[t]he plain meaning of these instructions merely informs the jury to reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2026J. “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220 ; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [“in reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution”].) “ ‘Jurors are presumed to be intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to the fact | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mooregreen1 sentence2026J. “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220 ; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [“in reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution”].) “ ‘Jurors are presumed to be intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to the fact | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2025(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 ; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [adopting that standard in California law].) “The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record . . . .’ ” ( Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579; see also Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 (per curiam) [review is of “the charge as a whole”].) When viewed in the broader context of the other instructions and the trial record, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in the manner Santiago suggests. 2025(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 ; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [adopting that standard in California law].) “The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record . . . .’ ” ( Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579; see also Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 (per curiam) [review is of “the charge as a whole”].) When viewed in the broader context of the other instructions and the trial record, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in the manner Santiago suggests. | 1 | 1 |
Zemek v. Super. Ct.green1 sentence2023(See Zemek v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 535 , 550 [“[P]etitioner suggests that a person can be found guilty of murder based on a failure to act only if there is ‘a special relationship’ between the person and the victim, which (in petitioner’s view) was lacking here. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lucasred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Livingstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Millsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pearsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jaspargreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rivasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Valdezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Collins v. Youngbloodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Avenagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bale v. San Jose Police Departmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Superior Court (Douglass)green | 1 | 1 |
| Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Eddings v. Oklahomagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Woodson v. North Carolinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lockett v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mason v. Mercury Casualty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Argonaut Insurance v. Transport Indemnity Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Jacobergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colleen Mary Rohan, Ex Rel. Oscar Gates v. Jeanne Woodford, Warden
red
2 sentences2014Gates v. Woodford (2003) 334 F.3d 803, 815 ]; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592 [court is not required to use the “reasonable likelihood” standard when jury instruction is not merely ambiguous, but flatly erroneous].) The United States Supreme Court set forth the reasonable likelihood standard in Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 . 2014Gates v. Woodford (2003) 334 F.3d 803, 815 ; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592 [court is not required to use the “ ‘reasonable likelihood’ ” standard when jury instruction is not merely ambiguous, but flatly erroneous].) The United States Supreme Court set forth the reasonable likelihood standard in Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 316 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 ] (Boyde). | 3 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Hajek and Vo
red
2 sentences2026J. “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220 ; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [“in reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution”].) “ ‘Jurors are presumed to be intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to the fact 2023(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) “ ‘ “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 60 .) “ ‘When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in | 2 | 2023–2026 |
People v. Pettie
green
2 sentences2023(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) “ ‘ “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 60 .) “ ‘When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in 2020(People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 60 .) The correctness of jury instructions is determined by looking at the context of the entire charge, not by considering only part of an instruction or a particular instruction in isolation. | 2 | 2020–2023 |
People v. Prieto
green
2 sentences2014Defendant is correct that an instructional error that affects defendant’s substantial rights may be reviewed on appeal despite the absence of an objection. (§ 1259; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247 .) We will therefore address the merits of his instructional challenge. “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction …, we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution. [Citation.]” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 , fn. omitted.) B. 2014Defendant is correct that an instructional error that affects defendant’s substantial rights may be reviewed on appeal despite the absence of an objection. (§ 1259; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247 .) We will therefore address the merits of his instructional challenge. “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction …, we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution. [Citation.]” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 , fn. omitted.) B. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Marriage of Fonstein
green
2 sentences2013(Id. at pp. 39-40.) On appeal, "[o]ur review of the trial court's interpretation of the agreement is governed by the settled rule that where extrinsic evidence has been properly admitted as an aid to the interpretation of a contract and the evidence conflicts, a reasonable 19 construction of the agreement by the trial court which is supported by substantial evidence will be upheld." (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 746-747 ; Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651 .) Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's construction if it was a reasonable construction o 2013(Winet, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 .) However, “[o]ur review of the trial court’s interpretation of the agreement is governed by the settled rule that where extrinsic evidence has been properly admitted as an aid to the interpretation of a contract and the evidence conflicts, a reasonable construction of the agreement by the trial court which is supported by substantial evidence will be upheld.” (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 746-747 ; Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651 .) Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s construction if it was a reasona | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Roddenberry v. Roddenberry
green
2 sentences2013(Id. at pp. 39-40.) On appeal, "[o]ur review of the trial court's interpretation of the agreement is governed by the settled rule that where extrinsic evidence has been properly admitted as an aid to the interpretation of a contract and the evidence conflicts, a reasonable 19 construction of the agreement by the trial court which is supported by substantial evidence will be upheld." (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 746-747 ; Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651 .) Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's construction if it was a reasonable construction o 2013(Winet, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 .) However, “[o]ur review of the trial court’s interpretation of the agreement is governed by the settled rule that where extrinsic evidence has been properly admitted as an aid to the interpretation of a contract and the evidence conflicts, a reasonable construction of the agreement by the trial court which is supported by substantial evidence will be upheld.” (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 746-747 ; Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651 .) Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s construction if it was a reasona | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Scully
green
1 sentence2026The references to unanimity in these instructions were presumably added to convey the principle that the jury as a whole may not return a verdict for a lesser included offense unless it first reaches an acquittal on the charged greater offense. [Citation.] But inserting this language into CALJIC Nos. 8.71 and 8.72, which address the role of reasonable doubt in choosing between greater and lesser homicide offenses, was unnecessary, as CALJIC No. 8.75 fully explains that the jury must unanimously agree to not guilty verdicts on the greater homicide offenses before the jury as a whole may return | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commissioner v. Clark
green
1 sentence2025(C.I.R. v. Clark (1989) 489 U.S. 726, 739 .) But the EFAA’s language is clear— not ambiguous—and Advantage advocates for a rewriting of the statute—not a narrow construction. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Letner and Tobin
green
1 sentence2024The omission of this third alternative made the instruction ambiguous.” (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 180-181 , fn. omitted.) Thus, the trial court’s finding below that the jury instructions clearly required an intent to kill was in error.4 Based on the ambiguous instruction alone, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the jury’s special circumstance true findings were necessarily predicated on a finding appellant was an aider and abettor with an intent to kill the victims. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Cortes
green
1 sentence2024We also presume the jury “understands and follows the court’s instructions.” (People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198 , 205 (Cortes).) 6 Rivas concedes that the pattern reasonable doubt instruction, CALCRIM No. 220, is a correct statement of the law. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Gentile
red
1 sentence2023(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) “ ‘ “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 60 .) “ ‘When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Navarette
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) “ ‘ “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 60 .) “ ‘When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Reynolds v. Bement
red
1 sentence2023As an initial matter, the contention is forfeited. “ ‘It is well settled that arguments ... cannot be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.’ ” 7Whether such knowledge is an element of aiding and abetting a lying- in-wait murder is not before us, and we express no opinion on the matter. 14 (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1092 , abrogated on another ground by Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 .) In any event, assuming the reasonable likelihood standard applies, it is met here. 8 “Although a defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to h | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Martinez v. Combs
green
1 sentence2023As an initial matter, the contention is forfeited. “ ‘It is well settled that arguments ... cannot be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.’ ” 7Whether such knowledge is an element of aiding and abetting a lying- in-wait murder is not before us, and we express no opinion on the matter. 14 (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1092 , abrogated on another ground by Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 .) In any event, assuming the reasonable likelihood standard applies, it is met here. 8 “Although a defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to h | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) “ ‘ “[I]n reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 60 .) “ ‘When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Rose v. Clark red | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Kalivas v. Barry Controls Corp. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Elkins v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Perry green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Watson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Iniguez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Tuggles green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Soule v. General Motors Corp. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Reyes green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Burgener red | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Winet v. Price green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Calder v. Bull green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Sovereign v. People green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Chamberlin v. Smith green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Lanphear green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Easley green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Hill green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Maughs green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.