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7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1924–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stoner v. Zuckergreen1 sentence2020Indeed, any attempt by the licensee to assign the license ordinarily destroys and terminates it.” (Eastman v. Piper, supra, 68 Cal.App. at p. 562 ; accord, Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637 ; Richardson, at p. 751; see 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 15.2.) Nonetheless, “[a]n otherwise revocable license becomes irrevocable when the licensee, acting in reasonable reliance either on the licensor’s representations or on the terms of the license, makes substantial expenditures of money or labor in the execution of the license, and the license will | 1 | 1 |
Cooke v. Ramponigreen1 sentence2020Indeed, any attempt by the licensee to assign the license ordinarily destroys and terminates it.” (Eastman v. Piper, supra, 68 Cal.App. at p. 562 ; accord, Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637 ; Richardson, at p. 751; see 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 15.2.) Nonetheless, “[a]n otherwise revocable license becomes irrevocable when the licensee, acting in reasonable reliance either on the licensor’s representations or on the terms of the license, makes substantial expenditures of money or labor in the execution of the license, and the license will | 1 | 1 |
Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheimgreen1 sentence2020A license, commonly viewed as an interest of much less significance than other property rights, is often stated to be not an interest in land at all, but only the mere permission of the landowner.”].) 7 In keeping with a license’s permissive nature, “‘[a] licensor generally can revoke a license at any time without excuse or without consideration to the licensee.’” (Richardson, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 751 ; accord, Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 36 [“a license is normally revocable at will”].) Moreover, “a license, being a mere personal privilege, is | 1 | 1 |
Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co.green1 sentence2020Indeed, any attempt by the licensee to assign the license ordinarily destroys and terminates it.” (Eastman v. Piper, supra, 68 Cal.App. at p. 562 ; accord, Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637 ; Richardson, at p. 751; see 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 15.2.) Nonetheless, “[a]n otherwise revocable license becomes irrevocable when the licensee, acting in reasonable reliance either on the licensor’s representations or on the terms of the license, makes substantial expenditures of money or labor in the execution of the license, and the license will | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Francgreen2 sentences2020A license, commonly viewed as an interest of much less significance than other property rights, is often stated to be not an interest in land at all, but only the mere permission of the landowner.”].) 7 In keeping with a license’s permissive nature, “‘[a] licensor generally can revoke a license at any time without excuse or without consideration to the licensee.’” (Richardson, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 751 ; accord, Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 36 [“a license is normally revocable at will”].) Moreover, “a license, being a mere personal privilege, is 2020Indeed, any attempt by the licensee to assign the license ordinarily destroys and terminates it.” (Eastman v. Piper, supra, 68 Cal.App. at p. 562 ; accord, Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637 ; Richardson, at p. 751; see 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 15.2.) Nonetheless, “[a]n otherwise revocable license becomes irrevocable when the licensee, acting in reasonable reliance either on the licensor’s representations or on the terms of the license, makes substantial expenditures of money or labor in the execution of the license, and the license will | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Reidgreen2 sentences1979(Estate of Reid (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 362, 369 [ 79 P.2d 451 ].) The right to resort to a vendor’s lien must be established by suit, the lien is of no operative force or effect until established by a decree of court and may be asserted only by a suit in equity for the purpose of obtaining such a decree. 1979(Estate of Reid (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 362, 369 [ 79 P.2d 451 ].) The right to resort to a vendor’s lien must be established by suit, the lien is of no operative force or effect until established by a decree of court and may be asserted only by a suit in equity for the purpose of obtaining such a decree. | 1 | 1 |
Schwartz v. Meadgreen2 sentences1938It is a mere personal privilege to resort to it if desired as a means of enforcing the terms of the contract. *370 (Schwartz v. Mead, 116 Cal. App. 606, 613 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 48 ]; 17 Cal. Jur. 718, sec. 23.) In the authority last cited it is said: “A vendor’s implied lien after conveyance is created by the law and not by contract of the parties, as are mortgages. 1938It is a mere personal privilege to resort to it if desired as a means of enforcing the terms of the contract. *370 (Schwartz v. Mead, 116 Cal. App. 606, 613 [ 3 Pac. (2d) 48 ]; 17 Cal. Jur. 718, sec. 23.) In the authority last cited it is said: “A vendor’s implied lien after conveyance is created by the law and not by contract of the parties, as are mortgages. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hammond v. Mustard
green
1 sentence2020Indeed, any attempt by the licensee to assign the license ordinarily destroys and terminates it.” (Eastman v. Piper, supra, 68 Cal.App. at p. 562 ; accord, Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637 ; Richardson, at p. 751; see 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 15.2.) Nonetheless, “[a]n otherwise revocable license becomes irrevocable when the licensee, acting in reasonable reliance either on the licensor’s representations or on the terms of the license, makes substantial expenditures of money or labor in the execution of the license, and the license will | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Eastman v. Piper
green
1 sentence2020Indeed, any attempt by the licensee to assign the license ordinarily destroys and terminates it.” (Eastman v. Piper, supra, 68 Cal.App. at p. 562 ; accord, Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637 ; Richardson, at p. 751; see 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 15.2.) Nonetheless, “[a]n otherwise revocable license becomes irrevocable when the licensee, acting in reasonable reliance either on the licensor’s representations or on the terms of the license, makes substantial expenditures of money or labor in the execution of the license, and the license will | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Shoen v. Zacarias
green
2 sentences2020Indeed, any attempt by the licensee to assign the license ordinarily destroys and terminates it.” (Eastman v. Piper, supra, 68 Cal.App. at p. 562 ; accord, Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637 ; Richardson, at p. 751; see 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 15.2.) Nonetheless, “[a]n otherwise revocable license becomes irrevocable when the licensee, acting in reasonable reliance either on the licensor’s representations or on the terms of the license, makes substantial expenditures of money or labor in the execution of the license, and the license will 2020Indeed, any attempt by the licensee to assign the license ordinarily destroys and terminates it.” (Eastman v. Piper, supra, 68 Cal.App. at p. 562 ; accord, Beckett v. City of Paris Dry Goods Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 633, 637 ; Richardson, at p. 751; see 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 15.2.) Nonetheless, “[a]n otherwise revocable license becomes irrevocable when the licensee, acting in reasonable reliance either on the licensor’s representations or on the terms of the license, makes substantial expenditures of money or labor in the execution of the license, and the license will | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Brown v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1992Under these provisions it has long been held that “instrument” invariably means a “written paper or instrument signed and delivered by one person to another, transferring the title to or creating a lien on property, or *670 giving a right to a debt or a duty.” (Hoag v. Howard (1880) 55 Cal. 564, 565 ; Brown v. Johnson, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 849 .) The vendor’s lien is not an instrument in this sense; rather, it is “a mere personal privilege to resort to land as a means of enforcing a land sale contract ... of no operative force or effect until established by a decree of court and [assert- 1992Under these provisions it has long been held that “instrument” invariably means a “written paper or instrument signed and delivered by one person to another, transferring the title to or creating a lien on property, or *670 giving a right to a debt or a duty.” (Hoag v. Howard (1880) 55 Cal. 564, 565 ; Brown v. Johnson, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 849 .) The vendor’s lien is not an instrument in this sense; rather, it is “a mere personal privilege to resort to land as a means of enforcing a land sale contract ... of no operative force or effect until established by a decree of court and [assert- | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hoag v. Howard
green
1 sentence1992Under these provisions it has long been held that “instrument” invariably means a “written paper or instrument signed and delivered by one person to another, transferring the title to or creating a lien on property, or *670 giving a right to a debt or a duty.” (Hoag v. Howard (1880) 55 Cal. 564, 565 ; Brown v. Johnson, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 849 .) The vendor’s lien is not an instrument in this sense; rather, it is “a mere personal privilege to resort to land as a means of enforcing a land sale contract ... of no operative force or effect until established by a decree of court and [assert- | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Williams v. Young
neutral
1 sentence1979It is, therefore, the personal privilege of the vendor, given solely for his security, and is in its nature unassignable.” (Williams v. Young (1862) 21 Cal. 227, 228 .) A vendor’s lien is a mere personal privilege to resort to land as a means of enforcing a land sale contract. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Bank of Suisun v. Stark
neutral
2 sentences1940The appellant relies upon the case of The Bank of Suisun v. Stark, 106 Cal. 202 [ 39 Pac. 531 ], There the grantors “reserved to themselves the right to live in and occupy the residence now occupied by them and situated upon the premises above described.” Such reservation is not one of a life estate, but a mere personal privilege. 1940The appellant relies upon the case of The Bank of Suisun v. Stark, 106 Cal. 202 [ 39 Pac. 531 ], There the grantors “reserved to themselves the right to live in and occupy the residence now occupied by them and situated upon the premises above described.” Such reservation is not one of a life estate, but a mere personal privilege. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
King v. Miller
neutral
1 sentence1925King v. Miller, 10 Wash. 274 [38 Pac. *685 1020]. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Walterman v. Village of Norwalk
green
1 sentence1924Cas. 1912A, 1176, 130 N. W. 479 ], where the court says: “ ... the use in the instrument of the word ‘remise, release and forever discharge, ’ etc., indicates pretty clearly an intention to give something more than a mere license; to grant an easement in the land.” Another suggestive feature of the instrument, and one which we deem especially pregnant with significance, is that it grants the *562 roadway' privilege to Moffit and to “his heirs or assigns.” As we have pointed out, a license, being a mere personal privilege, is never extended to the heirs or assigns of the licensee. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.