mere personal privilege in Missouri

17 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1832–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

Case	Followed	Cited
Bizzell v. Kodner Development Corp.green mo · 1985 · cited in 5 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1986–2001 2 sentences 1987“Statutes fixing venue confer a mere personal privilege which may be waived by the party entitled to assert it.” Bizzell v. Kodner Development Corp., 700 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo. banc 1985). 1986“Statutes fixing venue confer a mere personal privilege which may be waived by the party entitled to assert it.” Id. at 822 .	3	5
Osage Homestead, Inc. v. City of New Florencegreen moctapp · 1986 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1998–2005 2 sentences 2005E.D.1998) (quoting Osage Homestead, Inc. v. City of New Florence, 713 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Mo.App. 1998However, under Missouri law, “[sjtatutes fixing venue confer a mere personal privilege which may be waived by the party entitled to assert it.” Osage Homestead, Inc. v. City of New Florence, 713 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Mo.App.	2	2
Mertens v. Hewitt Associatesgreen scotus · 1993 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (referring to “injunction, mandamus, and restitution” as “categories of relief that were typically available in equity”); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984) (treating writs of prohibition and mandamus as “a common-law parallel to the § 1983 injunction at issue here”); Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 609 (1968) (stating that “[t]he distinction drawn [in an earlier case] between mandamus and a mandatory injunction seems formalistic in the present day and age,” following the merger of law and equity); 12 C.A.	1	1
Stern v. South Chester Tube Co.green scotus · 1968 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (referring to “injunction, mandamus, and restitution” as “categories of relief that were typically available in equity”); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984) (treating writs of prohibition and mandamus as “a common-law parallel to the § 1983 injunction at issue here”); Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 609 (1968) (stating that “[t]he distinction drawn [in an earlier case] between mandamus and a mandatory injunction seems formalistic in the present day and age,” following the merger of law and equity); 12 C.A.	1	1
Pulliam v. Allengreen scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (referring to “injunction, mandamus, and restitution” as “categories of relief that were typically available in equity”); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984) (treating writs of prohibition and mandamus as “a common-law parallel to the § 1983 injunction at issue here”); Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 609 (1968) (stating that “[t]he distinction drawn [in an earlier case] between mandamus and a mandatory injunction seems formalistic in the present day and age,” following the merger of law and equity); 12 C.A.	1	1
Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co. v. David Orf, Inc.green moctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 1 sentence 2005Under Missouri law, venue is “a mere personal privilege which may be waived by the party entitled to assert it.” Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co. v. David Orf, Inc., 983 S.W.2d 541, 547 (Mo.App.	1	1
Hoffman v. Sedlmayr Enterprises, Inc.green moctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997What Employer ignores, however, is the teaching of Hoffman that in a workers’ compensation case, as in other cases, “the fixing of venue confers a mere personal privilege which may be waived by the party entitled to assert it.” Id. at 816 [3]. 1997We find Employer has clearly waived any objection to “venue” “by taking steps relating to the merits of the case before objecting to venue.” Id. at 816 [4], This court cannot grant itself jurisdiction to hear this case.	1	1
Ottmann v. Ottmanngreen moctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 1 sentence 1993In re Marriage of Ottmann, 764 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Mo.App.1989).	1	1
Marriage of Norman v. Normangreen moctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 1 sentence 1989Norman v. Norman, 604 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Mo.App.1980).	1	1
Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Service Co.green mo · 1983 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 1 sentence 1983Union Electric Company v. Scott, 470 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo.App.1971); see Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Service Co., 646 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. banc 1983).	1	1
State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Scottgreen moctapp · 1971 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 1 sentence 1983Union Electric Company v. Scott, 470 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo.App.1971); see Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Service Co., 646 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. banc 1983).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
Griswold v. Carthage neutral moctapp · 1885 2 sentences 1926As supporting the principle that the Nebraska statute conferred a mere personal privilege which was not assignable the court in Erath & Flynn v. Allen & Son et al., supra, cited Griswold v. Railroad, 18 Mo. App. 52 , and Brown v. Railroad, 36 Mo. App. 458 . 1926As supporting the principle that the Nebraska statute conferred a mere personal privilege which was not assignable the court in Erath & Flynn v. Allen & Son et al., supra, cited Griswold v. Railroad, 18 Mo. App. 52 , and Brown v. Railroad, 36 Mo. App. 458 .	2	1893–1926
Brown v. Chicago, Santa Fe & California Railway Co. neutral kanctapp · 1889 2 sentences 1926As supporting the principle that the Nebraska statute conferred a mere personal privilege which was not assignable the court in Erath & Flynn v. Allen & Son et al., supra, cited Griswold v. Railroad, 18 Mo. App. 52 , and Brown v. Railroad, 36 Mo. App. 458 . 1926As supporting the principle that the Nebraska statute conferred a mere personal privilege which was not assignable the court in Erath & Flynn v. Allen & Son et al., supra, cited Griswold v. Railroad, 18 Mo. App. 52 , and Brown v. Railroad, 36 Mo. App. 458 .	2	1893–1926
Hutchinson v. Steinke green moctapp · 1962 1 sentence 1971Hutchinson v. Steinke, Mo.App., 353 S.W.2d 137 .	1	1971–1971
Robinson v. Field green mo · 1938 2 sentences 1962Robinson v. Field, 342 Mo. 778 , 117 S.W.2d 308 ; Jones v. Church, Mo.App., 252 S.W.2d 647 . 1962Robinson v. Field, 342 Mo. 778 , 117 S.W.2d 308 ; Jones v. Church, Mo.App., 252 S.W.2d 647 .	1	1962–1962
O'Connor v. Current River Railroad neutral mo · 1892 2 sentences 1926In these eases it was held that the lien given by section 3200, Revised Statutes 1879, now section 7261, Revised Statutes 1919, concerning certain railroad work, was personal in nature and nonassignable. [See, also, O’Connor v. Railroad, 111 Mo. 185 , 20 S. W. 16 .] The same rule was applied to a mechanic’s lien prior to legislation on the subject. 1926In these eases it was held that the lien given by section 3200, Revised Statutes 1879, now section 7261, Revised Statutes 1919, concerning certain railroad work, was personal in nature and nonassignable. [See, also, O’Connor v. Railroad, 111 Mo. 185 , 20 S. W. 16 .] The same rule was applied to a mechanic’s lien prior to legislation on the subject.	1	1926–1926
Jones v. Manly green · 1875 1 sentence 1903This court in an opinion as far back as the second Missouri Report, under a statute practically the same as the law of 1845, in force at the time the widow’s right of quarantine attached in this case, held, that quarantine or “the right to tarry in the mansion house of her husband and the plantation thereto belonging” was alienable, and in numerous cases since, as the question has come up in one way and another, this court has repeatedly declared and announced the same rule, except in the one case referred to by appellants, that will presently be noticed. [Stokes v. McAllister, 2 Mo. 163 ; Jon	1	1903–1903
Brown v. Moore neutral · 1881 1 sentence 1903This court in an opinion as far back as the second Missouri Report, under a statute practically the same as the law of 1845, in force at the time the widow’s right of quarantine attached in this case, held, that quarantine or “the right to tarry in the mansion house of her husband and the plantation thereto belonging” was alienable, and in numerous cases since, as the question has come up in one way and another, this court has repeatedly declared and announced the same rule, except in the one case referred to by appellants, that will presently be noticed. [Stokes v. McAllister, 2 Mo. 163 ; Jon	1	1903–1903
Henry v. Lane neutral mo · 1830 1 sentence 1903This court in an opinion as far back as the second Missouri Report, under a statute practically the same as the law of 1845, in force at the time the widow’s right of quarantine attached in this case, held, that quarantine or “the right to tarry in the mansion house of her husband and the plantation thereto belonging” was alienable, and in numerous cases since, as the question has come up in one way and another, this court has repeatedly declared and announced the same rule, except in the one case referred to by appellants, that will presently be noticed. [Stokes v. McAllister, 2 Mo. 163 ; Jon	1	1903–1903
Tewksbury v. Bronson neutral · 1880 1 sentence 1893Griswold v. Railroad, 18 Mo. App. 52 ; Brown v. Railroad, 36 Mo. App. 458 ; Tewksbury v. Bronson, 4 N. W.	1	1893–1893
Bingham v. Cabot green scotus · 1798 1 sentence 1832P. 427-8-9; 1 Condensed U. S. R. 170, Bingham v. Cobbett; 3 Dall. 382 and 370, Capron v. Noodin; 2 Cra.	1	1832–1832

Where else courts name it

AL 26 (1877–2017) MO 17 (1832–2016) SC 16 (1908–2024) TX 11 (1885–2017) PA 11 (1932–2025) NE 9 (1876–2015) NY 9 (1859–2000) CA 7 (1924–2020) IL 5 (1971–2003) CO 5 (1911–2003) MA 4 (1838–1993) FL 3 (1960–2004) IA 3 (1886–1937) NJ 3 (1882–2015) MD 3 (1984–2017) AR 3 (1873–1944) NC 3 (1953–1961) WY 2 (1957–1985) KS 2 (1907–1916) UT 2 (1903–1906) MI 2 (1927–2014) KY 2 (1884–1937) WA 2 (1913–1942) OR 2 (1943–1972) NM 2 (1920–1936) GA 2 (1905–1949)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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