ordinance violation in Illinois

2024See Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus, 2014 IL App (2d) 130654, ¶ 21 (without the enforcement mechanism set out in article 1, division 2.1, of the Municipal Code, a municipality would have to commence another action in circuit court to convert the administrative decision into a collectible judgment, thereby vitiating the incentive to use an administrative adjudication system). ¶ 38 Based on the foregoing, we find that a home rule municipality’s conformity with section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code when administratively adjudicating an ordinance violation determines whether the enforcemen

2024See Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus, 2014 IL App (2d) 130654, ¶ 21 (without the enforcement mechanism set out in article 1, division 2.1, of the Municipal Code, a municipality would have to commence another action in circuit court to convert the administrative decision into a collectible judgment, thereby vitiating the incentive to use an administrative adjudication system). ¶ 38 Based on the foregoing, we find that a home rule municipality’s conformity with section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code when administratively adjudicating an ordinance violation determines whether the enforcemen

2017However, the exhibit suggests that Kopnick might be capable of pleading an ordinance violation and that the “with prejudice” portion of the ruling is contrary to the principle that “a cause of action should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 , 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (2006); Reynolds, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 25 , 988 N.E.2d 984 .

2017However, the exhibit suggests that Kopnick might be capable of pleading an ordinance violation and that the “with prejudice” portion of the ruling is contrary to the principle that “a cause of action should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 , 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (2006); Reynolds, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 25 , 988 N.E.2d 984 .

2017See People v. Kleutgen, 359 Ill.

2017See People v. Kleutgen, 359 Ill.

2011At common law, a plaintiff allegedly injured by an animal was required to prove in a negligence action that “the animal had a mischievous propensity to commit such injuries and that the owner had knowledge of the propensity.” Beckert v. Risberg, 33 Ill. 2d 44, 46 (1965).

2011At common law, a plaintiff allegedly injured by an animal was required to prove in a negligence action that “the animal had a mischievous propensity to commit such injuries and that the owner had knowledge of the propensity.” Beckert v. Risberg, 33 Ill. 2d 44, 46 (1965).

2011See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (an officer may temporarily stop a person for brief questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime).

2011See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (an officer may temporarily stop a person for brief questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime).

2011See Lippert, 89 Ill.2d at 179 , 59 Ill.Dec. 819 , 432 N.E.2d 605 (quoting Professor LaFave's treatise that suggests the probable cause test may be more stringent when the question confronting the officer is whether a crime had occurred). "`[T]he probable cause test is a "compromise" for accommodating the "often opposing interests" of privacy and law enforcement.

2011See Lippert, 89 Ill.2d at 179 , 59 Ill.Dec. 819 , 432 N.E.2d 605 (quoting Professor LaFave's treatise that suggests the probable cause test may be more stringent when the question confronting the officer is whether a crime had occurred). "`[T]he probable cause test is a "compromise" for accommodating the "often opposing interests" of privacy and law enforcement.

2004It is a maxim of statutory construction that “an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed.” Weast Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 102 Ill. 2d 337, 340 (1984).

2004It is a maxim of statutory construction that "an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed." Weast Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Ill.2d 337, 340 , 80 Ill.Dec. 763 , 466 N.E.2d 215 (1984).

2004Contrary to the Cities’ assertions, the contempt proceedings were not separate from the ordinance violation proceedings; the Cities filed their contempt petitions under the same case numbers as the ordinance violations. “[IJndirect criminal contempt is a separate and distinct proceeding in and of itself and is not part of the original case being tried when the contemptuous act occurred.” People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill.

2004NOTES [1] Contrary to the Cities' assertions, the contempt proceedings were not separate from the ordinance violation proceedings; the Cities filed their contempt petitions under the same case numbers as the ordinance violations. "[I]ndirect criminal contempt is a separate and distinct proceeding in and of itself and is not part of the original case being tried when the contemptuous act occurred." People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill.App.3d 433, 438 , 266 Ill.Dec. 713 , 775 N.E.2d 275 (2002), citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 , 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2456 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359, 375 (1990)

2004The court is entitled to take reasonable steps for the collection of the $75 [sic] fine but that was not its goal in these cases.” 336 Ill.

2004The court is entitled to take reasonable steps for the collection of the $75 [ sic ] fine but that was not its goal in these cases." 336 Ill.App.3d 558, 560-61 , 271 Ill.Dec. 217 , 784 N.E.2d 435 (Cook, J., dissenting).

1999The best indicator of this intent is the language used in the ordinance or rule (American National Bank v. Powell, 293 Ill.

1999The best indicator of this intent is the language used in the ordinance or rule ( American National Bank v. Powell , 293 Ill.

1996(Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 425 , 581 N.E.2d 656 ; Davis v. Marathon Oil Co. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 380 , 356 N.E.2d 93 .) An ordinance violation does not constitute negligence per se, and therefore a defendant may prevail despite an ordinance violation by showing that he or she acted reasonably under the circumstances.

1996(Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 425 , 581 N.E.2d 656 ; Davis v. Marathon Oil Co. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 380 , 356 N.E.2d 93 .) An ordinance violation does not constitute negligence per se, and therefore a defendant may prevail despite an ordinance violation by showing that he or she acted reasonably under the circumstances.

2012The express power to arrest granted in section 107-3 "necessarily implies the power to undertake less intrusive actions, such as a traffic stop or a brief detention to await pursuing police officers, so long as there are reasonable grounds to believe the person seized has committed an offense other than an ordinance violation." People v. Shick, 318 Ill.App.3d 899, 904 , 253 Ill.Dec. 125 , 744 N.E.2d 858 (2001). ¶ 26 Thus, a security guard, with the powers of an ordinary citizen, may only stop and detain a person if he "has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance v

2012The express power to arrest granted in section 107-3 "necessarily implies the power to undertake less intrusive actions, such as a traffic stop or a brief detention to await pursuing police officers, so long as there are reasonable grounds to believe the person seized has committed an offense other than an ordinance violation." People v. Shick, 318 Ill.App.3d 899, 904 , 253 Ill.Dec. 125 , 744 N.E.2d 858 (2001). ¶ 26 Thus, a security guard, with the powers of an ordinary citizen, may only stop and detain a person if he "has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance v

2011"The statutory phrase `reasonable grounds' has the same substantive meaning as `probable cause.'" People v. Lee, 214 Ill.2d 476, 484 , 293 Ill.Dec. 267 , 828 N.E.2d 237 (2005).

2011"The statutory phrase `reasonable grounds' has the same substantive meaning as `probable cause.'" People v. Lee, 214 Ill.2d 476, 484 , 293 Ill.Dec. 267 , 828 N.E.2d 237 (2005).

2004NOTES [1] Contrary to the Cities' assertions, the contempt proceedings were not separate from the ordinance violation proceedings; the Cities filed their contempt petitions under the same case numbers as the ordinance violations. "[I]ndirect criminal contempt is a separate and distinct proceeding in and of itself and is not part of the original case being tried when the contemptuous act occurred." People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill.App.3d 433, 438 , 266 Ill.Dec. 713 , 775 N.E.2d 275 (2002), citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 , 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2456 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359, 375 (1990)

2004NOTES [1] Contrary to the Cities' assertions, the contempt proceedings were not separate from the ordinance violation proceedings; the Cities filed their contempt petitions under the same case numbers as the ordinance violations. "[I]ndirect criminal contempt is a separate and distinct proceeding in and of itself and is not part of the original case being tried when the contemptuous act occurred." People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill.App.3d 433, 438 , 266 Ill.Dec. 713 , 775 N.E.2d 275 (2002), citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 , 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2456 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359, 375 (1990)