10 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1995–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Commission against Discriminationgreen2 sentences2008Wynn & Wynn v. Massachusetts Comm. Against Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 665 (2000) (rev’d in part on other grounds). 2003Ibid. | 1 | 2 |
Sahli v. Bull HN Information Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2012Sys., Inc., 437 Mass. 696, 700 (2002), where an employer brought a declaratory judgment action against a former employee who, after signing a release of liability, had brought an age discrimination claim against the employer. | 1 | 1 |
Lorillard v. Ponsgreen2 sentences2004In a similar vein, Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., supra at 123, cites Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 954 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), which likened an age discrimination claim to “an action in tort.” The Supreme Court’s affirmance, however, rested instead on statutory grounds, concluding that Congress intentionally conferred a right to jury trial for such claims, again taking pains to distinguish such claims from claims brought under Title VII. 2004Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-585 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Frances P. PONS, Appellant, v. LORILLARD, a Division of Loew’s Theatres, Inc., Appelleegreen1 sentence2004In a similar vein, Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., supra at 123, cites Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 954 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), which likened an age discrimination claim to “an action in tort.” The Supreme Court’s affirmance, however, rested instead on statutory grounds, concluding that Congress intentionally conferred a right to jury trial for such claims, again taking pains to distinguish such claims from claims brought under Title VII. | 1 | 1 |
Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, Inc.green1 sentence2003See Dalis, supra, at 224-226 . | 1 | 1 |
Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc.green1 sentence2001Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 582-83 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Comfort v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutegreen1 sentence1995Comfort v. Rensselaer Polytech Institute, 575 F.Supp. 258, 260 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Knight v. Avon Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009We have said that, in evaluating a motion for summary judgment on an age discrimination claim, the three-stage order of proof set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), provides a “useful framework.” Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413 , 420 n.4 (2003). 2008Knight, 438 Mass. at 423 . | 2 | 2008–2009 |
Ciszewski v. Industrial Accident Board
green
1 sentence2012Furthermore, exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally only considered futile “where the power and authority of the agency themselves are in question, and not where the exercise of that agency’s discretion is challenged.” Ciszewski v. Industrial Acc. Bd., supra. Because the ministerial exception would not divest the commission of jurisdiction over Hilsenrath’s complaint, see Hosanna-Tabor, supra at 709-710 n.4, the Temple’s challenge is to the commission’s evaluation of an affirmative defense rather than its authority to adjudicate the complaint. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
1 sentence2009We have said that, in evaluating a motion for summary judgment on an age discrimination claim, the three-stage order of proof set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), provides a “useful framework.” Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413 , 420 n.4 (2003). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Nei v. Burley
green
1 sentence2003Yet, while the silence of the Legislature was one factor that the Supreme Judicial Court considered in concluding that there was no right to a jury trial in a Consumer Protection Action under G.L.c. 93A, see Nei v. Burley, supra, at 315 , such silence did not prevent the Court from holding that such a right existed in an action alleging gender discrimination in employment under G.L.C. 151B, §4 even though in the same chapter the Legislature expressly provided for a jury trial in an age discrimination claim. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Wheatley v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
green
1 sentence2001Id. at 397 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998This Court need not decide for purposes of this decision whether the more recent decision in Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122 (1997), has effectively amended the “pretext-only” test declared two years earlier in Blare . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.