acceptable standard in Illinois

2006Figueroa, 288 Ill.

2006Figueroa, 288 Ill.App.3d at 923 , 224 Ill.Dec. 82 , 681 N.E.2d at 65 .

2006The veterinary examining committee found “a glaringly obvious deviation from an acceptable standard of veterinary care” (Massa, 116 Ill. 2d at 384 , 507 N.E.2d at 817 ) — a finding the supreme court held to be “not against the manifest weight of the evidence” (Massa, 116 Ill. 2d at 385 , 507 N.E.2d at 818 ).

2006The veterinary examining committee found “a glaringly obvious deviation from an acceptable standard of veterinary care” (Massa, 116 Ill. 2d at 384 , 507 N.E.2d at 817 ) — a finding the supreme court held to be “not against the manifest weight of the evidence” (Massa, 116 Ill. 2d at 385 , 507 N.E.2d at 818 ).

2005"The admission of evidence in a trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Skubak v. Lutheran General Health Care Systems , 339 Ill.

2005“The admission of evidence in a trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Skubak v. Lutheran General Health Care Systems, 339 Ill.

2004In Stevenson, the plaintiff was appealing from a trial court’s order granting summary judgment for defendant because the plaintiff failed to “make out a prima facie case as to the acceptable standard of care against which the defendant physician was to be measured.” Stevenson, 71 Ill.

2004In Stevenson , the plaintiff was appealing from a trial court's order granting summary judgment for defendant because the plaintiff failed to "make out a prima facie case as to the acceptable standard of care against which the defendant physician was to be measured." Stevenson , 71 Ill.

2004According to this court, “[t]his testimony sufficiently tested the credibility of [the defendants’ expert’s] opinion that the use of an achalasia dilator was within the acceptable standard of care to the jury.” Rush, 255 Ill.

2004According to this court, "[t]his testimony sufficiently tested the credibility of [the defendants' expert's] opinion that the use of an achalasia dilator was within the acceptable standard of care to the jury." Rush , 255 Ill.

1977Ed. 2d 572 , 95 S. Ct. 2004 , it has not been an acceptable standard.

1977While in the past some sanction has been given by local custom to a percentage fee based on the gross amount of the estate, that has no legal basis, and since Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1975), 421 U.S. 773 , 44 L.Ed.2d 572 , 95 S.Ct. 2004 , it has not been an acceptable standard.

1996The plaintiff submitted an affidavit asserting that " '[tjhis was the first time that he came into possession of the knowledge that his injuries had been wrongfully caused by the aforesaid defendant.’ ” 250 Ill.

1996The plaintiff submitted an affidavit *794 asserting that "`[t]his was the first time that he came into possession of the knowledge that his injuries had been wrongfully caused by the aforesaid defendant.'" 250 Ill.App.3d at 389 , 190 Ill.Dec. 188 , 621 N.E.2d 57 .

1993Unlike Greene ( 147 Ill.

1988(Walski v. Tiesenga (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 249 , 381 N.E.2d 279 .) Plaintiff failed to establish an acceptable standard of care for diagnosing and treating metastatic bone disease, and she did not establish that defendants’ diagnosis and treatment were a deviation from any acceptable standard.

1988(Walski v. Tiesenga (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 249 , 381 N.E.2d 279 .) Plaintiff failed to establish an acceptable standard of care for diagnosing and treating metastatic bone disease, and she did not establish that defendants’ diagnosis and treatment were a deviation from any acceptable standard.

1985The plaintiff thus “ignores the rule of law that conclusions of fact unsupported by allegations of specific facts from which such conclusions may be drawn will not avail to present a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to take the case to the trier of fact.” (Steinmetz v. Board of Trustees (1978), 68 Ill.

1979App. 3d 1017, 1023 , 368 N.E.2d 443 .) Proof by plaintiff that defendant’s treatment was not favorable, that she still suffers from the same condition, does not of itself indicate that defendant failed to use the acceptable standard of care.

1971Here, the court's colloquy leaves doubt whether improper factors were considered together with the acceptable factors which may be considered in fixing sentence. • 4 In The People v. Crews, 38 Ill.2d 331 , 231 N.E.2d 451 , the trial court, in fixing sentence, considered certain information not in the record as evidence.

1971Here, the court's colloquy leaves doubt whether improper factors were considered together with the acceptable factors which may be considered in fixing sentence. • 4 In The People v. Crews, 38 Ill.2d 331 , 231 N.E.2d 451 , the trial court, in fixing sentence, considered certain information not in the record as evidence.

1928While in replevin, plaintiff must recover on the strength of his owm title, on reason and authority we conclude that the rule laid down in Allcock v. Loy, supra, is the more acceptable doctrine. , As a rule of evidence it is more in consonance wdth various statutory provisions, Cahill’s St. ch. 98, 79, and relieves the plaintiff from the anomalous burden of proving a negative.