positive rule in Tennessee

2009He specifically asserts that he has a right to confrontation in a probation revocation hearing, that an affidavit is testimonial under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), that the affidavit was inadmissible under Crawford because he was unable to cross-examine the declar-ant of the affidavit, and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311 is no longer valid because it was enacted prior to Crawford .

2009He specifically asserts that he has a right to confrontation in a probation revocation hearing, that an affidavit is testimonial under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), that the affidavit was inadmissible under Crawford because he was unable to cross-examine the declar-ant of the affidavit, and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311 is no longer valid because it was enacted prior to Crawford .

1999State 10 v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892, 898-99 (Tenn. 1996); Reece, 637 S.W.2d at 861 .

1986Crockett v. Scott, 199 Tenn. 90 , 284 S.W.2d 289 (1955); Davis v. Williams, supra. Nevertheless, the application of the Rule depends upon the interests the testator or grantor intended to create and this intention governs the construction of the instrument.

1986Crockett v. Scott, 199 Tenn. 90 , 284 S.W.2d 289 (1955); Davis v. Williams, supra. Nevertheless, the application of the Rule depends upon the interests the testator or grantor intended to create and this intention governs the construction of the instrument.

1956But that case did not do very much toward laying down a positive rule as to when a State was operating within its own sovereign right to levy a privilege tax, as now appears in the recent cases of Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 , 63 S.Ct. 1137 , 87 L.Ed. 1504 , and also Kern-Limerick, Inc., v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 , 74 S.Ct. 403 , 98 L.Ed. 546 , both of which were cited and relied on in our priginal opinion.

1956But that case did not do very much toward laying down a positive rule as to when a State was operating within its own sovereign right to levy a privilege tax, as now appears in the recent cases of Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 , 63 S.Ct. 1137 , 87 L.Ed. 1504 , and also Kern-Limerick, Inc., v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 , 74 S.Ct. 403 , 98 L.Ed. 546 , both of which were cited and relied on in our priginal opinion.

1956But that case did not do very much toward laying down a positive rule as to when a State was operating within its own sovereign right to levy a privilege tax, as now appears in the recent cases of Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 , 63 S.Ct. 1137 , 87 L.Ed. 1504 , and also Kern-Limerick, Inc., v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 , 74 S.Ct. 403 , 98 L.Ed. 546 , both of which were cited and relied on in our priginal opinion.

1956But that case did not do very much toward laying down a positive rule as to when a State was operating within its own sovereign right to levy a privilege tax, as now appears in the recent cases of Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 , 63 S.Ct. 1137 , 87 L.Ed. 1504 , and also Kern-Limerick, Inc., v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 , 74 S.Ct. 403 , 98 L.Ed. 546 , both of which were cited and relied on in our priginal opinion.

1956In Hadley v. Morris, 35 Tenn. App. 534, 547 , 249 S.W.2d 295, 301 , a case to which our attention is called by the administrator, this identical instruction, in effect, is held-to be “a positive error of law” with the statement that: “The effect of the instruction is to make the deceased child guilty of negligence for failure to stop, look and listen, regardless of the circumstances.” Certiorari was denied in that case.

1956In Hadley v. Morris, 35 Tenn. App. 534, 547 , 249 S.W.2d 295, 301 , a case to which our attention is called by the administrator, this identical instruction, in effect, is held-to be “a positive error of law” with the statement that: “The effect of the instruction is to make the deceased child guilty of negligence for failure to stop, look and listen, regardless of the circumstances.” Certiorari was denied in that case.

1929Crofford v. Cochran, 2 Sneed, 491 ; Gardner v. Quinn, 154 Tenn., 167 , 289 S. W., 513 .

1929Crofford v. Cochran, 2 Sneed, 491 ; Gardner v. Quinn, 154 Tenn., 167 , 289 S. W., 513 .

1924As stated by this court in Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. International Agricultural Corporation (1921), 146 Tenn., 451, 471 , 243 S. W., 81, 87 , amendments allowed below, “in the absence of a showing to the contrary, must be presumed to have been authorized by the chancellor in the proper exercise of his legal discretion and in furtherance of justice.” (b)* But the more serious contention remains to be considered, viz., the insistence that the sworn answer, instead of relying on the parol sale, makes a positive claim of ownership in the defendant’s lessor under registered color of title.

1924As stated by this court in Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. International Agricultural Corporation (1921), 146 Tenn., 451, 471 , 243 S. W., 81, 87 , amendments allowed below, “in the absence of a showing to the contrary, must be presumed to have been authorized by the chancellor in the proper exercise of his legal discretion and in furtherance of justice.” (b)* But the more serious contention remains to be considered, viz., the insistence that the sworn answer, instead of relying on the parol sale, makes a positive claim of ownership in the defendant’s lessor under registered color of title.

1891The contrary has been held so far as it relates to the violation of a positive rule of civil law, which proximately leads to the injury, when it is such an act as increased the risk and naturally led to the death. 97 Ind., 478 .