directed verdict claim in Alabama

1984Aetna incorrectly reads the case of National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d 1357 (Ala.1982), as requiring an application of the directed verdict test in every bad faith case.

1984In Vintson , this court, citing National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton, supra , applied the directed verdict test in determining that the plaintiff's bad faith claim was improperly submitted to the jury.

1991Thomas v. Principal Financial Group, 566 So.2d 735 (Ala.1990) (citing Justice Jones’s special concurring opinion in Safeco Ins.

1991Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1987)] nor the instant case should be read as weakening the application of the directed verdict test in a bad faith claim context." 461 So.2d at 810 .

1991In order for Ms. Grose to prevail on her AEMLD claim, she must prove, among other things, that she "suffered injury or damages . . . [caused] by one who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford , 406 So.2d 854 , 855 (Ala. 1981); Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc. , 335 So.2d 128 (Ala. 1976).

1991In order for Ms. Grose to prevail on her AEMLD claim, she must prove, among other things, that she "suffered injury or damages ... [caused] by one who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So.2d 854, 855 (Ala.1981); Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (Ala.1976).

1988Aetna Life Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lavoie , 470 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1984), judgment vacated, 475 U.S. 813 , 106 S.Ct. 1580 , 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Barnes , 405 So.2d 916 (Ala. 1981).

1988Aetna Life Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lavoie , 470 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1984), judgment vacated, 475 U.S. 813 , 106 S.Ct. 1580 , 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Barnes , 405 So.2d 916 (Ala. 1981).

1988Aetna Life Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lavoie , 470 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1984), judgment vacated, 475 U.S. 813 , 106 S.Ct. 1580 , 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Barnes , 405 So.2d 916 (Ala. 1981).

1988Aetna Life Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lavoie , 470 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1984), judgment vacated, 475 U.S. 813 , 106 S.Ct. 1580 , 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Barnes , 405 So.2d 916 (Ala. 1981).

1987Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Campbell , 485 So.2d 312 (Ala. 1986).

1986Moreover, defendants contend the duty to warn, if such does exist in the instant case, is met when those warnings were transmitted to the Birmingham Police Department, plaintiff's employer: "A directed verdict on this claim was proper because under Alabama law whenever a third party has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition in the workplace that duty is discharged by informing the employer of the dangerous condition — warning to each of the employer's individual employees who may be threatened by the dangerous condition then becomes the responsibility of the employer. [Emphasis supplied in d

1986Moreover, defendants contend the duty to warn, if such does exist in the instant case, is met when those warnings were transmitted to the Birmingham Police Department, plaintiff's employer: "A directed verdict on this claim was proper because under Alabama law whenever a third party has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition in the workplace that duty is discharged by informing the employer of the dangerous condition — warning to each of the employer's individual employees who may be threatened by the dangerous condition then becomes the responsibility of the employer. [Emphasis supplied in d

1986Moreover, defendants contend the duty to warn, if such does exist in the instant case, is met when those warnings were transmitted to the Birmingham Police Department, plaintiff's employer: "A directed verdict on this claim was proper because under Alabama law whenever a third party has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition in the workplace that duty is discharged by informing the employer of the dangerous condition—warning to each of the employer's individual employees who may be threatened by the dangerous condition then becomes the responsibility of the employer. [Emphasis supplied in def

1986Moreover, defendants contend the duty to warn, if such does exist in the instant case, is met when those warnings were transmitted to the Birmingham Police Department, plaintiff's employer: "A directed verdict on this claim was proper because under Alabama law whenever a third party has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition in the workplace that duty is discharged by informing the employer of the dangerous condition — warning to each of the employer's individual employees who may be threatened by the dangerous condition then becomes the responsibility of the employer. [Emphasis supplied in d

1986Moreover, defendants contend the duty to warn, if such does exist in the instant case, is met when those warnings were transmitted to the Birmingham Police Department, plaintiff's employer: "A directed verdict on this claim was proper because under Alabama law whenever a third party has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition in the workplace that duty is discharged by informing the employer of the dangerous condition—warning to each of the employer's individual employees who may be threatened by the dangerous condition then becomes the responsibility of the employer. [Emphasis supplied in def

1986Moreover, defendants contend the duty to warn, if such does exist in the instant case, is met when those warnings were transmitted to the Birmingham Police Department, plaintiff's employer: "A directed verdict on this claim was proper because under Alabama law whenever a third party has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition in the workplace that duty is discharged by informing the employer of the dangerous condition — warning to each of the employer's individual employees who may be threatened by the dangerous condition then becomes the responsibility of the employer. [Emphasis supplied in d

1985Ritch v. Waldrop , 428 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1982).

1984Latham argued that he had presented evidence "more than sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the defendants knew or should have known about the dangerous condition that existed in an area over which they exercised control, and thus [that] the granting of the directed verdict was error." Latham, supra , 435 So.2d at 213 .

1984Latham argued that he had presented evidence "more than sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the defendants knew or should have known about the dangerous condition that existed in an area over which they exercised control, and thus [that] the granting of the directed verdict was error." Latham, supra , 435 So.2d at 213 .

1983The trial court properly followed Valley Mining Corp., Inc. v. Metro Bank, 383 So.2d 158 (Ala.1980), in holding that the bank would have the right to a deficiency judgment following a sale of the collateral in a commercially unreasonable fashion, and that the appellees would be entitled to set off against the deficiency judgment any damages resulting to them because of the commercially unreasonable sale.

1981Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 217 Ala. 621 , 117 So. 72 (1928).

1981Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 217 Ala. 621 , 117 So. 72 (1928).

1979Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Collins , 280 Ala. 373 , 194 So.2d 532 (1967); Williams v. Palmer , 277 Ala. 188 , 168 So.2d 220 (1964); Davis v. Birmingham Electric Co. , 250 Ala. 98 , 33 So.2d 355 (1948).

1979Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Collins , 280 Ala. 373 , 194 So.2d 532 (1967); Williams v. Palmer , 277 Ala. 188 , 168 So.2d 220 (1964); Davis v. Birmingham Electric Co. , 250 Ala. 98 , 33 So.2d 355 (1948).

1979Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Collins , 280 Ala. 373 , 194 So.2d 532 (1967); Williams v. Palmer , 277 Ala. 188 , 168 So.2d 220 (1964); Davis v. Birmingham Electric Co. , 250 Ala. 98 , 33 So.2d 355 (1948).

1979Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Collins , 280 Ala. 373 , 194 So.2d 532 (1967); Williams v. Palmer , 277 Ala. 188 , 168 So.2d 220 (1964); Davis v. Birmingham Electric Co. , 250 Ala. 98 , 33 So.2d 355 (1948).

1979Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Collins , 280 Ala. 373 , 194 So.2d 532 (1967); Williams v. Palmer , 277 Ala. 188 , 168 So.2d 220 (1964); Davis v. Birmingham Electric Co. , 250 Ala. 98 , 33 So.2d 355 (1948).

1979Colonial Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Collins , 280 Ala. 373 , 194 So.2d 532 (1967); Williams v. Palmer , 277 Ala. 188 , 168 So.2d 220 (1964); Davis v. Birmingham Electric Co. , 250 Ala. 98 , 33 So.2d 355 (1948).

1950Co. v. Lambert, supra. In resolving the question the evidence is, of course, to be reviewed in its most favorable light for the plaintiff and strictly against the defendant, and if a reasonable inference arises to substantiate the claimed culpability of the defendant, to give defendant the directed verdict was error.