age discrimination claim in Washington

2017App. 850, 862 , 200 P.3d 764 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted)(alterations in original)(quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 181-82 , 23 P.3d 440 (2001), overruled on other grounds by McClartv. v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214 , 137 P.3d 844 (2006)).

2005Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 188 , 23 P.3d 440 (2001); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 362 , 753 P.2d 517 (1988). 5 ¶16 Once the employee presents a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination exists and the employer must produce evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination.

2017App. 850, 862 , 200 P.3d 764 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted)(alterations in original)(quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 181-82 , 23 P.3d 440 (2001), overruled on other grounds by McClartv. v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214 , 137 P.3d 844 (2006)).

2005Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 188 , 23 P.3d 440 (2001); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 362 , 753 P.2d 517 (1988). 5 ¶16 Once the employee presents a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination exists and the employer must produce evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination.

2005App. 183, 189 , 937 P.2d 612 , review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1020 (1997). 4 In an age discrimination claim, the protected class is individuals between 40 and 70 years of age, but the employee is not required to show that he was replaced by someone outside that range; he need only show that he was replaced by someone significantly younger.

2005McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Chen v. State, 86 Wash.App. 183, 189 , 937 P.2d 612 , review denied, 133 Wash.2d 1020 , 948 P.2d 387 (1997). [4] In an age discrimination claim, the *1070 protected class is individuals between 40 and 70 years of age, but the employee is not required to show that he was replaced by someone outside that range; he need only show that he was replaced by someone significantly younger.

2005Although the Ninth Circuit's decision might be criticized as not necessarily flowing from Gilmer in that it may have blurred the issue of compulsory arbitration with the issue of compelling an employee to enter into an arbitration agreement, its result nevertheless appears to be correct given the logic of Gilmer and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 , 121 S.Ct. 1302 , 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001).

2005Although the Ninth Circuit's decision might be criticized as not necessarily flowing from Gilmer in that it may have blurred the issue of compulsory arbitration with the issue of compelling an employee to enter into an arbitration agreement, its result nevertheless appears to be correct given the logic of Gilmer and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 , 121 S.Ct. 1302 , 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001).

2005"The discovery rule does not require knowledge of the existence of a legal cause of action itself, but merely knowledge of the facts necessary to establish the elements of the claim." Douchette, 117 Wash.2d at 814 , 818 P.2d 1362 . [3] In Douchette, 117 Wash.2d at 813-15 , 818 P.2d 1362 , we declined to apply a discovery rule to an age discrimination claim under chapter 49.60 RCW. [4] While the Court in Morgan declined to rule on whether a "discovery rule" of accrual would apply as to a discrete act, Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 n. 7, 122 S.Ct. 2061 its discussion of that matter is unrelated to its

2005"The discovery rule does not require knowledge of the existence of a legal cause of action itself, but merely knowledge of the facts necessary to establish the elements of the claim." Douchette, 117 Wash.2d at 814 , 818 P.2d 1362 . [3] In Douchette, 117 Wash.2d at 813-15 , 818 P.2d 1362 , we declined to apply a discovery rule to an age discrimination claim under chapter 49.60 RCW. [4] While the Court in Morgan declined to rule on whether a "discovery rule" of accrual would apply as to a discrete act, Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 n. 7, 122 S.Ct. 2061 its discussion of that matter is unrelated to its

2005"The discovery rule does not require knowledge of the existence of a legal cause of action itself, but merely knowledge of the facts necessary to establish the elements of the claim." Douchette, 117 Wash.2d at 814 , 818 P.2d 1362 . [3] In Douchette, 117 Wash.2d at 813-15 , 818 P.2d 1362 , we declined to apply a discovery rule to an age discrimination claim under chapter 49.60 RCW. [4] While the Court in Morgan declined to rule on whether a "discovery rule" of accrual would apply as to a discrete act, Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 n. 7, 122 S.Ct. 2061 its discussion of that matter is unrelated to its

2005"The discovery rule does not require knowledge of the existence of a legal cause of action itself, but merely knowledge of the facts necessary to establish the elements of the claim." Douchette, 117 Wash.2d at 814 , 818 P.2d 1362 . [3] In Douchette, 117 Wash.2d at 813-15 , 818 P.2d 1362 , we declined to apply a discovery rule to an age discrimination claim under chapter 49.60 RCW. [4] While the Court in Morgan declined to rule on whether a "discovery rule" of accrual would apply as to a discrete act, Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 n. 7, 122 S.Ct. 2061 its discussion of that matter is unrelated to its

2004The Court observed, in a passage relied on by Zuver, that “ ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ ” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 , 105 S. Ct. 3346 , 87 L.

2004The Court observed, in a passage relied on by Zuver, that "`[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.'" Gilmer , 500 U.S. at 26 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 , 105 S.Ct. 3346 , 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)).

2004The Court observed, in a passage relied on by Zuver, that “ ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ ” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 , 105 S. Ct. 3346 , 87 L.

2004The Court observed, in a passage relied on by Zuver, that “ ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ ” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 , 105 S. Ct. 3346 , 87 L.

2001See Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 361-63 , 753 P.2d 517 (1988) (adopting the McDonnell test in an age discrimination claim under RCW 49.60.180); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 136 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989) (extending Grimwood to common law termination claims).

2001See Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 361-63 , 753 P.2d 517 (1988) (adopting the McDonnell test in an age discrimination claim under RCW 49.60.180); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 136 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989) (extending Grimwood to common law termination claims).

2017App. 850, 862 , 200 P.3d 764 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted)(alterations in original)(quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 181-82 , 23 P.3d 440 (2001), overruled on other grounds by McClartv. v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214 , 137 P.3d 844 (2006)).

2017App. 850, 862 , 200 P.3d 764 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted)(alterations in original)(quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 181-82 , 23 P.3d 440 (2001), overruled on other grounds by McClartv. v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214 , 137 P.3d 844 (2006)).

2017App. 850, 862 , 200 P.3d 764 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted)(alterations in original)(quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 181-82 , 23 P.3d 440 (2001), overruled on other grounds by McClartv. v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214 , 137 P.3d 844 (2006)).

2017App. at 818 . - 21 - No. 74367-8-1/22 To survive summary judgment on an age discrimination claim when an employer presents "admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse employment action sufficient to raise[]a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the defendant] discriminated against the plaintiff,'" the employee must "show that[defendant's] stated reason for [the adverse action] was in fact pretext." Dumont v. City of Seattle, 148 Wn.

2015Lodis, 172 Wn.

2014Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 44-45 , 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (looking to federal cases interpreting Title VII and the ADA to determine whether the WLAD supports a disability claim based on a hostile work environment); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 361-62 , 753 P.2d 517 (1988) (looking to federal cases interpreting the ADEA to determine criteria for establishing an age discrimination claim under the WLAD); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wn.2d 368, 376-82 , 610 P.2d 857 , 621 P.2d 1293 (1980) (looking to federal case law interpreting Title VII to determine the extent of

2014See Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 143 Wn.2d 349, 359 , 20 P.3d 921 (2001) (noting that the WLAD covers a broader range of employers than does Title VII); Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357, 372-73 , 971 P.2d 45 (1999) (noting that the WLAD’s express liberal interpretation mandate and greater damages provisions distinguish it from Title VII); Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 110-11 , 922 P.2d 43 (1996) (finding that the WLAD creates a cause of action for discrimination against independent contractors on the basis of sex, race, national origin, religion, or disability, partly on

2014See Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 143 Wn.2d 349, 359 , 20 P.3d 921 (2001) (noting that the WLAD covers a broader range of employers than does Title VII); Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357, 372-73 , 971 P.2d 45 (1999) (noting that the WLAD’s express liberal interpretation mandate and greater damages provisions distinguish it from Title VII); Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 110-11 , 922 P.2d 43 (1996) (finding that the WLAD creates a cause of action for discrimination against independent contractors on the basis of sex, race, national origin, religion, or disability, partly on

2014See Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 143 Wn.2d 349, 359 , 20 P.3d 921 (2001) (noting that the WLAD covers a broader range of employers than does Title VII); Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357, 372-73 , 971 P.2d 45 (1999) (noting that the WLAD’s express liberal interpretation mandate and greater damages provisions distinguish it from Title VII); Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 110-11 , 922 P.2d 43 (1996) (finding that the WLAD creates a cause of action for discrimination against independent contractors on the basis of sex, race, national origin, religion, or disability, partly on

2014Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 44-45 , 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (looking to federal cases interpreting Title VII and the ADA to determine whether the WLAD supports a disability claim based on a hostile work environment); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 361-62 , 753 P.2d 517 (1988) (looking to federal cases interpreting the ADEA to determine criteria for establishing an age discrimination claim under the WLAD); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wn.2d 368, 376-82 , 610 P.2d 857 , 621 P.2d 1293 (1980) (looking to federal case law interpreting Title VII to determine the extent of

2014Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 44-45 , 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (looking to federal cases interpreting Title VII and the ADA to determine whether the WLAD supports a disability claim based on a hostile work environment); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 361-62 , 753 P.2d 517 (1988) (looking to federal cases interpreting the ADEA to determine criteria for establishing an age discrimination claim under the WLAD); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wn.2d 368, 376-82 , 610 P.2d 857 , 621 P.2d 1293 (1980) (looking to federal case law interpreting Title VII to determine the extent of

2014Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 44-45 , 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (looking to federal cases interpreting Title VII and the ADA to determine whether the WLAD supports a disability claim based on a hostile work environment); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 361-62 , 753 P.2d 517 (1988) (looking to federal cases interpreting the ADEA to determine criteria for establishing an age discrimination claim under the WLAD); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wn.2d 368, 376-82 , 610 P.2d 857 , 621 P.2d 1293 (1980) (looking to federal case law interpreting Title VII to determine the extent of

2014See Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 143 Wn.2d 349, 359 , 20 P.3d 921 (2001) (noting that the WLAD covers a broader range of employers than does Title VII); Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357, 372-73 , 971 P.2d 45 (1999) (noting that the WLAD’s express liberal interpretation mandate and greater damages provisions distinguish it from Title VII); Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 110-11 , 922 P.2d 43 (1996) (finding that the WLAD creates a cause of action for discrimination against independent contractors on the basis of sex, race, national origin, religion, or disability, partly on

2005McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Chen v. State, 86 Wash.App. 183, 189 , 937 P.2d 612 , review denied, 133 Wash.2d 1020 , 948 P.2d 387 (1997). [4] In an age discrimination claim, the *1070 protected class is individuals between 40 and 70 years of age, but the employee is not required to show that he was replaced by someone outside that range; he need only show that he was replaced by someone significantly younger.

2005McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Chen v. State, 86 Wash.App. 183, 189 , 937 P.2d 612 , review denied, 133 Wash.2d 1020 , 948 P.2d 387 (1997). [4] In an age discrimination claim, the *1070 protected class is individuals between 40 and 70 years of age, but the employee is not required to show that he was replaced by someone outside that range; he need only show that he was replaced by someone significantly younger.

2002Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation asks this court to answer the certified question in the affirmative, citing gratuitous language by the court in Human Rights Commission v. Cheney School District Number 30, 97 Wash.2d 118 , 641 P.2d 163 (1982) which, without discussion, stated that the petitioner could sue for damages for age discrimination under RCW 49.60.030. [20] This court in Cheney did observe that the Legislature has provided no authority for the Washington State Human Rights Commission to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering, but that "[a]

2002Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation asks this court to answer the certified question in the affirmative, citing gratuitous language by the court in Human Rights Commission v. Cheney School District Number 30, 97 Wash.2d 118 , 641 P.2d 163 (1982) which, without discussion, stated that the petitioner could sue for damages for age discrimination under RCW 49.60.030. [20] This court in Cheney did observe that the Legislature has provided no authority for the Washington State Human Rights Commission to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering, but that "[a]

1999Carle v. McChord Credit Union, 65 Wn.

1991Allison, 59 Wn.