ordinance violation in California

2022(Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 393 [“Because the current version of an ordinance controls, the issues raised by an appeal may be rendered moot by an amendment which either repeals or significantly modifies the portion of the ordinance to which the challenge is directed”].) It is unclear whether our holding that the sales price is to be calculated utilizing the revised language in section 54237.9 means the parties will agree on the calculation.

2010A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453 [ 246 P.2d 688 ]; see Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 393 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 164 ] [case may be rendered moot “by an amendment which either repeals or significantly modifies the portion of the ordinance to which the challenge is directed.”]; Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford (9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 [“As a general rule, if a challenged law is repealed or expires, the case becomes moot.”].) The ordinance imposing a moratorium on consideration of conversion applications expired several mont

2015Texas 1994) 860 F.Supp. 344, 346, 354 , reversed on another ground in Johnson v. City of Dallas (5th Cir. 1995) 61 F.3d 442 [ordinances that prohibit sleeping in public space do not implicate the right to travel].) The ordinance does not bar anyone from entering into or leaving the City.

2015(Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1102 [an ordinance that bans camping and *61 storing personal possessions on public property does not directly impede the right to travel]; Sanchez v. City of Fresno (E.D.Cal. 2012) 914 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1109-1111 (Sanchez) [dismissing violation of right to travel claim even though the complaint alleged the defendants’ policies singled out the homeless; seizing and destroying the property of homeless persons had an incidental impact on travel]; Johnson v. City of Dallas (N.D.Tex. 1994) 860 F.Supp. 344, 346, 354 , revd. on another ground in Johnson v. City of Dallas

1980The court in Burton , however, considered the same ordinance and standard for denying a license as was involved in the Sunset Amusement Co. case, supra, 7 Cal.3d 64, 73. 2 Although the parties do not cite the case to us, we feel compelled to note People ex rel.

1979Although enactments outside the criminal area have occasionally been subjected to scrutiny on grounds of vagueness — especially in cases involving the right to practice a recognized profession (see, e.g., Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 220-233 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 , 461 P.2d 375 ]; Hall v. Bureau of Employment Agencies (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d 482, 490-495 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 725 ]; Goldberg v. Barger (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 987, 991 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 827 ]; McMurtry v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1960) 180 Cal. App.2d 760, 766-773 [ 4 Cal. Rptr. 910 ]), or the exercise

2024(Carter, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051, fn. 7 .) In this context, the court suggested that the RSO’s definition of maximum rent implied that when there is no legal rent the baseline maximum rent is $0.

2022(See Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 292, fn. 12 .) But a violation of the ordinance will not necessarily be a violation of the statute.

2022Duplication occurs only where the ordinance covers no different ground, 3 so “a conviction under the ordinance will operate to bar prosecution under state law for the same offense.” (Ibid., quoting People v. Orozco (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 507, 511, fn. 1 .) If it is possible to violate the ordinance without violating state law, as it is here, there is no duplication.

2015(Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1102 [an ordinance that bans camping and *61 storing personal possessions on public property does not directly impede the right to travel]; Sanchez v. City of Fresno (E.D.Cal. 2012) 914 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1109-1111 (Sanchez) [dismissing violation of right to travel claim even though the complaint alleged the defendants’ policies singled out the homeless; seizing and destroying the property of homeless persons had an incidental impact on travel]; Johnson v. City of Dallas (N.D.Tex. 1994) 860 F.Supp. 344, 346, 354 , revd. on another ground in Johnson v. City of Dallas

2015(Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1102 [an ordinance that bans camping and *61 storing personal possessions on public property does not directly impede the right to travel]; Sanchez v. City of Fresno (E.D.Cal. 2012) 914 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1109-1111 (Sanchez) [dismissing violation of right to travel claim even though the complaint alleged the defendants’ policies singled out the homeless; seizing and destroying the property of homeless persons had an incidental impact on travel]; Johnson v. City of Dallas (N.D.Tex. 1994) 860 F.Supp. 344, 346, 354 , revd. on another ground in Johnson v. City of Dallas

2014(Creason v. Dept. of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 631 [“Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts”].) Given the allegations in the complaint, plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for violation of the equal protection clause.

2010A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453 [ 246 P.2d 688 ]; see Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 393 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 164 ] [case may be rendered moot “by an amendment which either repeals or significantly modifies the portion of the ordinance to which the challenge is directed.”]; Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford (9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 [“As a general rule, if a challenged law is repealed or expires, the case becomes moot.”].) The ordinance imposing a moratorium on consideration of conversion applications expired several mont

2010A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453 [ 246 P.2d 688 ]; see Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 393 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 164 ] [case may be rendered moot “by an amendment which either repeals or significantly modifies the portion of the ordinance to which the challenge is directed.”]; Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford (9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 [“As a general rule, if a challenged law is repealed or expires, the case becomes moot.”].) The ordinance imposing a moratorium on consideration of conversion applications expired several mont

2010A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453 [ 246 P.2d 688 ]; see Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 393 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 164 ] [case may be rendered moot “by an amendment which either repeals or significantly modifies the portion of the ordinance to which the challenge is directed.”]; Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford (9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 [“As a general rule, if a challenged law is repealed or expires, the case becomes moot.”].) The ordinance imposing a moratorium on consideration of conversion applications expired several mont

2007In its counsel’s letter supporting its request for a special adjustment, Owner challenged application of the Ordinance’s presumption on grounds it was “improper as a matter of law.” Citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 698 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 ], Owner maintained a local ordinance “may not ‘alter the preponderance of evidence burden of proof’ ” and that an ordinance would be void to the extent it purported to lay down rules of evidence.

2007In its counsel’s letter supporting its request for a special adjustment, Owner challenged application of the Ordinance’s presumption on grounds it was “improper as a matter of law.” Citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 698 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 682 , 693 P.2d 261 ], Owner maintained a local ordinance “may not ‘alter the preponderance of evidence burden of proof’ ” and that an ordinance would be void to the extent it purported to lay down rules of evidence.

2002The "sine qua non" for application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is thus the "discretionary deployment of the police power" in "the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases." ( Ehrlich, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 869 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 , 911 P.2d 429 (plur. opn. of Arabian, J.).) Only "individualized development fees wan-ant a type of review akin to the conditional conveyances at issue in Nollan and Dolan." ( Santa Monica Beach, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 968 P.2d 993 ; see also Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1022 , 73 Cal.Rp

2002The "sine qua non" for application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is thus the "discretionary deployment of the police power" in "the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases." ( Ehrlich, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 869 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 , 911 P.2d 429 (plur. opn. of Arabian, J.).) Only "individualized development fees wan-ant a type of review akin to the conditional conveyances at issue in Nollan and Dolan." ( Santa Monica Beach, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 968 P.2d 993 ; see also Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1022 , 73 Cal.Rp

2002Finally, Justice Kennard agreed that "[b]ecause the $280,000 recreational mitigation fee was imposed on Ehrlich's development application individually, and not pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability, the constitutionality of this fee is evaluated using the Nollan Dolan `essential nexus' and `rough proportionality' analysis." ( Id. at p. 907 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) A majority in Ehrlich further agreed that to the extent a development mitigation fee is not subject to heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan , there must nonetheless be a "reasonable relationship"

2002Finally, Justice Kennard agreed that "[b]ecause the $280,000 recreational mitigation fee was imposed on Ehrlich's development application individually, and not pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability, the constitutionality of this fee is evaluated using the Nollan Dolan `essential nexus' and `rough proportionality' analysis." ( Id. at p. 907 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) A majority in Ehrlich further agreed that to the extent a development mitigation fee is not subject to heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan , there must nonetheless be a "reasonable relationship"

1996If a condition is imposed pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability — that is, as a result of a legislative determination — the condition is constitutionally permissible unless the landowner meets his or her burden of proving that the condition either does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental purpose or deprives the landowner of any economically viable use of the land. ( Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374 , ___, fn. 8 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 315-317, 320 , 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316-2317, 2320 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 111-112 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 ]

1996If a condition is imposed pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability — that is, as a result of a legislative determination — the condition is constitutionally permissible unless the landowner meets his or her burden of proving that the condition either does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental purpose or deprives the landowner of any economically viable use of the land. ( Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374 , ___, fn. 8 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 315-317, 320 , 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316-2317, 2320 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 111-112 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 ]

1996If a condition is imposed pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability — that is, as a result of a legislative determination — the condition is constitutionally permissible unless the landowner meets his or her burden of proving that the condition either does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental purpose or deprives the landowner of any economically viable use of the land. ( Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374 , ___, fn. 8 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 315-317, 320 , 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316-2317, 2320 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 111-112 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 ]

1996If a condition is imposed pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability — that is, as a result of a legislative determination — the condition is constitutionally permissible unless the landowner meets his or her burden of proving that the condition either does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental purpose or deprives the landowner of any economically viable use of the land. ( Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374 , ___, fn. 8 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 315-317, 320 , 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316-2317, 2320 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 111-112 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 ]

1996If a condition is imposed pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability — that is, as a result of a legislative determination — the condition is constitutionally permissible unless the landowner meets his or her burden of proving that the condition either does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental purpose or deprives the landowner of any economically viable use of the land. ( Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374 , ___, fn. 8 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 315-317, 320 , 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316-2317, 2320 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 111-112 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 ]

1996If a condition is imposed pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability — that is, as a result of a legislative determination — the condition is constitutionally permissible unless the landowner meets his or her burden of proving that the condition either does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental purpose or deprives the landowner of any economically viable use of the land. ( Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374 , ___, fn. 8 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 315-317, 320 , 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316-2317, 2320 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 111-112 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 ]

1994(Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra, 491 U.S. 781 ; Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 420 , 108 S.Ct. 2495 ]; ACORN v. City of Phoenix, supra, 798 F.2d 1260, 1267 .) 6 In examining the Ordinance under this test, it bears emphasis that the phrase “narrowly tailored” does not mean the “least restrictive” means imaginable or that a court could not imagine another regulation which it might find to be better tailored to the purpose served by the regulation.

1994Thus, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra, 491 U.S. at page 797 [ 105 L.Ed.2d at page 679 ] explains that “narrowly tailored” does not mean “the least intrusive means,” does not mean a “less restrictive alternative,” and that “. . . restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid ‘simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.’ ” (See also Sundance Saloon Inc. v. City of San Diego, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 821-822.) The Ordinance clearly allows ample alternatives.

1993(Cf In re Dapper (1969) 71 Cal.2d 184, 189 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 454 P.2d 905 ],)* ** 5 For these reasons, in evaluating the validity of the City’s regulations, we shall apply the language of chapter 5.24 of its municipal code (Chapter 5.24) as amended on July 25, 1991.

1993(Cf In re Dapper (1969) 71 Cal.2d 184, 189 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 454 P.2d 905 ],)* ** 5 For these reasons, in evaluating the validity of the City’s regulations, we shall apply the language of chapter 5.24 of its municipal code (Chapter 5.24) as amended on July 25, 1991.

1993(Callie, supra, at p. 19 .) Because the current version of an ordinance controls, the issues raised by an appeal may be rendered moot by an amendment which either repeals or significantly modifies the portion of the ordinance to which the challenge is directed. ( Callie, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at pp. 18-19 [reversing judgment and directing the trial court to dismiss the action where the portion of the ordinance which it attacked had been repealed]; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Oxnard (1985) 40 Cal.3d 1, 3 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 672 , 706 P.2d 285 ] [reversing the judgment for the trial court’s rec

1993(Callie, supra, at p. 19 .) Because the current version of an ordinance controls, the issues raised by an appeal may be rendered moot by an amendment which either repeals or significantly modifies the portion of the ordinance to which the challenge is directed. ( Callie, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at pp. 18-19 [reversing judgment and directing the trial court to dismiss the action where the portion of the ordinance which it attacked had been repealed]; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Oxnard (1985) 40 Cal.3d 1, 3 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 672 , 706 P.2d 285 ] [reversing the judgment for the trial court’s rec

1992Once that is established, “a rebuttable presumption arises that the potential harm to the public outweighs the potential harm to the defendant.” (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 72 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 715 , 672 P.2d 121 ], fn. omitted.) If the defendant demonstrates that the preliminary injunction would result in grave or irreparable harm, then the injunction should be granted only after the trial court considers “(1) the degree of certainty of the outcome on the merits, and (2) the consequences to each of the parties of granting or denying interim relief ....

1992Once that is established, “a rebuttable presumption arises that the potential harm to the public outweighs the potential harm to the defendant.” (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 72 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 715 , 672 P.2d 121 ], fn. omitted.) If the defendant demonstrates that the preliminary injunction would result in grave or irreparable harm, then the injunction should be granted only after the trial court considers “(1) the degree of certainty of the outcome on the merits, and (2) the consequences to each of the parties of granting or denying interim relief ....

1992(United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440-441 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ].) However, prior to the patsearch, there were no grounds to take defendant into custody for the ordinance violation. 1 Thus, we find no authority permitting Officer Ryan to frisk defendant simply because he was on parole. 2.

1992(United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440-441 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ].) However, prior to the patsearch, there were no grounds to take defendant into custody for the ordinance violation. 1 Thus, we find no authority permitting Officer Ryan to frisk defendant simply because he was on parole. 2.

1991The California Supreme Court supplied the following definition from section 18090.2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code: an “outdoor advertising display sign” is “ ‘a rigidly assembled sign, display, or device permanently affixed to the ground or permanently attached to a building or other inherently permanent structure constituting or used for the display of, a commercial or other advertisement to the public.’ ” (Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 856, fn. 2 .) Believing that this definition would avoid constitutional issues raised by a more expansive definition, the co

1987The fact that time considerations are included in subsection (k) but omitted in table No. 7 of subsection (i) is compelling evidence of legislative intent that time of use was not a factor for consideration vis-a-vis a grandfathered structure. (1b) Thus in response to the city's first contention on appeal, we determine that the city council's interpretation of the ordinance was in error. (4a) Looking next to the issue of whether the action was governed by sections 1085 or 1094.5 we conclude that the trial court was correct in applying ordinary or traditional mandamus to the proceeding under se

1987The fact that time considerations are included in subsection (k) but omitted in table No. 7 of subsection (i) is compelling evidence of legislative intent that time of use was not a factor for consideration vis-a-vis a grandfathered structure. (1b) Thus in response to the city's first contention on appeal, we determine that the city council's interpretation of the ordinance was in error. (4a) Looking next to the issue of whether the action was governed by sections 1085 or 1094.5 we conclude that the trial court was correct in applying ordinary or traditional mandamus to the proceeding under se

1987Water Dist. (1967) 256 Cal. App.2d 271, 278 [ 63 Cal. Rptr. 889 ]; citing Brock v. Superior Court (1952) 109 Cal. App.2d 594, 598-601 [ 241 P.2d 283 ].) On the other hand, where an agency is exercising a quasi-legislative function, judicial review must proceed under ordinary or traditional mandamus. ( Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun.

1987Water Dist. (1967) 256 Cal. App.2d 271, 278 [ 63 Cal. Rptr. 889 ]; citing Brock v. Superior Court (1952) 109 Cal. App.2d 594, 598-601 [ 241 P.2d 283 ].) On the other hand, where an agency is exercising a quasi-legislative function, judicial review must proceed under ordinary or traditional mandamus. ( Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun.