converse instruction in Kentucky

2001Although it can be argued that a converse presumption could be implied from KRS 403.190(3), the judicial reasoning used in Herron v. Herron, Ky., 573 S.W.2d 342 (1978), precludes that result.

2001Although it can be argued that a converse presumption could be implied from KRS 403.190(3), the judicial reasoning used in Herron v. Her-ron, Ky., 573 S.W.2d 342 (1978), precludes that result.

1941Humphrey v. Mansbach, 251 Ky. 66 , 64 S. W. (2d) 454 ; City of Jackson v. Haddix et al., 280 Ky. 436 , 133 S. W. (2d) 547 .

1939The first instruction should also have embraced a converse instruction, which is ordinarily done by adding the words: “Unless you so believe you should find for defendant.” Humphrey v. Mansbach, 251 Ky. 66 , 64 S. W. (2d) 454, 456 .

1941Humphrey v. Mansbach, 251 Ky. 66 , 64 S. W. (2d) 454 ; City of Jackson v. Haddix et al., 280 Ky. 436 , 133 S. W. (2d) 547 .

1939The first instruction should also have embraced a converse instruction, which is ordinarily done by adding the words: “Unless you so believe you should find for defendant.” Humphrey v. Mansbach, 251 Ky. 66 , 64 S. W. (2d) 454, 456 .

2013Applying the converse of the rule adduced in Graham to the facts in Lassiter , we determined that naming a government agency in a lawsuit is the “functional equivalent of naming the agency’s head in his official capacity.” 308 S.W.3d at 719 .

1971In Golubic v. Rashnich, 249 Ky. 266 , 60 S.W.2d 616 (1933), we recognized the rule that the converse of an instruction should be incorporated “ * * * as a necessary part thereof”.

1971In Golubic v. Rashnich, 249 Ky. 266 , 60 S.W.2d 616 (1933), we recognized the rule that the converse of an instruction should be incorporated “ * * * as a necessary part thereof”.

1970In support of that premise, our attention is directed to Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation, Vol. 2, Section 57.61, wherein is a critical discussion of Goudie v. Lakey Foundry & Machine Company, 327 Mich. 138 , 41 N.W.2d 496 , in this language: “Claimant has been exposed to dust conditions in his employer’s work for the greater part of ten years.

1970In support of that premise, our attention is directed to Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation, Vol. 2, Section 57.61, wherein is a critical discussion of Goudie v. Lakey Foundry & Machine Company, 327 Mich. 138 , 41 N.W.2d 496 , in this language: “Claimant has been exposed to dust conditions in his employer’s work for the greater part of ten years.

1966See Draper v. Railway Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597 , 189 S.W.2d 934 ; Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 923 ; Harlan-Wallins Coal Corporation v. Stewart, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 912 ; Johnson Brothers Lumber Company v. Hood, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 929 ; Bickel v. Ford Motor Company, Ky., 370 S.W.2d 193 .

1966See Draper v. Railway Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597 , 189 S.W.2d 934 ; Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 923 ; Harlan-Wallins Coal Corporation v. Stewart, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 912 ; Johnson Brothers Lumber Company v. Hood, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 929 ; Bickel v. Ford Motor Company, Ky., 370 S.W.2d 193 .

1966See Draper v. Railway Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597 , 189 S.W.2d 934 ; Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 923 ; Harlan-Wallins Coal Corporation v. Stewart, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 912 ; Johnson Brothers Lumber Company v. Hood, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 929 ; Bickel v. Ford Motor Company, Ky., 370 S.W.2d 193 .

1966See Draper v. Railway Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597 , 189 S.W.2d 934 ; Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 923 ; Harlan-Wallins Coal Corporation v. Stewart, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 912 ; Johnson Brothers Lumber Company v. Hood, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 929 ; Bickel v. Ford Motor Company, Ky., 370 S.W.2d 193 .

1964They cite Masonic Widows and Orphans Home and Infirmary v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815 and Lewis v. Town of Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 47 S.W. 862 .

1964They cite Masonic Widows and Orphans Home and Infirmary v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815 and Lewis v. Town of Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 47 S.W. 862 .

1964They cite Masonic Widows and Orphans Home and Infirmary v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815 and Lewis v. Town of Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 47 S.W. 862 .

1964They cite Masonic Widows and Orphans Home and Infirmary v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815 and Lewis v. Town of Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 47 S.W. 862 .

1961In Lexington Glass Company v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company, Ky., 271 S.W.2d 909 , it was pointed out that to give separately the converse of an instruction which adequately covers the basic issue in the case would serve to confuse rather than clarify the case for the jury.

1961In Lexington Glass Company v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company, Ky., 271 S.W.2d 909 , it was pointed out that to give separately the converse of an instruction which adequately covers the basic issue in the case would serve to confuse rather than clarify the case for the jury.

1953West v. Butler’s Executor, 248 Ky. 404 , 58 S.W.2d 662 .

1953West v. Butler’s Executor, 248 Ky. 404 , 58 S.W.2d 662 .

1948Bernheim Foundation, 305 Ky. 802 , 205 S. W. 2d 1003 , 1006 et seq.; but the converse of the principle of the cy pres doctrine likewise has been upheld by our courts; viz., *7 where a trust is created for the benefit of a particular charity or particular organization and it is impossible to determine that the settlor was more intent on a general charitable purpose than for the benefit of the particular charity or organization, the fund or property constituting the corpus of the trust estate may not be devoted to any purpose not provided for by the terms of the trust.

1948Bernheim Foundation, 305 Ky. 802 , 205 S. W. 2d 1003 , 1006 et seq.; but the converse of the principle of the cy pres doctrine likewise has been upheld by our courts; viz., *7 where a trust is created for the benefit of a particular charity or particular organization and it is impossible to determine that the settlor was more intent on a general charitable purpose than for the benefit of the particular charity or organization, the fund or property constituting the corpus of the trust estate may not be devoted to any purpose not provided for by the terms of the trust.

1944While the converse to the instruction complained of would have been in better form, had it recited, “but unless you so believe, you will find for the defendants; or, if you find for the defendants under either Instruction No. 3A or Instruction No. 4A, you should likewise find for the defendants under this instruction”; the converse, as given, was not prejudicial to the substantial rights of appellants, for the reasons given in Nickell v. Stewart, 291 Ky. 4 , 163 S. W. 2d 39 .

1944While the converse to the instruction complained of would have been in better form, had it recited, “but unless you so believe, you will find for the defendants; or, if you find for the defendants under either Instruction No. 3A or Instruction No. 4A, you should likewise find for the defendants under this instruction”; the converse, as given, was not prejudicial to the substantial rights of appellants, for the reasons given in Nickell v. Stewart, 291 Ky. 4 , 163 S. W. 2d 39 .

1941Humphrey v. Mansbach, 251 Ky. 66 , 64 S. W. (2d) 454 ; City of Jackson v. Haddix et al., 280 Ky. 436 , 133 S. W. (2d) 547 .

1941Humphrey v. Mansbach, 251 Ky. 66 , 64 S. W. (2d) 454 ; City of Jackson v. Haddix et al., 280 Ky. 436 , 133 S. W. (2d) 547 .

1938City of Winchester v. Board of Education, 182 Ky. 313 , 206 S. W. 492; Vaughn v. City of Williamsburg, 245 Ky. 339 , 53 S. W. (2d) 690 .

1938City of Winchester v. Board of Education, 182 Ky. 313 , 206 S. W. 492; Vaughn v. City of Williamsburg, 245 Ky. 339 , 53 S. W. (2d) 690 .

1938City of Winchester v. Board of Education, 182 Ky. 313 , 206 S. W. 492; Vaughn v. City of Williamsburg, 245 Ky. 339 , 53 S. W. (2d) 690 .

1938City of Winchester v. Board of Education, 182 Ky. 313 , 206 S. W. 492; Vaughn v. City of Williamsburg, 245 Ky. 339 , 53 S. W. (2d) 690 .

1934Co. v. Childers, 214 Ky. 361 , 283 S. W. 113 ; but the converse of the rule does not necessarily follow.

1934Co. v. Childers, 214 Ky. 361 , 283 S. W. 113 ; but the converse of the rule does not necessarily follow.

1930In Lynch v. Snead Architectural Iron Works, 132 Ky. 241 , 116 S. W. 693 , 21 L.

1930In Lynch v. Snead Architectural Iron Works, 132 Ky. 241 , 116 S. W. 693 , 21 L.