mere personal privilege in Alabama

1986Ill, 61 A.L.R. 793 , the constitutional requisition of indictments generally in all cases of felony is not one conferring a mere personal privilege upon an accused person, but is so imbued with the public concern for due and proper administration of the law that no individual may waive it. [Emphasis added.] "In De Golyer v. Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 626 , 51 N.E.2d 251 , it was pointed out that the Massachusetts bill of rights has consistently denied the power of the Legislature to permit trial which could lead to imprisonment in the State prison save there be an indictment.

1958Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314 , 164 N.E. 111 , 61 A.L.R. 793 , the constitutional requisition of indictments generally in all cases of felony is not one conferring a mere personal privilege upon an accused person, but is so imbued with the public concern for due and proper administration of the law that no individual may waive it.

1923That is to say, from the holding that venue is a personal privilege which may be waived by a defendant’s failure to complain against a suit filed against him in the county in which neither he, nor one of the defendants, resides, the court has extended the rule to the effect that the debtor might in advance stipulate in the contract the county in which he would be suable on or under that contract, and as a part of the valuable “consideration supporting the contract.” In Thompson v. Union Springs Guano Co., supra, the plaintiff being a corporation, it is declared, on authority of Woolf v. McGaug

1923That is to say, from the holding that venue is a personal privilege which may be waived by a defendant’s failure to complain against a suit filed against him in the county in which neither he, nor one of the defendants, resides, the court has extended the rule to the effect that the debtor might in advance stipulate in the contract the county in which he would be suable on or under that contract, and as a part of the valuable “consideration supporting the contract.” In Thompson v. Union Springs Guano Co., supra, the plaintiff being a corporation, it is declared, on authority of Woolf v. McGaug

1986Ill, 61 A.L.R. 793 , the constitutional requisition of indictments generally in all cases of felony is not one conferring a mere personal privilege upon an accused person, but is so imbued with the public concern for due and proper administration of the law that no individual may waive it. [Emphasis added.] "In De Golyer v. Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 626 , 51 N.E.2d 251 , it was pointed out that the Massachusetts bill of rights has consistently denied the power of the Legislature to permit trial which could lead to imprisonment in the State prison save there be an indictment.

1986Ill, 61 A.L.R. 793 , the constitutional requisition of indictments generally in all cases of felony is not one conferring a mere personal privilege upon an accused person, but is so imbued with the public concern for due and proper administration of the law that no individual may waive it. [Emphasis added.] "In De Golyer v. Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 626 , 51 N.E.2d 251 , it was pointed out that the Massachusetts bill of rights has consistently denied the power of the Legislature to permit trial which could lead to imprisonment in the State prison save there be an indictment.

2015An executed license, for reasons founded upon the equitable principle of estoppel, becomes irrevocable and confers upon the licensee a substantive equitable right in the property. 3 Camp, 291 Ala. at 17-18 , 277 So.2d at 99 .

2015An executed license, for reasons founded upon the equitable principle of estoppel, becomes irrevocable and confers upon the licensee a substantive equitable right in the property. 3 Camp, 291 Ala. at 17-18 , 277 So.2d at 99 .

1996First National Bank of Mobile v. Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc., 398 So.2d 258 (Ala.1981)_ A valid foreclosure sale of property subject to a mortgage extinguishes the eqmty of redemption; however ... a post-foreclosure right of redemption arises in the mortgagor or his vendee_ Unlike the equity of redemption, wMch exists prior to foreclosure and is deemed an interest in the property, the statutory right of redemption arises after foreclosure and is a mere personal privilege conferred by statute; it is not property or a property right.” Id., 456 So.2d at 1052-53 (emphasis in original).

1996First National Bank of Mobile v. Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc., 398 So.2d 258 (Ala.1981)_ A valid foreclosure sale of property subject to a mortgage extinguishes the eqmty of redemption; however ... a post-foreclosure right of redemption arises in the mortgagor or his vendee_ Unlike the equity of redemption, wMch exists prior to foreclosure and is deemed an interest in the property, the statutory right of redemption arises after foreclosure and is a mere personal privilege conferred by statute; it is not property or a property right.” Id., 456 So.2d at 1052-53 (emphasis in original).

1974Since the Civil Court of Jefferson County had jurisdiction to render this judgment against the appellant, its final decree is valid and enforceable and on authority of Constantine v. Constantine, 261 Ala. 40 , 72 So.2d 831 (1954), a judgment of a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties and possesses the power to render the particular judgment is immune from collateral attack.

1974Since the Civil Court of Jefferson County had jurisdiction to render this judgment against the appellant, its final decree is valid and enforceable and on authority of Constantine v. Constantine, 261 Ala. 40 , 72 So.2d 831 (1954), a judgment of a court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties and possesses the power to render the particular judgment is immune from collateral attack.

1973An executed license, for reasons founded upon the equitable principle of estoppel, becomes irrevocable and confers upon the licensee a substantive equitable right in the property. 3 This interpretation and rule was adopted by this court in our decision in Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578 , wherein this court stated that: “It would be against all conscience to permit the defendant to revoke his license, after the plaintiff had acted upon it so far that great damage must necessarily result from the revocation.

1973While this is generally a correct statement of the law, both Messer and Hicks recognize the exception to the general rule established by Rhodes v. Otis, supra. Where a valuable consideration has moved to the licensor from the licensee, and possession and use has been wholly or partly yielded to the licensee, the license becomes irrevocable.

1973We think a denial of the right of revocation, under such circumstances, is consistent with justice and right, supported by the analogies of the law, and many respectable decisions.—Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Metc. 34 ; Angell on Water Courses, 5 div. of chap. 8; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150 ; Bridges v. Purcell, 18 N.C. 492 ; Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 82; Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. 241." Appellants rely on Messer v. City of Birmingham, supra; Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Company, 133 Ala. 411 , 31 So. 947 ; and similar cases to support their *100 pro

1973We think a denial of the right of revocation, under such circumstances, is consistent with justice and right, supported by the analogies of the law, and many respectable decisions.—Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Metc. 34 ; Angell on Water Courses, 5 div. of chap. 8; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150 ; Bridges v. Purcell, 18 N.C. 492 ; Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 82; Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. 241.” Appellants rely on Messer v. City of Birmingham, supra; Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Company, 133 Ala. 411 , 31 So. 947 ; and similar cases to support their proposit

1973We think a denial of the right of revocation, under such circumstances, is consistent with justice and right, supported by the analogies of the law, and many respectable decisions.—Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Metc. 34 ; Angell on Water Courses, 5 div. of chap. 8; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150 ; Bridges v. Purcell, 18 N.C. 492 ; Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 82; Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. 241." Appellants rely on Messer v. City of Birmingham, supra; Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Company, 133 Ala. 411 , 31 So. 947 ; and similar cases to support their *100 pro

1973We think a denial of the right of revocation, under such circumstances, is consistent with justice and right, supported by the analogies of the law, and many respectable decisions.—Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Metc. 34 ; Angell on Water Courses, 5 div. of chap. 8; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150 ; Bridges v. Purcell, 18 N.C. 492 ; Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 82; Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. 241.” Appellants rely on Messer v. City of Birmingham, supra; Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Company, 133 Ala. 411 , 31 So. 947 ; and similar cases to support their proposit

1973We think a denial of the right of revocation, under such circumstances, is consistent with justice and right, supported by the analogies of the law, and many respectable decisions.—Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Metc. 34 ; Angell on Water Courses, 5 div. of chap. 8; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150 ; Bridges v. Purcell, 18 N.C. 492 ; Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 82; Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. 241." Appellants rely on Messer v. City of Birmingham, supra; Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Company, 133 Ala. 411 , 31 So. 947 ; and similar cases to support their *100 pro

1973We think a denial of the right of revocation, under such circumstances, is consistent with justice and right, supported by the analogies of the law, and many respectable decisions.—Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Metc. 34 ; Angell on Water Courses, 5 div. of chap. 8; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150 ; Bridges v. Purcell, 18 N.C. 492 ; Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 82; Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & R. 241.” Appellants rely on Messer v. City of Birmingham, supra; Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Company, 133 Ala. 411 , 31 So. 947 ; and similar cases to support their proposit

1971See Mewburn v. Bass, 82 Ala. 622 , 2 So. 520 ; Wood v. Vogel, 204 Ala. 692 , 87 So. 174 ; and McGowan v. Williams, 241 Ala. 588 , 4 So.2d 164 .

1971See Mewburn v. Bass, 82 Ala. 622 , 2 So. 520 ; Wood v. Vogel, 204 Ala. 692 , 87 So. 174 ; and McGowan v. Williams, 241 Ala. 588 , 4 So.2d 164 .

1971See Mewburn v. Bass, 82 Ala. 622 , 2 So. 520 ; Wood v. Vogel, 204 Ala. 692 , 87 So. 174 ; and McGowan v. Williams, 241 Ala. 588 , 4 So.2d 164 .

1971See Mewburn v. Bass, 82 Ala. 622 , 2 So. 520 ; Wood v. Vogel, 204 Ala. 692 , 87 So. 174 ; and McGowan v. Williams, 241 Ala. 588 , 4 So.2d 164 .

1964In Lewis v. McBride, 176 Ala. 134 , 57 So. 705 (1, 2), we said: “ * * * According to numerous decisions of this court, the equity of redemption is that interest in the land which is held by the mortgagor, before foreclosure; while the right of redemption is not an interest in the land at all, but a mere personal privilege given by statute to the mortgagor after the land has bean sold under the mortgage. * * *” ( 57 So. 706 ) The facts here are somewhat similar to the situation in Beasley v. Ross, 234 Ala. 335 , 174 So. 764 (1), wherein it appears that after maturity of the indebtedness, and af

1964In Lewis v. McBride, 176 Ala. 134 , 57 So. 705 (1, 2), we said: “ * * * According to numerous decisions of this court, the equity of redemption is that interest in the land which is held by the mortgagor, before foreclosure; while the right of redemption is not an interest in the land at all, but a mere personal privilege given by statute to the mortgagor after the land has bean sold under the mortgage. * * *” ( 57 So. 706 ) The facts here are somewhat similar to the situation in Beasley v. Ross, 234 Ala. 335 , 174 So. 764 (1), wherein it appears that after maturity of the indebtedness, and af

1964In Lewis v. McBride, 176 Ala. 134 , 57 So. 705 (1, 2), we said: “ * * * According to numerous decisions of this court, the equity of redemption is that interest in the land which is held by the mortgagor, before foreclosure; while the right of redemption is not an interest in the land at all, but a mere personal privilege given by statute to the mortgagor after the land has bean sold under the mortgage. * * *” ( 57 So. 706 ) The facts here are somewhat similar to the situation in Beasley v. Ross, 234 Ala. 335 , 174 So. 764 (1), wherein it appears that after maturity of the indebtedness, and af

1964In Lewis v. McBride, 176 Ala. 134 , 57 So. 705 (1, 2), we said: “ * * * According to numerous decisions of this court, the equity of redemption is that interest in the land which is held by the mortgagor, before foreclosure; while the right of redemption is not an interest in the land at all, but a mere personal privilege given by statute to the mortgagor after the land has bean sold under the mortgage. * * *” ( 57 So. 706 ) The facts here are somewhat similar to the situation in Beasley v. Ross, 234 Ala. 335 , 174 So. 764 (1), wherein it appears that after maturity of the indebtedness, and af

1964In Lewis v. McBride, 176 Ala. 134 , 57 So. 705 (1, 2), we said: “ * * * According to numerous decisions of this court, the equity of redemption is that interest in the land which is held by the mortgagor, before foreclosure; while the right of redemption is not an interest in the land at all, but a mere personal privilege given by statute to the mortgagor after the land has bean sold under the mortgage. * * *” ( 57 So. 706 ) The facts here are somewhat similar to the situation in Beasley v. Ross, 234 Ala. 335 , 174 So. 764 (1), wherein it appears that after maturity of the indebtedness, and af

1949Section 743, Title 7, Code; Land v. Cooper, 244 Ala. 141 , 12 So.2d 410 , and cases there cited.

1949Section 743, Title 7, Code; Land v. Cooper, 244 Ala. 141 , 12 So.2d 410 , and cases there cited.

1930It is further recognized ih this state that a simple contract creditor without a lien of any character, “without a jus in re or -a jus in rem, owning a mere personal claim against his debtor, has not an insurable interest in the property of his debtor.” Creed v. Sun Fire Office, 101 Ala. 522 , 14 So. 323 , 326, 23 L.

1925This rule was approved in Woolf v. McGaugh, 175 Ala. 307 , 57 So. 757 : “It may be stated as a general rule that the bringing of an action in an improper county is not a jurisdictional defect, where the court has general jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the statutes fixing the venue in certain actions confer a mere personal privilege which may b© waived by a failure to claim it in a proper manner and at the proper time.” *617 The court further stated in the McGaugh Case: “It lias often been held by this court that the statutory provisions fixing the local jurisdictions in both law and e

1923Thereafter, in Brown v. Alabama Chemical Co., 207 Ala. 215 , 92 South. 260 , the Thompson and Woolf Cases, supra, were reviewed, the Massachusetts case (Nute v. Hamilton Ins.

1923Thereafter, in Brown v. Alabama Chemical Co., 207 Ala. 215 , 92 South. 260 , the Thompson and Woolf Cases, supra, were reviewed, the Massachusetts case (Nute v. Hamilton Ins.

1907This exemption is a mere personal privilege, which they may waive. — Jackson v. State, 74 Ala. 26 ; Spigener v. State, 62 Ala. 383 .

1907This exemption is a mere personal privilege, which they may waive. — Jackson v. State, 74 Ala. 26 ; Spigener v. State, 62 Ala. 383 .

1897In Clark v. Averill, supra, the court said : “It is said by the plaintiff that this is a mere personal privilege that no one but the debtor himself can set up, in his name.

1890When this case was before us at a former term ( 88 Ala. 176 ), we held, that the exemption of the officers and servants of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company, conferred by the act of incorporation of the State of Tennessee, is not a mere personal privilege, but a valuable right of the company, and that the language of the act incorporating the c'oirqoany, enacted by the General Assembly of this State, is comprehensive enough to include and grant every right, power and privilege granted by the Tennessee charter, not inconsistent with the.

1889It is said: “The exemption claimed by the defendant is not a mere personal privilege, but it is a valuable right of the company, granted to it by the State, to save and protect it against such serious inconveniences and injuries as would necessarily happen, were those upon whom it must depend for that vigilance, promptness and dispatch indispensable in business, liable to be called away to the performance of other duties.” It is true that charters of corporations are to be construed strictly against the corpora-tors, and that doubts as to the proper construction are to be solyed in favor of th

1889In Zimmer v. State, 30 Ark. 677 , the defendant claimed freedom from liability to work on public roads, under a similar exemption contained in the charter of the company of which he was an employee and servant, and the same position now insisted on was taken.

1887Our decisions fully commit us to the personal nature of the right, and are, therefore, logically inconsistent with the idea of its assignability. — Parmer v. Parmer, 74 Ala. 285 ; Childress v. Monette, 54 Ala. 317 ; Otis v. McMillan, 70 Ala. 46 .

1887Our decisions fully commit us to the personal nature of the right, and are, therefore, logically inconsistent with the idea of its assignability. — Parmer v. Parmer, 74 Ala. 285 ; Childress v. Monette, 54 Ala. 317 ; Otis v. McMillan, 70 Ala. 46 .