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6 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lenz v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.green2 sentences2010Statutory provisions in favor of an owner, such as provisions regulating the remedies of such owner and the compensation to be paid to him, are to be liberally construed." 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 3.213[4] (rev. 3d ed. 1976); See Lenz v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 111 Wis. 198, 206 , 86 N.W. 607 (1901). 2010Statutory provisions in favor of an owner, such as provisions regulating the remedies of such owner and the compensation to be paid to him, are to be liberally construed." 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 3.213[4] (rev. 3d ed. 1976); See Lenz v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 111 Wis. 198, 206 , 86 N.W. 607 (1901). | 2 | 2 |
Finger v. Stategreen1 sentence1969When all of the elements necessary to constitute the crime charged appear in the evidence, the law of this state gives the trier of fact great latitude in determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the testimony to resolve any evidentiary or factual disputes and to find the defendant guilty or not guilty as the case may be. *78 In Finger v. State (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 103, 110, 111 , 161N. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gori v. United States
green
2 sentences1975The general rule and exception were there stated by the high court to be: ". . . where *224 circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error. . . ." [42] There can be no doubt as to the meaning of "prosecutorial or judicial overreaching," for the high court footnoted the converse of the rule, stating: "Conversely, where a defendant's mistrial motion is necessitated by judicial or p 1975The general rule and exception were there stated by the high court to be: “. . . where circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant’s motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error. . . .” 42 There can be no doubt as to the meaning of “prosecutorial or judicial overreaching,” for the high court footnoted the converse of the rule, stating: “Conversely, where a defendant’s mistrial motion is necessitated by judicial or prosecut | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State v. Roggensack
green
2 sentences1971It is argued on behalf of Mr. Wheeler that the converse of the rule stated in State v. Roggensack (1963), 19 Wis. 2d 38 , 119 N. W. 2d 412 , should also be a rule. 1971It is argued on behalf of Mr. Wheeler that the converse of the rule stated in State v. Roggensack (1963), 19 Wis. 2d 38 , 119 N. W. 2d 412 , should also be a rule. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp.
green
2 sentences1959The plaintiff bases such contention upon the following statement appearing in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1956), 273 Wis. 266, 271 , 77 N. W. (2d) 413 : “Respondents also cite the rule of Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. (1952), 260 Wis. 433 , 51 N. W. (2d) 42 , and other cases holding that the causal connection between injury and violation of a safety order may be presumed where the injury is such as the order is intended to prevent.” It is urged that the converse of such rule should be applied where the injury is not such as the violated safety order was intended 1959The plaintiff bases such contention upon the following statement appearing in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1956), 273 Wis. 266, 271 , 77 N. W. (2d) 413 : “Respondents also cite the rule of Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. (1952), 260 Wis. 433 , 51 N. W. (2d) 42 , and other cases holding that the causal connection between injury and violation of a safety order may be presumed where the injury is such as the order is intended to prevent.” It is urged that the converse of such rule should be applied where the injury is not such as the violated safety order was intended | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1959The plaintiff bases such contention upon the following statement appearing in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1956), 273 Wis. 266, 271 , 77 N. W. (2d) 413 : “Respondents also cite the rule of Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. (1952), 260 Wis. 433 , 51 N. W. (2d) 42 , and other cases holding that the causal connection between injury and violation of a safety order may be presumed where the injury is such as the order is intended to prevent.” It is urged that the converse of such rule should be applied where the injury is not such as the violated safety order was intended 1959The plaintiff bases such contention upon the following statement appearing in Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1956), 273 Wis. 266, 271 , 77 N. W. (2d) 413 : “Respondents also cite the rule of Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. (1952), 260 Wis. 433 , 51 N. W. (2d) 42 , and other cases holding that the causal connection between injury and violation of a safety order may be presumed where the injury is such as the order is intended to prevent.” It is urged that the converse of such rule should be applied where the injury is not such as the violated safety order was intended | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.