converse rule in Kansas

2006In Thompson , the Court of Appeals restated the above converse rule and noted that where there is a settlement between the insurer and the defendant, the insured is no longer entitled to recover for the insured part of the loss. 3 Kan.

1973(First Nat’l Bank v. Lovitt, supra; Palmer v. Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 156 Kan. 690 , 135 P. 2d 899 ; and Clinton v. State Tax Commission, supra.) In support of their cross-appeal defendants strenuously argue that 79-2005 is unavailable to a taxpayer desiring to challenge the payment of a mortgage registration fee.

1973(First Nat’l Bank v. Lovitt, supra; Palmer v. Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 156 Kan. 690 , 135 P. 2d 899 ; and Clinton v. State Tax Commission, supra.) In support of their cross-appeal defendants strenuously argue that 79-2005 is unavailable to a taxpayer desiring to challenge the payment of a mortgage registration fee.

1973(Mtr. of Suffolk Co. Loan v. Bragalini, 5 N. Y. 2d 579, 159 N. E. 2d 164 .) As previously noted, the converse rule prevails in this jurisdiction.

1958(Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach Co., 128 Kan. 230 , 276 Pac. 796 ; Beecher v. Ritchie, 167 Kan. 342 , 205 P. 2d 1014 .) This is merely the converse of the rule stated in Anderson v. Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676 , 266 P. 2d 320 , that, “. . . so long as an independent contractor is guilty of no negligence in his performance of municipal improvement work, he is entitled to share the immunity from liability possessed by the city.” (p. 683.) (Our emphasis.) Another argument of defendant is that the petition is fatally defective because of the alternative allegation that defendant ‘knew or should have kn

1958(Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach Co., 128 Kan. 230 , 276 Pac. 796 ; Beecher v. Ritchie, 167 Kan. 342 , 205 P. 2d 1014 .) This is merely the converse of the rule stated in Anderson v. Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676 , 266 P. 2d 320 , that, “. . . so long as an independent contractor is guilty of no negligence in his performance of municipal improvement work, he is entitled to share the immunity from liability possessed by the city.” (p. 683.) (Our emphasis.) Another argument of defendant is that the petition is fatally defective because of the alternative allegation that defendant ‘knew or should have kn

1958(Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach Co., 128 Kan. 230 , 276 Pac. 796 ; Beecher v. Ritchie, 167 Kan. 342 , 205 P. 2d 1014 .) This is merely the converse of the rule stated in Anderson v. Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676 , 266 P. 2d 320 , that, “. . . so long as an independent contractor is guilty of no negligence in his performance of municipal improvement work, he is entitled to share the immunity from liability possessed by the city.” (p. 683.) (Our emphasis.) Another argument of defendant is that the petition is fatally defective because of the alternative allegation that defendant ‘knew or should have kn

1958(Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach Co., 128 Kan. 230 , 276 Pac. 796 ; Beecher v. Ritchie, 167 Kan. 342 , 205 P. 2d 1014 .) This is merely the converse of the rule stated in Anderson v. Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676 , 266 P. 2d 320 , that, “. . . so long as an independent contractor is guilty of no negligence in his performance of municipal improvement work, he is entitled to share the immunity from liability possessed by the city.” (p. 683.) (Our emphasis.) Another argument of defendant is that the petition is fatally defective because of the alternative allegation that defendant ‘knew or should have kn

1958(Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach Co., 128 Kan. 230 , 276 Pac. 796 ; Beecher v. Ritchie, 167 Kan. 342 , 205 P. 2d 1014 .) This is merely the converse of the rule stated in Anderson v. Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676 , 266 P. 2d 320 , that, “. . . so long as an independent contractor is guilty of no negligence in his performance of municipal improvement work, he is entitled to share the immunity from liability possessed by the city.” (p. 683.) (Our emphasis.) Another argument of defendant is that the petition is fatally defective because of the alternative allegation that defendant ‘knew or should have kn

1958(Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach Co., 128 Kan. 230 , 276 Pac. 796 ; Beecher v. Ritchie, 167 Kan. 342 , 205 P. 2d 1014 .) This is merely the converse of the rule stated in Anderson v. Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676 , 266 P. 2d 320 , that, “. . . so long as an independent contractor is guilty of no negligence in his performance of municipal improvement work, he is entitled to share the immunity from liability possessed by the city.” (p. 683.) (Our emphasis.) Another argument of defendant is that the petition is fatally defective because of the alternative allegation that defendant ‘knew or should have kn

1958(Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach Co., 128 Kan. 230 , 276 Pac. 796 ; Beecher v. Ritchie, 167 Kan. 342 , 205 P. 2d 1014 .) This is merely the converse of the rule stated in Anderson v. Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676 , 266 P. 2d 320 , that, “. . . so long as an independent contractor is guilty of no negligence in his performance of municipal improvement work, he is entitled to share the immunity from liability possessed by the city.” (p. 683.) (Our emphasis.) Another argument of defendant is that the petition is fatally defective because of the alternative allegation that defendant ‘knew or should have kn

1958(Swan v. Riverside Bathing Beach Co., 128 Kan. 230 , 276 Pac. 796 ; Beecher v. Ritchie, 167 Kan. 342 , 205 P. 2d 1014 .) This is merely the converse of the rule stated in Anderson v. Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676 , 266 P. 2d 320 , that, “. . . so long as an independent contractor is guilty of no negligence in his performance of municipal improvement work, he is entitled to share the immunity from liability possessed by the city.” (p. 683.) (Our emphasis.) Another argument of defendant is that the petition is fatally defective because of the alternative allegation that defendant ‘knew or should have kn

1958This last rule was pronounced in Shaubell v. Bennett, 173 Kan. 774 , 252 P. 2d 927 , where the alternative allegation was followed by the words, “in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence prior to her injury.” (p. 778.) The Miller case is readily distinguishable from our case because there the plaintiff sought to charge a company furnishing gas to a hotel with knowledge of a flexible gas *368 pipe connection maintained in one of the hotel rooms by the hotel owner.

1958This last rule was pronounced in Shaubell v. Bennett, 173 Kan. 774 , 252 P. 2d 927 , where the alternative allegation was followed by the words, “in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence prior to her injury.” (p. 778.) The Miller case is readily distinguishable from our case because there the plaintiff sought to charge a company furnishing gas to a hotel with knowledge of a flexible gas *368 pipe connection maintained in one of the hotel rooms by the hotel owner.

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1941See Britton v. Hunt, 9 Kan. 228 ; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223 ; Ervin v. Morris, 26 Kan. 664 ; Richards v. Thompson, 43 Kan. 209 , 23 Pac. 106 ; Stacey v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 137 , 254 Pac. 339 ; Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127 , 69 P. 2d 23 ; Phillips v. Parker, 148 Kan. 474 , 83 P. 2d 709 ; Simmons v. Clark, 151 Kan. 431 , 99 P. 2d 739 .

1939(Lawrence v. Smith, supra; Eldred v. Meek, supra; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 178 Ill. 387 [ 53 N. E. 101 ]; Reid v. Voorhees, 216 Ill. 236 [ 74 N. E. 804 ].) The converse of this rule is likewise well established; That where the invalid portions can be separated from that which is valid, and still give effect to the general testamentary scheme, the invalid clauses will be disregarded, and those that are valid upheld.

1939(Lawrence v. Smith, supra; Eldred v. Meek, supra; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 178 Ill. 387 [ 53 N. E. 101 ]; Reid v. Voorhees, 216 Ill. 236 [ 74 N. E. 804 ].) The converse of this rule is likewise well established; That where the invalid portions can be separated from that which is valid, and still give effect to the general testamentary scheme, the invalid clauses will be disregarded, and those that are valid upheld.

1939(Lawrence v. Smith, supra; Eldred v. Meek, supra; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 178 Ill. 387 [ 53 N. E. 101 ]; Reid v. Voorhees, 216 Ill. 236 [ 74 N. E. 804 ].) The converse of this rule is likewise well established; That where the invalid portions can be separated from that which is valid, and still give effect to the general testamentary scheme, the invalid clauses will be disregarded, and those that are valid upheld.

1939(Lawrence v. Smith, supra; Eldred v. Meek, supra; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 178 Ill. 387 [ 53 N. E. 101 ]; Reid v. Voorhees, 216 Ill. 236 [ 74 N. E. 804 ].) The converse of this rule is likewise well established; That where the invalid portions can be separated from that which is valid, and still give effect to the general testamentary scheme, the invalid clauses will be disregarded, and those that are valid upheld.

1926The supreme court of the United States in the consideration of the situs of property for taxation said: “If we look to the decisions of other states we find the frequent ruling that when an indebtedness has taken a concrete form and become evidenced by a note, bill, mortgage or other written instrument, and that written instrument evidencing the indebtedness is left within the state in the hands of an agent of the nonresident owner to be by him used for the purposes of collection and deposit or reinvestment within the state, its taxable situs is in the state.” (New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U. S

1926The supreme court of the United States in the consideration of the situs of property for taxation said: “If we look to the decisions of other states we find the frequent ruling that when an indebtedness has taken a concrete form and become evidenced by a note, bill, mortgage or other written instrument, and that written instrument evidencing the indebtedness is left within the state in the hands of an agent of the nonresident owner to be by him used for the purposes of collection and deposit or reinvestment within the state, its taxable situs is in the state.” (New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U. S

1915On the whole, however, we think that the rule as finally settled by the English courts, with the qualification above mentioned, is the true one, and is deduced from the best consideration of the reasons on which it is founded.” (pp. 366, 368.) (See, also, the recent case, Hess v. Conway, 92 Kan. 787 , 142 Pac. 253 .) We have therefore the highest sanction for the converse doctrine, that knowledge or notice of the agent prior to the agency and clearly in the mind of the agent at the timé of the agent’s transaction for his principal is binding on the principal.

1915On the whole, however, we think that the rule as finally settled by the English courts, with the qualification above mentioned, is the true one, and is deduced from the best consideration of the reasons on which it is founded.” (pp. 366, 368.) (See, also, the recent case, Hess v. Conway, 92 Kan. 787 , 142 Pac. 253 .) We have therefore the highest sanction for the converse doctrine, that knowledge or notice of the agent prior to the agency and clearly in the mind of the agent at the timé of the agent’s transaction for his principal is binding on the principal.

1914(Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 346 ; Martin v. Ballou, 13 Barb. 119 ; and 4 Kent’s Com. 124.)” (p. 84.) Burdis v. Burdis, supra, is a well-considered case often cited by other courts and by annotators, but everything decided in it is against the contention of appellant in the case at bar.

1914(Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 346 ; Martin v. Ballou, 13 Barb. 119 ; and 4 Kent’s Com. 124.)” (p. 84.) Burdis v. Burdis, supra, is a well-considered case often cited by other courts and by annotators, but everything decided in it is against the contention of appellant in the case at bar.

1895Corp. §28; McCormick v. Gas Co., 48 Kan. 614 .) We think that the converse of this rule is equally true, and, in order to create an individual liability on the part of a stockholder for the debts of the company upon a mere agreement to subscribe for stock, -it must appear that the corporation existed at the time the agreement was made, or that the agreement was presented to the directors of the corporation after its organization and accepted by a regular vote or order.