ordinance bar in Maryland

2016Statute or Ordinance Rule: Proximate Cause Under the second prong of the Statute or Ordinance Rule, Dankos must show “that the violation proximately caused the *463 injury complained of.” Blackburn, 438 Md. at 112 , 90 A.3d 464 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2016Statute or Ordinance Rule: Proximate Cause Under the second prong of the Statute or Ordinance Rule, Dankos must show “that the violation proximately caused the *463 injury complained of.” Blackburn, 438 Md. at 112 , 90 A.3d 464 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2001In Donner v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 196 Md. 475, 490 , 77 A.2d 305 (1950), the Court of Appeals discussed the presumption of continuance.

2001In Donner v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 196 Md. 475, 490 , 77 A.2d 305 (1950), the Court of Appeals discussed the presumption of continuance.

1975That court was of the view that if a similar statute were passed on a state-wide basis in Michigan it might withstand the test of constitutionality, but as an ordinance deprived the plaintiffs of "due process of law." *263 Although the efforts of the City of Bowie to alleviate its litter problem are indeed most laudable, it is my view that unlike the result reached in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra , the appellants here have sustained the burden of proof in showing that the means employed by the use of the ordinance do not bear a real and substantial relation to the end the City sought to attai

1975That court was of the view that if a similar statute were passed on a state-wide basis in Michigan it might withstand the test of constitutionality, but as an ordinance deprived the plaintiffs of “due process of law.” Although the efforts of the City of Bowie to alleviate its litter problem are indeed most laudable, it is my view that unlike the result reached in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, the appellants here have sustained the burden of proof in showing that the means employed by the use of the ordinance do not bear a real and substantial relation to the end the City sought to attain, and

1975That court was of the view that if a similar statute were passed on a state-wide basis in Michigan it might withstand the test of constitutionality, but as an ordinance deprived the plaintiffs of "due process of law." *263 Although the efforts of the City of Bowie to alleviate its litter problem are indeed most laudable, it is my view that unlike the result reached in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra , the appellants here have sustained the burden of proof in showing that the means employed by the use of the ordinance do not bear a real and substantial relation to the end the City sought to attai

1975That court was of the view that if a similar statute were passed on a state-wide basis in Michigan it might withstand the test of constitutionality, but as an ordinance deprived the plaintiffs of “due process of law.” Although the efforts of the City of Bowie to alleviate its litter problem are indeed most laudable, it is my view that unlike the result reached in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, the appellants here have sustained the burden of proof in showing that the means employed by the use of the ordinance do not bear a real and substantial relation to the end the City sought to attain, and

1963If an exception to the general rule is permitted for reasons that are not urgent and substantial, but for mere convenience, then a provision of the ordinance for an exception might cease to be such and, in practice, become the rule.” The philosophy implicit in Heath’s reading of the ordinance was expressed in City of Baltimore v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632 , which struck down a special ordinance granting an exception to the general zoning ordinance.

1963The Court said (at p. 638): “* * * when the legislative body of a municipality adopts a comprehensive zoning plan, exceptions should be allowed only in such cases as are clearly exceptions in fact to the purposes of the ordinance, and without which there would be imposed a burden upon the owner of the property not justified by considerations of the public health, safety and welfare.” Easter v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 395 , was a case in which the Board and the lower court approved the granting of a spe *7 cial exception which would have allowed a store front to be brought out to the buildin

1948Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 296 , 49 A. 2d *24 799; Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 593 , 51 A. 2d 269 ; Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623 , 51 A. 2d 273 ; Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 678 , 51 A. 2d 658 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, supra. Under the provisions of the 1939 Code, Article 43, sections 471 to 496 inclusive, provision is made for the regulation and control of those engaged in the occupation of “Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists”.

1948Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 296 , 49 A. 2d *24 799; Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 593 , 51 A. 2d 269 ; Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623 , 51 A. 2d 273 ; Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 678 , 51 A. 2d 658 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, supra. Under the provisions of the 1939 Code, Article 43, sections 471 to 496 inclusive, provision is made for the regulation and control of those engaged in the occupation of “Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists”.

1948Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 296 , 49 A. 2d *24 799; Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 593 , 51 A. 2d 269 ; Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623 , 51 A. 2d 273 ; Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 678 , 51 A. 2d 658 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, supra. Under the provisions of the 1939 Code, Article 43, sections 471 to 496 inclusive, provision is made for the regulation and control of those engaged in the occupation of “Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists”.

1948Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 296 , 49 A. 2d *24 799; Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 593 , 51 A. 2d 269 ; Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623 , 51 A. 2d 273 ; Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 678 , 51 A. 2d 658 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, supra. Under the provisions of the 1939 Code, Article 43, sections 471 to 496 inclusive, provision is made for the regulation and control of those engaged in the occupation of “Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists”.

1948Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 296 , 49 A. 2d *24 799; Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 593 , 51 A. 2d 269 ; Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623 , 51 A. 2d 273 ; Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 678 , 51 A. 2d 658 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, supra. Under the provisions of the 1939 Code, Article 43, sections 471 to 496 inclusive, provision is made for the regulation and control of those engaged in the occupation of “Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists”.

1948Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 296 , 49 A. 2d *24 799; Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 593 , 51 A. 2d 269 ; Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623 , 51 A. 2d 273 ; Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 678 , 51 A. 2d 658 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, supra. Under the provisions of the 1939 Code, Article 43, sections 471 to 496 inclusive, provision is made for the regulation and control of those engaged in the occupation of “Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists”.

1948Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 296 , 49 A. 2d *24 799; Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 593 , 51 A. 2d 269 ; Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623 , 51 A. 2d 273 ; Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 678 , 51 A. 2d 658 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, supra. Under the provisions of the 1939 Code, Article 43, sections 471 to 496 inclusive, provision is made for the regulation and control of those engaged in the occupation of “Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists”.

1948Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 296 , 49 A. 2d *24 799; Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 593 , 51 A. 2d 269 ; Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623 , 51 A. 2d 273 ; Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 187 Md. 678 , 51 A. 2d 658 ; Lipsitz v. Parr, supra. Under the provisions of the 1939 Code, Article 43, sections 471 to 496 inclusive, provision is made for the regulation and control of those engaged in the occupation of “Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists”.

1929A similar ordinance was before this court in Mogul v. Gaither, 142 Md. 380, 383 .

1929However, these additional provisions are regulatory and ancillary requirements of a general and reasonable-nature, well designed to secure the primary object of the ordinance, and do not raise any question which was not before the court in Mogul v. Gaither, supra. In that case,, it was determined that the ordinance was constitutional, and that its enactment was a reasonable exercise of the legislative- *191 power delegated to the municipality.