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20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Union Oil of California, Amsco Div. v. Watsongreen2 sentences1991In Union Oil v. Watson, 468 So.2d 349, 353 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 479 So.2d 119 (1985), the court discussed the nature of the required showing on this element in the following words: Where dismissal is on technical grounds, for procedural reasons, or any other reason not inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, it does not constitute a favorable termination. [citations omitted] The converse of that rule is that a favorable termination exists where a dismissal is of such a nature as to indicate the innocence of the accused. [citations omitted] *786 For example, where a dismissal is take 1991In Union Oil v. Watson, 468 So.2d 349, 353 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 479 So.2d 119 (1985), the court discussed the nature of the required showing on this element in the following words: Where dismissal is on technical grounds, for procedural reasons, or any other reason not inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, it does not constitute a favorable termination. [citations omitted] The converse of that rule is that a favorable termination exists where a dismissal is of such a nature as to indicate the innocence of the accused. [citations omitted] *786 For example, where a dismissal is take | 2 | 3 |
Steiger v. MASSACHUSETTS CASUALTY INS.green2 sentences1989See City of Miami Beach v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 324 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); See also Steiger v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 273 So.2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (plaintiff is entitled to present evidence on the facts that are relevant to his theory of the case). 1985See City of Miami Beach v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 324 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); see also Steiger v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 273 So.2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (plaintiff is entitled to present evidence on the facts that are relevant to his theory of the case). | 2 | 2 |
City of Miami Beach v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc.green2 sentences1989See City of Miami Beach v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 324 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); See also Steiger v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 273 So.2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (plaintiff is entitled to present evidence on the facts that are relevant to his theory of the case). 1985See City of Miami Beach v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 324 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); see also Steiger v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 273 So.2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (plaintiff is entitled to present evidence on the facts that are relevant to his theory of the case). | 2 | 2 |
Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonvillegreen2 sentences1960See Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, Fla. 1951, 56 So.2d 914 ; Gilmer v. Rubin, Fla.App. 1958, 98 So.2d 367 ; Traurig v. Spear, Fla.App. 1958, 102 So.2d 165 ; Manganelli v. Covington, Fla.App. 1959, 114 So.2d 320 . 1959See Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, Fla., 1951, 56 So.2d 914 , and Gilmer v. Rubin, Fla. App., 1958, 98 So.2d 367 . | 2 | 2 |
Gilmer v. Rubingreen2 sentences1960See Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, Fla. 1951, 56 So.2d 914 ; Gilmer v. Rubin, Fla.App. 1958, 98 So.2d 367 ; Traurig v. Spear, Fla.App. 1958, 102 So.2d 165 ; Manganelli v. Covington, Fla.App. 1959, 114 So.2d 320 . 1959See Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, Fla., 1951, 56 So.2d 914 , and Gilmer v. Rubin, Fla. App., 1958, 98 So.2d 367 . | 1 | 2 |
Department of Revenue v. GTE MOBILNETgreen1 sentence2003Green, 110 So.2d 409 ; Dep't of Revenue v. GTE Mobilnet of Tampa, Inc., 727 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Division of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeshipgreen1 sentence1993Florida Home Builders Association v. Division of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeship, 367 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1979). | 1 | 1 |
Lackner v. LaCroixgreen2 sentences1985Hickland v. Endee, 574 F. Supp. 770, 779 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.1984); Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747 , *354 602 P.2d 393, 395 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 695 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 comment a (1977). 1985Hickland v. Endee, 574 F. Supp. 770, 779 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.1984); Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747 , *354 602 P.2d 393, 395 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 695 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 comment a (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Hickland v. Endeegreen1 sentence1985Hickland v. Endee, 574 F. Supp. 770, 779 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.1984); Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747 , *354 602 P.2d 393, 395 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 695 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 comment a (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Holmes v. Lefflergreen1 sentence1984Robbins v. State, 453 So.2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see generally, e.g., Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So.2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 419 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Bowden v. City of Jacksonvillegreen1 sentence1968See Bowden v. City of Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216 , 42 So. 394 (1906). | 1 | 1 |
Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering Corp. v. Adamsgreen2 sentences1963The converse rule appears in Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419 , 181 So. 403, 893 (1938), where the defense of contributory negligence was denied to a defendant in a suit by a minor for injuries sustained while employed by defendant in violation of a state statute prohibiting his employment. 1963The converse rule appears in Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419 , 181 So. 403, 893 (1938), where the defense of contributory negligence was denied to a defendant in a suit by a minor for injuries sustained while employed by defendant in violation of a state statute prohibiting his employment. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Borges v. State
green
2 sentences1983It is Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265 (Fla.1982), that holds the converse of the principle of law applied in Bell, that is, if two statutory offenses do not have the exact same essential constituent elements and neither statutory offense includes all of the elements of the other, those two offenses are not constitutionally “the same offense” and a person can be put in jeopardy as to both of such offenses even if the two offenses are based on one and the same factual event. 1 Borges holds, further, in essence that if the constitutional double jeopardy clauses permit a trial on and conviction of 1983The abstract principle of law applied in Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1982), is: If two statutory offenses do not have the exact same essential constituent elements and neither statutory offense includes all of the elements of the other, those two offenses are not constitutionally "the same offense" and a person can be put in jeopardy as to both of such offenses even if the two offenses are based on one and the same factual event. [2] The principle in Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 1983), is actually the converse of the principle in Borges and is: If two statutory offenses have t | 2 | 1983–1983 |
United States Gypsum Company v. Green
green
1 sentence2003Green, 110 So.2d 409 ; Dep't of Revenue v. GTE Mobilnet of Tampa, Inc., 727 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Don Camby Lowther v. United States of America
green
1 sentence1987Such a state of affairs would be detrimental to the public interest, since public officers would be discouraged from performing their duties conscientiously." [12] See, for example, Section 73.071, Florida Statutes, which provides that where less than an entire property is taken by eminent domain proceedings, resulting business damages may under certain circumstances be recovered. [13] In Lowther, 480 F.2d 1031 , the federal government seized weapons alleged to have been possessed illegally. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Weems v. State
green
1 sentence1987Weems v. State, 469 So.2d 128 (Fla.1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Peters v. Quick
green
1 sentence1985Hickland v. Endee, 574 F. Supp. 770, 779 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.1984); Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747 , *354 602 P.2d 393, 395 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 695 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 comment a (1977). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Robbins v. State
green
1 sentence1984Robbins v. State, 453 So.2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see generally, e.g., Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So.2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 419 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1982). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Taylor v. State
green
2 sentences1983Taylor v. State, 138 Fla. 762 , 190 So. 262 (1939), cited by the majority in lieu of an opinion, is a fine old case but its citation should be noted as a major shift in the majority view in similar cases from this court. 1983Taylor v. State, 138 Fla. 762 , 190 So. 262 (1939), cited by the majority in lieu of an opinion, is a fine old case but its citation should be noted as a major shift in the majority view in similar cases from this court. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Bell v. State
green
1 sentence1983The abstract principle of law applied in Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1982), is: If two statutory offenses do not have the exact same essential constituent elements and neither statutory offense includes all of the elements of the other, those two offenses are not constitutionally "the same offense" and a person can be put in jeopardy as to both of such offenses even if the two offenses are based on one and the same factual event. [2] The principle in Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 1983), is actually the converse of the principle in Borges and is: If two statutory offenses have t | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Amendola v. Amendola
green
1 sentence1967App.), 71 So.2d 670 ; Amendola v. Amendola (Fla.App. 1960), 121 So.2d 805 , Steele v. Steele (D.D.C. 1946), 65 F. Supp. 329 , and Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 252 , 287 P.2d 585 , Sanchez v. Olivarez, 94 N.J. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Alexander v. Alexander
green
1 sentence1967But the statutes under which a married woman is liable generally for her tort are not likely to be interpreted to make her immune to her husband, and liability to him should no doubt accompany the converse rule of liability on his part for bodily harm inflicted by him on her." See also: Alexander v. Alexander (U.S.D.C. 1956), 140 F. Supp. 925 ; Gremillion v. Caffey (La. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Sanchez v. Olivarez
green
1 sentence1967App.), 71 So.2d 670 ; Amendola v. Amendola (Fla.App. 1960), 121 So.2d 805 , Steele v. Steele (D.D.C. 1946), 65 F. Supp. 329 , and Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 252 , 287 P.2d 585 , Sanchez v. Olivarez, 94 N.J. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Gremillion v. Caffey
green
1 sentence1967App.), 71 So.2d 670 ; Amendola v. Amendola (Fla.App. 1960), 121 So.2d 805 , Steele v. Steele (D.D.C. 1946), 65 F. Supp. 329 , and Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 252 , 287 P.2d 585 , Sanchez v. Olivarez, 94 N.J. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Steele v. Steele
green
1 sentence1967App.), 71 So.2d 670 ; Amendola v. Amendola (Fla.App. 1960), 121 So.2d 805 , Steele v. Steele (D.D.C. 1946), 65 F. Supp. 329 , and Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 252 , 287 P.2d 585 , Sanchez v. Olivarez, 94 N.J. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Apitz v. Dames
green
1 sentence1967App.), 71 So.2d 670 ; Amendola v. Amendola (Fla.App. 1960), 121 So.2d 805 , Steele v. Steele (D.D.C. 1946), 65 F. Supp. 329 , and Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 252 , 287 P.2d 585 , Sanchez v. Olivarez, 94 N.J. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance v. Hoxie
green
2 sentences1965Co. v. Hoxie, 1937, 129 Fla. 332 , 176 So. 480 , applies here to charge appellant with his attorney's knowledge. 1965Co. v. Hoxie, 1937, 129 Fla. 332 , 176 So. 480 , applies here to charge appellant with his attorney's knowledge. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein
green
1 sentence1963And in Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1959), it was held that the defense was not available to the defendant in a suit by a minor for injuries sustained by the minor from the use of a firearm sold by the defendant to the plaintiff minor in violation of a state statute and an ordinance of the city of Miami. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Manganelli v. Covington green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Catlett v. Chestnut, as Exr. green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
The Motor Transit Co. v. Bethea
green
1 sentence1960Knight v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 585 , 173 So. 801 ; Smith v. McEwen, 119 Fla. 588 , 161 So. 68 ; Catlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498 , 146 So. 241, 248 , 91 A.L.R. 212 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Knight v. City of Miami green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Smith v. McEwen, Et Ux. green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Brady v. Kane
green
1 sentence1960Appellant has cited, and we are cognizant of the many cases latest of which is Brady v. Kane, Fla.App. 1959, 111 So.2d 472, 474 , which state the proposition that: "On a motion for directed verdict the trial court will consider the testimony adduced in the cause in the light most favorable to the party moved against; and the moving party admits every conclusion favorable to the adverse party which may rationally be inferred by the jury from the evidence before it." However, in applying the principle enunciated in the Brady case, we must also consider the application of the converse rule which | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Traurig v. Spear green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.