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12 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1893–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bourkegreen1 sentence2024As explained in Maggio: “ ‘[W]here it can be determined from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to - 27 - a greater sentence, remandment is not required.’ [Citation.] The converse of this rule is remandment is required where reliance on the improper sentencing factor was significant and led to a greater sentence.” Maggio, 2017 IL App (4th) 150287, ¶ 50 (quoting People v. Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maggiogreen1 sentence2024As explained in Maggio: “ ‘[W]here it can be determined from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to - 27 - a greater sentence, remandment is not required.’ [Citation.] The converse of this rule is remandment is required where reliance on the improper sentencing factor was significant and led to a greater sentence.” Maggio, 2017 IL App (4th) 150287, ¶ 50 (quoting People v. Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bullard v. Barnes
green
2 sentences1995In Dralle, the plaintiff urged the supreme court to extend its holding in Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505 , 468 N.E.2d 1228 (a parent may recover compensation for loss of a minor child’s society in a wrongful death action). 1995In Dralle, the plaintiff urged the supreme court to extend its holding in Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505 , 468 N.E.2d 1228 (a parent may recover compensation for loss of a minor child’s society in a wrongful death action). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Rios v. Niagara MacHine & Tool Works
green
1 sentence1995(See Rios, 59 Ill. 2d at 85-86 .) Obviously, the converse of this rule is also true. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dralle v. Ruder
green
1 sentence1995In reaching its conclusion, the court said: "And our appellate court has consistently refused to recognize the converse claim — actions brought by children for loss of society and companionship resulting from nonfatal injuries to their parents.” Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d at 65 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Huter v. Ekman
green
2 sentences1988(Huter v. Ekman (1985), 137 Ill. 1988And our appellate court has consistently refused to recognize the converse claim — actions brought by children for loss of society and companionship resulting from nonfatal injuries to their parents. ( Huter v. Ekman (1985), 137 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Block v. Pielet Brothers Scrap & Metal, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988App.3d 733 ; Block v. Pielet Brothers Scrap & Metal, Inc. (1983), 119 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
The PEOPLE v. Norcutt
green
2 sentences1979Relying on Chambers and People v. Norcutt (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 256 , 255 N.E.2d 442 , the defendant in People v. Bean (1974), 17 Ill. 1979Relying on Chambers and People v. Norcutt (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 256 , 255 N.E.2d 442 , the defendant in People v. Bean (1974), 17 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Bean
green
1 sentence1979Relying on Chambers and People v. Norcutt (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 256 , 255 N.E.2d 442 , the defendant in People v. Bean (1974), 17 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
The City of Chicago v. Lawrence
green
2 sentences1977(City of Chicago v. Lawrence (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 461, 464 , 248 N.E.2d 71, 73-74 .) It seems evident that the converse of this rule is also true, i.e., the courts will only entertain a constitutional objection when the party challenging the unconstitutional feature has been aggrieved thereby. 1977(City of Chicago v. Lawrence (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 461, 464 , 248 N.E.2d 71, 73-74 .) It seems evident that the converse of this rule is also true, i.e., the courts will only entertain a constitutional objection when the party challenging the unconstitutional feature has been aggrieved thereby. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People Ex Rel. Sandberg v. Grabs
green
1 sentence1971Sandberg v. Grabs, 373 Ill. 423 ) merely applied the converse of the principle stated in Knappenberger, and derived from several earlier cases: “that the failure to state the proposition in both the affirmative and negative form voided the election, and not that a mere failure to state the proposition in the exact language prescribed by the statute made it void.” (Knappenberger v. Hughes, 377 Ill. 126, 130 .) The Knappenberger opinion also placed reliance upon the court’s observation in People ex rel. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Knappenberger v. Hughes
green
1 sentence1971Sandberg v. Grabs, 373 Ill. 423 ) merely applied the converse of the principle stated in Knappenberger, and derived from several earlier cases: “that the failure to state the proposition in both the affirmative and negative form voided the election, and not that a mere failure to state the proposition in the exact language prescribed by the statute made it void.” (Knappenberger v. Hughes, 377 Ill. 126, 130 .) The Knappenberger opinion also placed reliance upon the court’s observation in People ex rel. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People ex rel. Howard v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad
green
1 sentence1971Howard v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 296 Ill. 246 , that many instances where a deviation in ballot form voided the election have involved ballots which stated a proposition twice, once preceded by “For”, followed by a square marked “Yes”, and once preceded by “Against”, followed by a square marked “No”. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
The People v. Boneau
green
1 sentence1935(People v. Boneau, 327 Ill. 194 ; Weinberg v. People, 208 id. 15; Huggins v. People, 135 id. 243.) The converse of the rule follows, that where the evidence discloses the property was purchased at a fair price such circumstance tends to refute guilty knowledge. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Andrews v. People
green
1 sentence1935Andrews v. People, 60 Ill. 354 ; People v. Cochrane, 1 Wheeler’s Crim. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Super-Power Co. v. Sommers
green
1 sentence1933The converse of this instruction, with the exception that it did not contain the word “willfully,” given at the request of the petitioner in the case of Super-Power Co. v. Sommers, 352 Ill. 610 , was before this court in that case. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Herrin & Southern Railroad v. Nolte
neutral
1 sentence1933At the request of the petitioner the court gave to the jury the following instruction: “You are further instructed that if you believe from the entire testimony and from your inspection of the premises, that any witness has willfully magnified or exaggerated the value of the land taken or the damages to the land not taken, on account of his interest in the suit or his prejudice or want of knowledge or experience or truthfulness, then you have the right, and it is your duty, to disregard the evidence of such witness in so far as the same is unjustly magnified or unjustly increased, either as to | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Chicago, Ottawa & Peoria Railway Co. v. Rausch
neutral
1 sentence1933Practically this same instruction, as well as the converse of it, except that the instruction did not contain the word “willfully,” was condemned in Chicago, Ottawa and Peoria Railway Co. v. Rausch, 245 Ill. 477 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Frank Parmelee Co. v. Wheelock
neutral
1 sentence1924The court held the converse of this rule in Frank Parmelee Co. v. Wheelock, 127 Ill. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Eldred v. Meek
green
2 sentences1914(Eldred, v. Meek, 183 Ill. 26 ; Lawrence v. Smith, 163 id. 149 ; Reid v. Voorhees, 216 id. 236; Johnson v. Preston, 226 id. 447.) The converse of this rule is. equally well established, that where the invalid portions can be separated from those which are valid and still give effect to the general testamentary scheme, the invalid clauses will be disregarded and those that are valid upheld. 1914(Eldred, v. Meek, 183 Ill. 26 ; Lawrence v. Smith, 163 id. 149 ; Reid v. Voorhees, 216 id. 236; Johnson v. Preston, 226 id. 447.) The converse of this rule is. equally well established, that where the invalid portions can be separated from those which are valid and still give effect to the general testamentary scheme, the invalid clauses will be disregarded and those that are valid upheld. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Harvey v. Sullens
neutral
1 sentence1893In Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147 , the court holds, that an instruction, of like effect with the one under consideration, was erroneous, although, under the particular facts of that case, it was held, as must be done here, that the giving of it was not prejudicial error. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Meeker v. Meeker
neutral
1 sentence1893Meeker v. Meeker, 75 Ill. 260 ; Brown v. Riggin, 94 id. 560; Rutherford v. Morris, 77 id. 397; Freeman v. Easley, 117 id. 317; Campbell v. Campbell, 130 id. 481; Myatt v. Walker, 44 id. 485; Trish v. Newell, 62 id. 196; Schneider v. Manning, 121 id. 376. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.