17 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Welfare of D.D.B.green2 sentences2001During this conversation, the state’s attorney explained that she intended to renew the motion to amend the charge in light of a recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in which the court held that a Duluth ordinance violation was merely an ordinance violation, not equivalent to a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor. 5 See generally In re Welfare of D.D.B., 596 N.W.2d 666, 667 (Minn.App.1999). 2000See In re Welfare of D.D.B., 596 N.W.2d 666, 667-68 (Minn.App.1999) (stating that a violation of the Duluth City Code is not a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor but simply an ordinance violation). | 2 | 2 |
Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Rosevillegreen1 sentence2016We recognize that the solid-waste ordinance is not a zoning ordinance, but we are mindful that when construing ordinances that restrict land use, we “must give weight to the 8 interpretation that, while still within the confines of the term, is least restrictive upon the rights of the property owner to use his land as he wishes.” Frank’s Nursery, 295 N.W.2d at 608-09 (construing the “plain and ordinary meaning” of an ordinance and applying principle that “zoning ordinances should be construed strictly against the city and in favor of the property owner”). | 1 | 1 |
Manco of Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Board of Rock Dell Townshipgreen1 sentence2014See Manco, 583 N.W.2d at 295 . | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2011But Smith does not support this proposition, because the court in Smith held that “an ordinance violation, when punishment includes confinement, is a crime for the purpose of the postconviction remedy statute.” Id. at 457-58 , 223 N.W.2d at 777 (emphasis added). 2011But Smith does not support this proposition, because the court in Smith held that “an ordinance violation, when punishment includes confinement, is a crime for the purpose of the postconviction remedy statute.” Id. at 457-58 , 223 N.W.2d at 777 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Mohler v. City of St. Louis Parkgreen1 sentence2004Louis Park, 643 N.W.2d 623, 634 (Minn.App.2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences1975Our discussion of a similar objection in State v. McDonald, 298 Minn. 449, 455 , 215 N. W. 2d 607, 611 (1974), disposes of the matter: “Defendant also contends that the state improperly cross-examined him concerning his prior criminal record, specifically including an ordinance violation. 1975Our discussion of a similar objection in State v. McDonald, 298 Minn. 449, 455 , 215 N. W. 2d 607, 611 (1974), disposes of the matter: “Defendant also contends that the state improperly cross-examined him concerning his prior criminal record, specifically including an ordinance violation. | 1 | 1 |
City of St. Paul v. Whidbygreen2 sentences1974Paul v. Whidby, 295 Minn. 129, 136 , 203 N. W. 2d 823, 827 (1972): “* * * Any citizen imprisoned for violation of a city ordinance would be incredulous if informed that he was not experiencing a criminal sanction. “* * * The fact that certain acts are proscribed by ordinances enacted by a municipal corporation in its legislative capacity rather than by state criminal statutes makes them no less criminal in nature.” We hold that an ordinance violation, when punishment includes *458 confinement, is a crime for the purpose of the postconviction remedy statute. 1974Paul v. Whidby, 295 Minn. 129, 136 , 203 N. W. 2d 823, 827 (1972): “* * * Any citizen imprisoned for violation of a city ordinance would be incredulous if informed that he was not experiencing a criminal sanction. “* * * The fact that certain acts are proscribed by ordinances enacted by a municipal corporation in its legislative capacity rather than by state criminal statutes makes them no less criminal in nature.” We hold that an ordinance violation, when punishment includes *458 confinement, is a crime for the purpose of the postconviction remedy statute. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Weltzin
green
2 sentences2001The court also reviewed the various rules of criminal procedure with potential applicability to the case, id. at 603-04 , and noted that, because the rules would have permitted the state to dismiss the tab charge and recharge the ordinance violation, the district court did not err in permitting the state to do by amendment what it could have done by dismissal. 2001Id. at 606 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
City of St. Paul v. Dalsin
green
2 sentences1989The court held the ordinance invalid and unenforceable as to roofers, not because the ordinance requirement was unfair to the defendant roofer (although it may have been), but because the licensing requirement "has no reasonable relation to any justifiable regulation of the roofing trade." Id. at 330 , 71 N.W.2d at 859 . 1989The court held the ordinance invalid and unenforceable as to roofers, not because the ordinance requirement was unfair to the defendant roofer (although it may have been), but because the licensing requirement "has no reasonable relation to any justifiable regulation of the roofing trade." Id. at 330 , 71 N.W.2d at 859 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Borst
green
2 sentences1975In State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388 , 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967), and State v. Illingworth, 278 Minn. 434 , 154 N.W.2d 687 (1967), this court held that an indigent defendant was entitled to the assistance of counsel, without *510 regard to whether he was charged with an ordinance violation or a violation of a statute. 1975In State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388 , 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967), and State v. Illingworth, 278 Minn. 434 , 154 N.W.2d 687 (1967), this court held that an indigent defendant was entitled to the assistance of counsel, without *510 regard to whether he was charged with an ordinance violation or a violation of a statute. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State v. Illingworth
green
2 sentences1975In State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388 , 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967), and State v. Illingworth, 278 Minn. 434 , 154 N.W.2d 687 (1967), this court held that an indigent defendant was entitled to the assistance of counsel, without *510 regard to whether he was charged with an ordinance violation or a violation of a statute. 1975In State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388 , 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967), and State v. Illingworth, 278 Minn. 434 , 154 N.W.2d 687 (1967), this court held that an indigent defendant was entitled to the assistance of counsel, without *510 regard to whether he was charged with an ordinance violation or a violation of a statute. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Nornborg v. Larson
neutral
1 sentence1974Under our statutes a defendant may appeal from a conviction based on a plea of guilty or a finding of guilty and secure a trial de novo notwithstanding the fact he has previously received a fair trial free from error.” Prior to Holmes, in Village of Elbow Lake v. Holt, 69 Minn. 349, 350 , 72 N. W. 564 (1897), in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Mitchell, we held: “* * * When the appeal [from a conviction in justice court of an ordinance violation] is general, upon questions of both law and fact, and the case is tried de novo, and the defendant convicted, the district court may impose any sent | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Village of Elbow Lake v. Holt
neutral
1 sentence1974Under our statutes a defendant may appeal from a conviction based on a plea of guilty or a finding of guilty and secure a trial de novo notwithstanding the fact he has previously received a fair trial free from error.” Prior to Holmes, in Village of Elbow Lake v. Holt, 69 Minn. 349, 350 , 72 N. W. 564 (1897), in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Mitchell, we held: “* * * When the appeal [from a conviction in justice court of an ordinance violation] is general, upon questions of both law and fact, and the case is tried de novo, and the defendant convicted, the district court may impose any sent | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Madison
green
2 sentences1973Not only have we condemned such disclosures by the prosecution, State v. Madison, 281 Minn. 170 , 160 N. W. 2d 680 (1968), certiorari denied, 393 U. S. 102 , 89 S. Ct. 904 , 21 L. ed. 2d 796 (1969), but the prejudice here is compounded by the fact defendant was only 17 years of age, and under our law juvenile offenses are not crimes which can be used for impeachment. 1973Not only have we condemned such disclosures by the prosecution, State v. Madison, 281 Minn. 170 , 160 N. W. 2d 680 (1968), certiorari denied, 393 U. S. 102 , 89 S. Ct. 904 , 21 L. ed. 2d 796 (1969), but the prejudice here is compounded by the fact defendant was only 17 years of age, and under our law juvenile offenses are not crimes which can be used for impeachment. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Duncan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1973That matter came before us to compel the Hennepin County Municipal Court to grant the defendant a jury trial on the authority of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 , 88 S. Ct. 1444 , 20 L. ed. 2d 491 (1968). 1973That matter came before us to compel the Hennepin County Municipal Court to grant the defendant a jury trial on the authority of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 , 88 S. Ct. 1444 , 20 L. ed. 2d 491 (1968). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Arey v. Brown
green
1 sentence1973Not only have we condemned such disclosures by the prosecution, State v. Madison, 281 Minn. 170 , 160 N. W. 2d 680 (1968), certiorari denied, 393 U. S. 102 , 89 S. Ct. 904 , 21 L. ed. 2d 796 (1969), but the prejudice here is compounded by the fact defendant was only 17 years of age, and under our law juvenile offenses are not crimes which can be used for impeachment. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
State Ex Rel. Connolly v. Parks
green
2 sentences1967Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 625 , 273 N. W. 233, 234 , which prohibited a municipal court from according a defendant a jury trial for an ordinance violation, we said: *145 “* * * We do not understand that respondent seriously claims that the punishment of imprisonment for a maximum of 90 days is such a serious punishment as to remove the offense in question from the class of petty offenses for which there is no right to a jury trial.” In very recent years, however, the Supreme Court of the United States and our own court have concurrently adopted a more solicitous attitude toward the rig 1967Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 625 , 273 N. W. 233, 234 , which prohibited a municipal court from according a defendant a jury trial for an ordinance violation, we said: *145 “* * * We do not understand that respondent seriously claims that the punishment of imprisonment for a maximum of 90 days is such a serious punishment as to remove the offense in question from the class of petty offenses for which there is no right to a jury trial.” In very recent years, however, the Supreme Court of the United States and our own court have concurrently adopted a more solicitous attitude toward the rig | 1 | 1967–1967 |
State v. Cavett
neutral
2 sentences1950They are simply local police regulations or by-laws for the government of the municipal ity, and have no reference to or connection with the administran tion of the criminal laws of the state” (Italics supplied.) A violation of a municipal ordinance is not an offense against the state, but only against the municipality enacting it. 3 Thus, an act may be punishable under both the general law and a municipal ordinance (see State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 505 , 214 N. W. 479 ), and a conviction under the ordinance is not a bar to a prosecution under the general law. 1950They are simply local police regulations or by-laws for the government of the municipal ity, and have no reference to or connection with the administran tion of the criminal laws of the state” (Italics supplied.) A violation of a municipal ordinance is not an offense against the state, but only against the municipality enacting it. 3 Thus, an act may be punishable under both the general law and a municipal ordinance (see State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 505 , 214 N. W. 479 ), and a conviction under the ordinance is not a bar to a prosecution under the general law. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
State v. Pehrson
green
2 sentences1948In State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573 , 287 N.W. 313 , 123 A.L.R. 1045 , this court set out certain rules when it held an ordinance to be in violation of state and federal constitutional prohibitions against class legislation. 1948In State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573 , 287 N.W. 313 , 123 A.L.R. 1045 , this court set out certain rules when it held an ordinance to be in violation of state and federal constitutional prohibitions against class legislation. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
State v. Lee
green
2 sentences1937State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445 , 13 N. W. 913 . 1937State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445 , 13 N. W. 913 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.