ordinance violation in Kansas

2007The court also had jurisdiction where the ordinance violation could have been charged as a felony in the district court due to an enhancement based upon the dollar amount of damages or loss if the county/district attorney denied felony prosecution. 12 277 Kan. 136 (2004). 13 244 Kan. 207 (1989). 14 The Legislature amended K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8-1567 twice during the 2007 session.

2007The court also had jurisdiction where the ordinance violation could have been charged as a felony in the district court due to an enhancement based upon the dollar amount of damages or loss if the county/district attorney denied felony prosecution. 12 277 Kan. 136 (2004). 13 244 Kan. 207 (1989). 14 The Legislature amended K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8-1567 twice during the 2007 session.

2003Boyles v. City of Topeka, 271 Kan. 69 , 21 P.3d 974 (2001).

2003Boyles v. City of Topeka, 271 Kan. 69 , 21 P.3d 974 (2001).

2001The prosecutor concedes that the ordinance clause the complaint undertakes to enforce has no motive other than to regulate against unsightly use of property — that breach of the public safety was neither charged nor at stake.” Richards, 666 S.W.2d at 11 .

2001The prosecutor concedes that the ordinance clause the complaint undertakes to enforce has no motive other than to regulate against unsightly use of property—that breach of the public safety was neither charged nor at stake." Richards, 666 S.W.2d at 11 .

1997Cf. State v. Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517, 532 , 641 A.2d 257 (1994) (holding unconstitutionally vague a portion of a statute enhancing a penalty if the offender acted “at least in part” with a proscribed motivation).

1997Cf. State v. Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517, 532 , 641 A.2d 257 (1994) (holding unconstitutionally vague a portion of a statute enhancing a penalty if the offender acted “at least in part” with a proscribed motivation).

1991App. 2d 478 , 726 *474 P.2d 796, rev. denied 240 Kan. 804 (1986), both stand for the proposition that fault can be assessed presumptively if the injury suffered was directly related to the ordinance violation involved.

1957(See also Horner v. City of Atchison, 93 K6an. 557, 144 Pac. 1010 .) In State, ex rel., v. City of Hutchinson, 109 Kan. 484, 487 , 207 Pac. 440 , we held that it should be presumed that a city complied with the law in passing an ordinance and such presumption should not be overthrown except by the clearest and most convincing evidence; that the time will soon come when cities will be unable to prove either their corporate existence or their territorial limits by *400 proper record, evidence.

1957(See also Horner v. City of Atchison, 93 K6an. 557, 144 Pac. 1010 .) In State, ex rel., v. City of Hutchinson, 109 Kan. 484, 487 , 207 Pac. 440 , we held that it should be presumed that a city complied with the law in passing an ordinance and such presumption should not be overthrown except by the clearest and most convincing evidence; that the time will soon come when cities will be unable to prove either their corporate existence or their territorial limits by *400 proper record, evidence.

1957(See also Horner v. City of Atchison, 93 K6an. 557, 144 Pac. 1010 .) In State, ex rel., v. City of Hutchinson, 109 Kan. 484, 487 , 207 Pac. 440 , we held that it should be presumed that a city complied with the law in passing an ordinance and such presumption should not be overthrown except by the clearest and most convincing evidence; that the time will soon come when cities will be unable to prove either their corporate existence or their territorial limits by *400 proper record, evidence.

1942(Zumbrun v. City of Osawatomie, 135 Kan. 26 , 10 P. 2d 3 .) Damages to plaintiff’s building from the blasting operations would be just as great if the ordinance had been complied with as. though it had not.

1942(Zumbrun v. City of Osawatomie, 135 Kan. 26 , 10 P. 2d 3 .) Damages to plaintiff’s building from the blasting operations would be just as great if the ordinance had been complied with as. though it had not.

1942Redfield v. Chelsea Coal Co., 138 Kan. 373, 375 , 26 P. 2d 579 .) Here it seems clear to us, as it did to the trial court, that plaintiff, having pleaded a common-law action for damages, adds nothing to that by pleading this ordinance and its violation.

1942Redfield v. Chelsea Coal Co., 138 Kan. 373, 375 , 26 P. 2d 579 .) Here it seems clear to us, as it did to the trial court, that plaintiff, having pleaded a common-law action for damages, adds nothing to that by pleading this ordinance and its violation.