acceptable standard in Tennessee

2011However, “[a]lthough the trial court has broad discretion in determining the qualifications of expert witnesses and the admissibility of their testimony … [,] reversal of the trial court’s discretion is appropriate where the trial court’s action is clearly erroneous or where there has been an abuse of discretion.” Wilson v. Patterson, 73 S.W.3d 95, 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted). *** -5- Proof regarding the “failure of a physician to adhere to an acceptable standard of care in treating a patient must be by expert medical testimony.” Williams v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 54

2006Proof regarding the “failure of a physician to adhere to an acceptable standard of care in treating a patient must be by expert medical testimony.” Williams v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 545, 553 (Tenn.2006); Roberts, 73 S.W.3d at 113 .

2019The Complaint does not allege that HRC was negligent in providing BHRT treatment to any individual patient or BHRT patients as a group; neither, using the language in Proctor, does it allege that HRC “had deviated from the acceptable standard of 11 The Complaint alleged that HRC should be judicially dissolved because it had “carried on, conducted, or transacted its business or affairs in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner.” 12 In Proctor v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, P.C., the plaintiff began treatment under the care of Dr. N. Earl McElheney, who worked for the defendants, two pro

2016By contrast, the Proctor plaintiffs‘ TCPA claims ―did not allege that Defendants had deviated from the acceptable standard of professional practice in either the decision to perform the surgery that was performed or in the manner in which the actual surgery was performed.‖ Id.

2011However, “[a]lthough the trial court has broad discretion in determining the qualifications of expert witnesses and the admissibility of their testimony … [,] reversal of the trial court’s discretion is appropriate where the trial court’s action is clearly erroneous or where there has been an abuse of discretion.” Wilson v. Patterson, 73 S.W.3d 95, 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted). *** -5- Proof regarding the “failure of a physician to adhere to an acceptable standard of care in treating a patient must be by expert medical testimony.” Williams v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 54

2011“In order to qualify as an expert in a medical malpractice action, a physician is not required to be familiar with all the medical statistics of a particular community.” Wilson, 73 S.W.3d at 102 . [sic] (citing Ledford v. Moskowitz, 742 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)).

2022Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 686 S.W.2d 87, 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (“The proper treatment of a patient with serious mental problems . . . and who is in a catatonic state, is not within the common knowledge of ordinary lay persons.”)); see also Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the case did not involve the necessity of expert proof but holding that it suggested that expert proof is necessary to determine the acceptable standard for a psychiatrist to protect a nurse from a violent patient).

2022Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 686 S.W.2d 87, 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (“The proper treatment of a patient with serious mental problems . . . and who is in a catatonic state, is not within the common knowledge of ordinary lay persons.”)); see also Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the case did not involve the necessity of expert proof but holding that it suggested that expert proof is necessary to determine the acceptable standard for a psychiatrist to protect a nurse from a violent patient).

2009In addition to the Tennessee Code’s requirement that experts demonstrate knowledge of the acceptable standard of care, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(b) requires a medical malpractice expert be “licensed to practice in the state or a contiguous bordering state a profession or specialty which would make the person’s expert testimony relevant to the issues in the case[.]” However, this requirement “does not require that the expert practice the same profession or specialty as the defendant, ‘so long as the expert had a sufficient basis on which to establish familiarity with the defend