mere personal privilege in Nebraska

1928On the other hand, in State v. Crinklaw, 40 Neb. 759 , in a habeas corpus proceeding, it was held that the constitutional right to a trial by a jury of the' county where the crime is alleged to have been committed is a mere personal privilege of the accused, and that he may waive such privilege.

1911It is held in State v. Crink law, supra, that “the constitutional right to a trial before a jury of the county of district where the crime is alleged to have been committed is a mere personal privilege of the accused, and not conferred upon him from any considerations of public policy.

1944In McCarty v. Hopkins, 61 Neb, 550, 85 N. W. 540 , where the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, later changed it to guilty, and then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court, this court said: “The right of an accused person to be tried by a jury drawn from the county or district in which the prosecution was initiated, is a mere personal privilege and, like the other rights conferred by section 11, article I of the constitution, may be waived.

1928In McCarty v. Hopkins, 61 Neb. 550 , it was held that a person charged with a crime may, by a judicial confession of guilt, waive all the rights secured to him by section 11, art.

2015Stat. § 25-403.01 (Reissue 2008). 8 See Blitzkie v. State, 228 Neb. 409 , 422 N.W.2d 773 (1988). - 224 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports CASTONGUAY v. RETELSDORF Cite as 291 Neb. 220 county or district is a mere personal privilege which [the defendant] may waive.’”9 Indeed, because venue is a waivable personal privilege, it is not clear that it is a matter that can be objected to by a court sua sponte.10 The legal position alleged in a complaint is not “wholly without merit” simply because the alleged facts indicate that the defendant may—but may not—ask for a change of venue.

1998Thus, because a license is a mere personal privilege, a license “ ‘is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted ....”’ Id.

1970“It is true that a mere license is defined to be a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted, * * * but the grant of a franchise, when accepted and acted upon, does create a contract, * * * since it creates obligations binding upon both the grantor and the grantee.” Denny v. Brady, 201 Ind. 59 , 163 N. E. 489 .

1970“It is true that a mere license is defined to be a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted, * * * but the grant of a franchise, when accepted and acted upon, does create a contract, * * * since it creates obligations binding upon both the grantor and the grantee.” Denny v. Brady, 201 Ind. 59 , 163 N. E. 489 .

1970The authorities concede that the distinction is of a somewhat nebulous and uncertain character without an exact line of demarcation. “ ‘A franchise is property, * * * a vested right, protected by the Constitution — while a license is a mere personal privilege, and, except in rare instances and under peculiar conditions, revocable.’ ” Shaw v. City of Asheville, 269 N. C. 90 , 152 S. E. 2d 139 .

1970The authorities concede that the distinction is of a somewhat nebulous and uncertain character without an exact line of demarcation. “ ‘A franchise is property, * * * a vested right, protected by the Constitution — while a license is a mere personal privilege, and, except in rare instances and under peculiar conditions, revocable.’ ” Shaw v. City of Asheville, 269 N. C. 90 , 152 S. E. 2d 139 .

1876In Hoyt v. Howe, 3 Wis., 758 , the court held, “we think it clear, that if the lien attaches, and the effect of the statutes above recited is merely to exempt the homestead from forced sale, the property becomes subject to sale like any other property of the debtor: to hold the contrary would be to maintain that property, which is bound by, and subject toa judgment, and only exempted from sale to satisfy the judgment by means of its peculiar character, with the consent and act of the owner, is nevertheless, still exempted from sale.” In Smith v. Brackett, 36 Barb., 574 , it is held that “the e