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19 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1868–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grant v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010Melendez-Diaz , — U.S. at---, 129 S.Ct. at 2531-32 ; see Grant v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 714, 719-20 , 682 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2009) (applying Melendez-Diaz to hold that the attestation clause on a certificate of breath analysis is testimonial in nature and that its admission in the face of a proper objection, without providing an opportunity for cross-examination of the attestor, constituted a violation of the Confrontation Clause). 2010In Grant v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the attestation clause contained in a certificate of breath analysis was testimonial under Melendez-Diaz, 54 Va. App. 714, 720 (2009). | 2 | 3 |
Anderson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1999Any such certificate of analysis purporting to be signed by a person authorized by the Division shall be admissible in evidence without proof of seal or signature of the person whose name is signed to it---- Interpreting this statute in Anderson , we rejected the contention that the certificate at issue, which contained the same relevant wording in the attestation clause, was inadmissible because the person administering the test had no personal knowledge of the machine’s performance testing. 25 Va.App. at 31 , 486 S.E.2d at 117 ; see id. at 34 n. 3, 486 S.E.2d at 119 n. 3 (Benton, J., dissent 1999Any such certificate of analysis purporting to be signed by a person authorized by the Division shall be admissible in evidence without proof of seal or signature of the person whose name is signed to it---- Interpreting this statute in Anderson , we rejected the contention that the certificate at issue, which contained the same relevant wording in the attestation clause, was inadmissible because the person administering the test had no personal knowledge of the machine’s performance testing. 25 Va.App. at 31 , 486 S.E.2d at 117 ; see id. at 34 n. 3, 486 S.E.2d at 119 n. 3 (Benton, J., dissent | 2 | 2 |
Aguilar v. Com.green1 sentence2025Our own Supreme Court has reiterated that conclusion, also noting that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that every person who had some role in performing a forensic analysis, or whose work upon which the ultimate conclusions depend, testify at trial.” Aguilar v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 322, 335 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Presbyterian Orphans' Home v. Bowmangreen1 sentence2025See Presbyterian Orphans Home v. Bowman, 165 Va. 484, 490 (1935) (noting that it was “unimportant” to the validity of the will that the signatures of the testator and the witnesses appeared after the will’s attestation clause). | 1 | 1 |
Magruder v. Com.green2 sentences2009In Magruder , our Supreme Court clarified that a criminal defendant could “insur[e] the physical presence of the forensic analysts at trial” under Code § 19.2-187.1 “by issuing summons for their appearance at the Commonwealth’s cost, or asking the trial court or Commonwealth to do so.” Magruder, 275 Va. at 298 , 657 S.E.2d at 120-21 (emphasis added). 2009In Magruder , our Supreme Court clarified that a criminal defendant could “insur[e] the physical presence of the forensic analysts at trial” under Code § 19.2-187.1 “by issuing summons for their appearance at the Commonwealth’s cost, or asking the trial court or Commonwealth to do so.” Magruder, 275 Va. at 298 , 657 S.E.2d at 120-21 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Copeland v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2009While we are not obliged to accept the Commonwealth’s concession of legal error, see Copeland v. Commonwealth, 52 Va.App. 529, 531 , 664 S.E.2d 528, 529 (2008), we agree with the Commonwealth in this case: the attestation clause is testimonial under the holding of Melendez-Diaz, 4 and Grant complied with the requirements of Code § 19.2-187.1. 2009While we are not obliged to accept the Commonwealth’s concession of legal error, see Copeland v. Commonwealth, 52 Va.App. 529, 531 , 664 S.E.2d 528, 529 (2008), we agree with the Commonwealth in this case: the attestation clause is testimonial under the holding of Melendez-Diaz, 4 and Grant complied with the requirements of Code § 19.2-187.1. | 1 | 1 |
Gray v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997Cf. Gray v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945 , 265 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1980); Frere v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 460, 465 , 452 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1995) (“[I]n order to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, a certificate introduced under [a similar statute] must bear the examiner’s signature as part of an attestation clause included on the certificate.”). 1997Cf. Gray v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945 , 265 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1980); Frere v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 460, 465 , 452 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1995) (“[I]n order to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, a certificate introduced under [a similar statute] must bear the examiner’s signature as part of an attestation clause included on the certificate.”). | 1 | 1 |
Frere v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997Cf. Gray v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945 , 265 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1980); Frere v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 460, 465 , 452 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1995) (“[I]n order to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, a certificate introduced under [a similar statute] must bear the examiner’s signature as part of an attestation clause included on the certificate.”). 1997Cf. Gray v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945 , 265 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1980); Frere v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 460, 465 , 452 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1995) (“[I]n order to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, a certificate introduced under [a similar statute] must bear the examiner’s signature as part of an attestation clause included on the certificate.”). | 1 | 1 |
Redford v. Bookergreen2 sentences1940See also, Redford v. Booker, 166 Va. 561 , 185 S. E. 879 . 1940See also, Redford v. Booker, 166 Va. 561 , 185 S. E. 879 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Unis v. Charlton's adm'r
green
2 sentences1868In Butts v. Blunt, 1 Rand. 255 , and Unis & al. v. Charlton’s adm’r, 12 Gratt. 484 , cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, there was no proof that any commission existed. 1868In Butts v. Blunt, 1 Rand. 255 , and Unis & al. v. Charlton’s adm’r, 12 Gratt. 484 , cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, there was no proof that any commission existed. | 3 | 1868–1868 |
Butts v. Blunt
neutral
2 sentences1868In Butts v. Blunt, 1 Rand. 255 , and Unis & al. v. Charlton’s adm’r, 12 Gratt. 484 , cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, there was no proof that any commission existed. 1868In Butts v. Blunt, 1 Rand. 255 , and Unis & al. v. Charlton’s adm’r, 12 Gratt. 484 , cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, there was no proof that any commission existed. | 3 | 1868–1868 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2025We held that the attestation clause on the certificate of analysis “was designed to be used exactly like the certificate at issue in Melendez-Diaz--to prove facts essential to the prosecution that would - 13 - As the Supreme Court stated in Melendez-Diaz, not “anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.” 557 U.S. at 311 n.1 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Wimbish v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2009We note that this case is very different from Wimbish, 51 Va.App. 474 , 658 S.E.2d 715 , where we rejected a Crawford challenge to the admission of, inter alia, the attestation clause on a certificate of analysis. 2009We note that this case is very different from Wimbish, 51 Va.App. 474 , 658 S.E.2d 715 , where we rejected a Crawford challenge to the admission of, inter alia, the attestation clause on a certificate of analysis. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2006In addition, the attestation clause is a statement that the breath test operator “would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Crawford, supra, at 51 . 2006In addition, the attestation clause is a statement that the breath test operator “would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Crawford, supra, at 51 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006The answer depends upon whether the attestation clause is deemed “testimonial.” 2 Although a panel of the Court of Appeals decided this precise issue in Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 460 , 618 S.E.2d 347 (2005), the full Court sitting en banc withdrew the panel opinion and substituted its opinion in Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 58 , 628 S.E.2d 74 (2006), which assumed “without deciding that (1) the breath analysis result and (2) the accompanying certificate were ‘testimonial’ and their introduction in evidence, despite Code § 18.2-268.9, was constitutional error under Crawfo 2006The answer depends upon whether the attestation clause is deemed “testimonial.” 2 Although a panel of the Court of Appeals decided this precise issue in Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 460 , 618 S.E.2d 347 (2005), the full Court sitting en banc withdrew the panel opinion and substituted its opinion in Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 58 , 628 S.E.2d 74 (2006), which assumed “without deciding that (1) the breath analysis result and (2) the accompanying certificate were ‘testimonial’ and their introduction in evidence, despite Code § 18.2-268.9, was constitutional error under Crawfo | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006The answer depends upon whether the attestation clause is deemed “testimonial.” 2 Although a panel of the Court of Appeals decided this precise issue in Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 460 , 618 S.E.2d 347 (2005), the full Court sitting en banc withdrew the panel opinion and substituted its opinion in Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 58 , 628 S.E.2d 74 (2006), which assumed “without deciding that (1) the breath analysis result and (2) the accompanying certificate were ‘testimonial’ and their introduction in evidence, despite Code § 18.2-268.9, was constitutional error under Crawfo 2006The answer depends upon whether the attestation clause is deemed “testimonial.” 2 Although a panel of the Court of Appeals decided this precise issue in Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 460 , 618 S.E.2d 347 (2005), the full Court sitting en banc withdrew the panel opinion and substituted its opinion in Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 58 , 628 S.E.2d 74 (2006), which assumed “without deciding that (1) the breath analysis result and (2) the accompanying certificate were ‘testimonial’ and their introduction in evidence, despite Code § 18.2-268.9, was constitutional error under Crawfo | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gooch v. Gooch
green
2 sentences2006The assignments of error in Gooch also did not challenge the admission at trial of an attestation clause to probate that was not wholly in the testator's handwriting. 134 Va. at 30 , 113 S.E. at 876 . 2006The assignments of error in Gooch also did not challenge the admission at trial of an attestation clause to probate that was not wholly in the testator's handwriting. 134 Va. at 30 , 113 S.E. at 876 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ransom v. Sigler
green
1 sentence1948In accord, see also, In re Bybee’s Estate, 179 Iowa 1089 , 160 N. W. 900 ; Merrill v. Boal, 47 R. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Love v. Gibbs
neutral
2 sentences1948In Love v. Gibbs, 273 Ky. 775 , 117 S. W. (2d) 987 , it was held that the dual intent of a, person signing an attestation clause to serve both as a witness and as scrivener for testator would not invalidate the execution of the will. 1948In Love v. Gibbs, 273 Ky. 775 , 117 S. W. (2d) 987 , it was held that the dual intent of a, person signing an attestation clause to serve both as a witness and as scrivener for testator would not invalidate the execution of the will. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Lucas v. Brown
green
2 sentences1935McCue v. Turner, 252 Ky. 849 , 68 S. W. (2d) 415 ; Lucas v. Brown, 187 Ky. 502 , 219 S. W. 796 ; Stone v. Holden (In re Norris), 221 Mich. 430 , 191 N. W. 238 , 29 A. L. 1935McCue v. Turner, 252 Ky. 849 , 68 S. W. (2d) 415 ; Lucas v. Brown, 187 Ky. 502 , 219 S. W. 796 ; Stone v. Holden (In re Norris), 221 Mich. 430 , 191 N. W. 238 , 29 A. L. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Stone v. Holden
green
2 sentences1935McCue v. Turner, 252 Ky. 849 , 68 S. W. (2d) 415 ; Lucas v. Brown, 187 Ky. 502 , 219 S. W. 796 ; Stone v. Holden (In re Norris), 221 Mich. 430 , 191 N. W. 238 , 29 A. L. 1935McCue v. Turner, 252 Ky. 849 , 68 S. W. (2d) 415 ; Lucas v. Brown, 187 Ky. 502 , 219 S. W. 796 ; Stone v. Holden (In re Norris), 221 Mich. 430 , 191 N. W. 238 , 29 A. L. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
McCue v. Turner
green
2 sentences1935McCue v. Turner, 252 Ky. 849 , 68 S. W. (2d) 415 ; Lucas v. Brown, 187 Ky. 502 , 219 S. W. 796 ; Stone v. Holden (In re Norris), 221 Mich. 430 , 191 N. W. 238 , 29 A. L. 1935McCue v. Turner, 252 Ky. 849 , 68 S. W. (2d) 415 ; Lucas v. Brown, 187 Ky. 502 , 219 S. W. 796 ; Stone v. Holden (In re Norris), 221 Mich. 430 , 191 N. W. 238 , 29 A. L. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Savage v. Bowen
green
2 sentences1935In Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540 , 49 S. E. 668, 671 , Judge Harrison said: “In the matter of executing a will, the statutory requirements must be complied with, but substance must not be sacrificed to form, and the end of the law to the means used for attaining it.” It is perfectly true that some fraudulent provision might have been.inserted above the attestation clause. 1935In Savage v. Bowen, 103 Va. 540 , 49 S. E. 668, 671 , Judge Harrison said: “In the matter of executing a will, the statutory requirements must be complied with, but substance must not be sacrificed to form, and the end of the law to the means used for attaining it.” It is perfectly true that some fraudulent provision might have been.inserted above the attestation clause. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Martin v. Martin
green
2 sentences1934If so noted, this supports the resulting inference of fact that they are part of the will; if not, absence of the notation may or may not be suspicious, depending on the extent of formality and care that seems to have been observed; and the changes may be, in themselves, suspicious enough to indicate that they were made later, or so natural and probable as to support the contrary inference.’ “See, also, upon this question Martin v. Martin (1929), 334 Ill. 115 , 165 N. E. 644 , 67 A. L. 1934If so noted, this supports the resulting inference of fact that they are part of the will; if not, absence of the notation may or may not be suspicious, depending on the extent of formality and care that seems to have been observed; and the changes may be, in themselves, suspicious enough to indicate that they were made later, or so natural and probable as to support the contrary inference.’ “See, also, upon this question Martin v. Martin (1929), 334 Ill. 115 , 165 N. E. 644 , 67 A. L. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Starkweather v. Martin
green
1 sentence1895In the case of Starkweather v. Martin, 28 Mich. 471 , the court, of which Judges Cooley and Christiancy were members, decided that where an instrument is recorded by the proper officer, and in the appropriate place for recording deeds, under a law permitting the registry of sealed instruments only, and the instrument is in the form of a warranty deed, purporting to be acknowledged and dated at a time when it was the common and lawful course to seal conveyances, and contrary to official duty to take the acknowledgment unless the instrument was sealed, and where the conclusion, attestation claus | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Brown's Ex'r. v. Tilden
neutral
1 sentence1888But if the question to be determined is as to the finality of intention, what presumption of this sort could a court discover when the whole will, standing alone, and considered as a whole, indicated and exhibited a complete achievement of every purpose manifested therein; and so the same court which decided the case of Devecmon v. Devecmon had already rendered a deci sion sustaining a will, with an unattested attestation clause, the intention of the testator being complete, so far as the will manifested any intention, without the attestation clause either signed or unsigned by witnesses, (Bro | 1 | 1888–1888 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.