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11 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1885–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Limon v. Stategreen1 sentence2017As such, Sefzik merely had an expectation of the governmental benefit—his expectation is not a protected property right.”); Limon v. State, 947 S.W.2d 620, 626 (Tex. App.Austin 1997, no writ) (permit or license is generally “a mere personal privilege granted by the legislature,” and licensee may at best have due process interests in its “right to conduct business (taring the term such right was granted"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisgreen1 sentence1997Code § 11.08 (West 1995); Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Macha, 780 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1989, writ denied); State v. Harris, 342 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1960, no pet.); Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 108 S.W.2d 300, 302-03 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1937, no writ); see also Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1970). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. MacHagreen1 sentence1997Code § 11.08 (West 1995); Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Macha, 780 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1989, writ denied); State v. Harris, 342 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1960, no pet.); Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 108 S.W.2d 300, 302-03 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1937, no writ); see also Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1970). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Liquor Control Board v. Canyon Creek Land Corp.green1 sentence1997Code § 11.08 (West 1995); Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Macha, 780 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1989, writ denied); State v. Harris, 342 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1960, no pet.); Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 108 S.W.2d 300, 302-03 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1937, no writ); see also Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1970). | 1 | 1 |
Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Boardgreen1 sentence1997Code § 11.08 (West 1995); Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Macha, 780 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1989, writ denied); State v. Harris, 342 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1960, no pet.); Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 108 S.W.2d 300, 302-03 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1937, no writ); see also Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1970). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
De La Vega v. League
green
2 sentences1936The requirement as to the county in which the suit may be brought is a mere personal privilege granted to the parties, which may be waived like any other privilege of this character." (Italics ours.) Bonner v. Hearne, 75 Tex. 242 , 12 S.W. 38, 40 ; De La Vega v. League, 64 Tex. 205 . 1923S. 1895, which is as follows: ‘Suits for the recovery of lands or damages thereto, suits to remove in-cumbrances upon the title to land, suits to quiet the title to land, and suits to prevent or stay waste on lands, must be brought in the county in which the land or a part thereof may lie.’ “It was held in De La Vega v. League, 64 Tex. 205 , that this requirement of the statute confers a mere personal privilege, which may be waived, and the judgment of the district court of some other county, whose jurisdiction has been submitted to without objection, will settle the title to the land as effec | 5 | 1900–1936 |
Bonner v. Hearne
green
2 sentences1936The requirement as to the county in which the suit may be brought is a mere personal privilege granted to the parties, which may be waived like any other privilege of this character." (Italics ours.) Bonner v. Hearne, 75 Tex. 242 , 12 S.W. 38, 40 ; De La Vega v. League, 64 Tex. 205 . 1936The requirement as to the county in which the suit may be brought is a mere personal privilege granted to the parties, which may be waived like any other privilege of this character." (Italics ours.) Bonner v. Hearne, 75 Tex. 242 , 12 S.W. 38, 40 ; De La Vega v. League, 64 Tex. 205 . | 5 | 1900–1936 |
Watson v. Baker
green
2 sentences1920The justice’s court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and if Ashcom was served with process, this would have given the court jurisdiction over the person, even though the suit had been irregularly brought in a precinct or county other than that of his residence, if he failed to appear and plead in abatement his privilege to be sued elsewhere.” On motion for rehearing, the court held that the territorial jurisdiction of district courts, and of justice’s courts as well, is coextensive with the state, and although suits are required to be brought against parties in the counties of their d 1920The justice’s court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and if Ashcom was served with process, this would have given the court jurisdiction over the person, even though the suit had been irregularly brought in a precinct or county other than that of his residence, if he failed to appear and plead in abatement his privilege to be sued elsewhere.” On motion for rehearing, the court held that the territorial jurisdiction of district courts, and of justice’s courts as well, is coextensive with the state, and although suits are required to be brought against parties in the counties of their d | 2 | 1900–1920 |
City of Dalias v. Gill
green
1 sentence1969A mere license is distinguishable from a franchise in so far as a license is granted for the purpose of regulation, and also in that usually a license is a mere personal privilege, is, in its nature, a temporary or revocable permission, and may be derived from a source other than the legislature or sovereign power.” In City of Dallas v. Gill, Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W. 1144 , writ ref., the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement of a city ordinance relating to the operation of jitneys on the streets of the City of Dallas because it allegedly constituted the grant of a franchise and was not pa | 1 | 1969–1969 |
City Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jackson
neutral
1 sentence1938City Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jackson, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 433 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Masterson v. Ashcom
neutral
1 sentence1920The court cited several decisions by the Supreme Court, including Masterson v. Ashcom, 54 Tex. 324 , and quoted from the latter case as follows: “There is a marked distinction between the question of a mere personal privilege to be sued in a precinct or county of residence, and which privilege may expressly or impliedly be waived, and that of jurisdiction proper, which cannot be conferred, even by express consent. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
N. K. Fairbanks & Co. v. Blum
neutral
2 sentences1920The justice’s court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and if Ashcom was served with process, this would have given the court jurisdiction over the person, even though the suit had been irregularly brought in a precinct or county other than that of his residence, if he failed to appear and plead in abatement his privilege to be sued elsewhere.” On motion for rehearing, the court held that the territorial jurisdiction of district courts, and of justice’s courts as well, is coextensive with the state, and although suits are required to be brought against parties in the counties of their d 1920The justice’s court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and if Ashcom was served with process, this would have given the court jurisdiction over the person, even though the suit had been irregularly brought in a precinct or county other than that of his residence, if he failed to appear and plead in abatement his privilege to be sued elsewhere.” On motion for rehearing, the court held that the territorial jurisdiction of district courts, and of justice’s courts as well, is coextensive with the state, and although suits are required to be brought against parties in the counties of their d | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Ross v. Lister
neutral
1 sentence1892Railway v. Winter, 44 Texas, 611 ; Ross v. Lister, 14 Texas, 469 ; Denny v. White, 2 Coldwell, 283; Beecher v. Baldy, 7 Mich., 505 ; Lambert v. Kinnery, 74 N. C., 350 . | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Ryan v. Jackson
neutral
1 sentence1885Ryan v. Jackson, 11 Tex., 391 ; Morris v. Runnells, 12 Tex., 176 . | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.