converse rule in Georgia

1996The rule in this State is to admit evidence^ even if it] is of doubtful relevancy.’ Talbotton Railroad Co. v. Gibson, 106 Ga. 229, 236 ( 32 S. E. 151 ); Dalton v. Drake, 75 Ga. 115 ; Savannah, F. & W.

1996The rule in this State is to admit evidence[, even if it] is of doubtful relevancy.' Talbotton Railroad Co. v. Gibson, 106 Ga. 229, 236 ( 32 S.E. 151 ); Dalton v. Drake, 75 Ga. 115 ; Savannah, F. & W.

1996I think the majority's view disregards the old maxims that "`[e]very fact or circumstance serving to elucidate or throw light upon the issue being tried, constitutes proper evidence in the case.' Sample v. Lipscomb, 18 Ga. 687 . `Where the competency of evidence is doubtful, it should go to the jury, that they may consider how far its force is impaired by surrounding incidents.' Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72 Ga. 217 (5a) (53 Am.R. 838); and the converse of this rule has been stated thus: `It is relevant to put in evidence any circumstances which tend to make the propositions at issue either mo

1996I think the majority's view disregards the old maxims that "`[e]very fact or circumstance serving to elucidate or throw light upon the issue being tried, constitutes proper evidence in the case.' Sample v. Lipscomb, 18 Ga. 687 . `Where the competency of evidence is doubtful, it should go to the jury, that they may consider how far its force is impaired by surrounding incidents.' Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72 Ga. 217 (5a) (53 Am.R. 838); and the converse of this rule has been stated thus: `It is relevant to put in evidence any circumstances which tend to make the propositions at issue either mo

1984In State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309 ( 275 SE2d 646 ) (1981), we held: "Where a defendant raises an affirmative defense and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." That is without question a correct statement of the law of Georgia, *322 inasmuch as it is always the burden of the state to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt — that being but the converse of the requirement of disproving any defense which might be raised.

1984In State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309 ( 275 SE2d 646 ) (1981), we held: "Where a defendant raises an affirmative defense and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." That is without question a correct statement of the law of Georgia, *322 inasmuch as it is always the burden of the state to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt — that being but the converse of the requirement of disproving any defense which might be raised.

1984McLanahan v. Keith, supra, is hereby overruled to the extent that it is in conflict with Couch v. Wallace, supra. We believe that this holding is required by the plain meaning of the words of the statute.” We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that since he relied on McLanahan v. Keith, 239 Ga. 94 ( 236 SE2d 52 ), to apply a converse rule retroactively would be prejudicial to him.

1984McLanahan v. Keith, supra, is hereby overruled to the extent that it is in conflict with Couch v. Wallace, supra. We believe that this holding is required by the plain meaning of the words of the statute.” We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that since he relied on McLanahan v. Keith, 239 Ga. 94 ( 236 SE2d 52 ), to apply a converse rule retroactively would be prejudicial to him.

1984Liability in Ga., 34, § 2-21, Negligent Design (citing Stovall, Poppell, supra).

1984Without question the losing side in Little v. Walker, 250 Ga. 854 , supra, also relied on McLanahan and suffered harm from such reliance.

1978Ivins v. State, 129 Ga. App. 865, 868 , supra. If the exclusionary rule invoked here for suppression of evidence is to act as a deterrent to illegal law enforcement practices (Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1) (95 SC 2254, 45 LE2d 416)), it must be applied to the factual predicate of the instant case or the converse rule will emerge.

1978Ivins v. State, 129 Ga. App. 865, 868 , supra. If the exclusionary rule invoked here for suppression of evidence is to act as a deterrent to illegal law enforcement forcement practices (Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1) (95 SC 2254, 45 LE2d 416)), it must be applied to the factual predicate of the instant case or the converse rule will emerge.

1978Ivins v. State, 129 Ga. App. 865, 868 , supra. If the exclusionary rule invoked here for suppression of evidence is to act as a deterrent to illegal law enforcement practices (Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1) (95 SC 2254, 45 LE2d 416)), it must be applied to the factual predicate of the instant case or the converse rule will emerge.

1978Ivins v. State, 129 Ga. App. 865, 868 , supra. If the exclusionary rule invoked here for suppression of evidence is to act as a deterrent to illegal law enforcement forcement practices (Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1) (95 SC 2254, 45 LE2d 416)), it must be applied to the factual predicate of the instant case or the converse rule will emerge.

1952While it has often been said by the appellate courts of this State that a duty' rests upon a railroad company to exercise ordinary care in addition to its duty to observe the statutory requirements (Pollard v. Savage, 55 Ga. App. 470 , 190 S. E. 423 , and cases cited), the converse of that rule, that the duty to observe the statutory requirements is in addition to the duty to exercise ordinary care, is not the law of this State.

1952While it has often been said by the appellate courts of this State that a duty' rests upon a railroad company to exercise ordinary care in addition to its duty to observe the statutory requirements (Pollard v. Savage, 55 Ga. App. 470 , 190 S. E. 423 , and cases cited), the converse of that rule, that the duty to observe the statutory requirements is in addition to the duty to exercise ordinary care, is not the law of this State.

1944Here, as in Bates v. State, 18 Ga. App. 718 (9) ( 90 S. E. 481 ), it wás not erroneous to fail to charge the converse where the instruction “carried with it the converse of the proposition.” See in this connection, Maughon v. State, 9 Ga. App. 568 ( 71 S. E. 922 ). 9.

1944Here, as in Bates v. State, 18 Ga. App. 718 (9) ( 90 S. E. 481 ), it wás not erroneous to fail to charge the converse where the instruction “carried with it the converse of the proposition.” See in this connection, Maughon v. State, 9 Ga. App. 568 ( 71 S. E. 922 ). 9.

1944Here, as in Bates v. State, 18 Ga. App. 718 (9) ( 90 S. E. 481 ), it wás not erroneous to fail to charge the converse where the instruction “carried with it the converse of the proposition.” See in this connection, Maughon v. State, 9 Ga. App. 568 ( 71 S. E. 922 ). 9.

1943D. 423 ); Hinkle. v. Smth, 133 Ga. 255 ( 65 S. E. 427 ); Godley v. Barnes, 132 Ga. 513 . ( 64 S. E. 546 ); Nickols v. Pool, 47 N. C. 23, 28 ; Uecker v. Zuercher, 54 Tex. Civ.

1943D. 423 ); Hinkle. v. Smth, 133 Ga. 255 ( 65 S. E. 427 ); Godley v. Barnes, 132 Ga. 513 . ( 64 S. E. 546 ); Nickols v. Pool, 47 N. C. 23, 28 ; Uecker v. Zuercher, 54 Tex. Civ.

1943D. 423 ); Hinkle. v. Smth, 133 Ga. 255 ( 65 S. E. 427 ); Godley v. Barnes, 132 Ga. 513 . ( 64 S. E. 546 ); Nickols v. Pool, 47 N. C. 23, 28 ; Uecker v. Zuercher, 54 Tex. Civ.

1943D. 423 ); Hinkle. v. Smth, 133 Ga. 255 ( 65 S. E. 427 ); Godley v. Barnes, 132 Ga. 513 . ( 64 S. E. 546 ); Nickols v. Pool, 47 N. C. 23, 28 ; Uecker v. Zuercher, 54 Tex. Civ.

1943D. 423 ); Hinkle. v. Smth, 133 Ga. 255 ( 65 S. E. 427 ); Godley v. Barnes, 132 Ga. 513 . ( 64 S. E. 546 ); Nickols v. Pool, 47 N. C. 23, 28 ; Uecker v. Zuercher, 54 Tex. Civ.

1943D. 423 ); Hinkle. v. Smth, 133 Ga. 255 ( 65 S. E. 427 ); Godley v. Barnes, 132 Ga. 513 . ( 64 S. E. 546 ); Nickols v. Pool, 47 N. C. 23, 28 ; Uecker v. Zuercher, 54 Tex. Civ.

1941The overruling of the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea, being unexcepted to, was a solemn adjudication that the plea was good if proved (Bennett v. Simmons, 30 Ga. App. 529, 531 , 118 S. E. 493 , and cit.), and became the law of the case so far as the sufficiency of the plea as against demurrer is concerned (Story v. First National Bank, 34 Ga. App. 27 , 128 S. E. 12 ; Western & Atlantic R. v. Morgan, 40 Ga. App. 611, 613 , 150 S. E. 850 ); but still the defendant would have to sustain the allegations contained in the plea with proof.

1941The overruling of the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea, being unexcepted to, was a solemn adjudication that the plea was good if proved (Bennett v. Simmons, 30 Ga. App. 529, 531 , 118 S. E. 493 , and cit.), and became the law of the case so far as the sufficiency of the plea as against demurrer is concerned (Story v. First National Bank, 34 Ga. App. 27 , 128 S. E. 12 ; Western & Atlantic R. v. Morgan, 40 Ga. App. 611, 613 , 150 S. E. 850 ); but still the defendant would have to sustain the allegations contained in the plea with proof.

1941The overruling of the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea, being unexcepted to, was a solemn adjudication that the plea was good if proved (Bennett v. Simmons, 30 Ga. App. 529, 531 , 118 S. E. 493 , and cit.), and became the law of the case so far as the sufficiency of the plea as against demurrer is concerned (Story v. First National Bank, 34 Ga. App. 27 , 128 S. E. 12 ; Western & Atlantic R. v. Morgan, 40 Ga. App. 611, 613 , 150 S. E. 850 ); but still the defendant would have to sustain the allegations contained in the plea with proof.

1941The overruling of the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea, being unexcepted to, was a solemn adjudication that the plea was good if proved (Bennett v. Simmons, 30 Ga. App. 529, 531 , 118 S. E. 493 , and cit.), and became the law of the case so far as the sufficiency of the plea as against demurrer is concerned (Story v. First National Bank, 34 Ga. App. 27 , 128 S. E. 12 ; Western & Atlantic R. v. Morgan, 40 Ga. App. 611, 613 , 150 S. E. 850 ); but still the defendant would have to sustain the allegations contained in the plea with proof.

1941The overruling of the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea, being unexcepted to, was a solemn adjudication that the plea was good if proved (Bennett v. Simmons, 30 Ga. App. 529, 531 , 118 S. E. 493 , and cit.), and became the law of the case so far as the sufficiency of the plea as against demurrer is concerned (Story v. First National Bank, 34 Ga. App. 27 , 128 S. E. 12 ; Western & Atlantic R. v. Morgan, 40 Ga. App. 611, 613 , 150 S. E. 850 ); but still the defendant would have to sustain the allegations contained in the plea with proof.

1941The overruling of the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea, being unexcepted to, was a solemn adjudication that the plea was good if proved (Bennett v. Simmons, 30 Ga. App. 529, 531 , 118 S. E. 493 , and cit.), and became the law of the case so far as the sufficiency of the plea as against demurrer is concerned (Story v. First National Bank, 34 Ga. App. 27 , 128 S. E. 12 ; Western & Atlantic R. v. Morgan, 40 Ga. App. 611, 613 , 150 S. E. 850 ); but still the defendant would have to sustain the allegations contained in the plea with proof.