statements rule in Missouri

2022The circuit court admitted testimony about the children’s statements under the exception to the prohibition against the admission of hearsay articulated in In re Marriage of P.K.A., 725 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. App. 1987) (“the P.K.A. exception”): The P.K.A. exception “applies to non-jury sexual abuse cases where (1) the best interest of the child is the primary concern; (2) sexual abuse may have occurred, or has been threatened; (3) the child might not be competent or reasonably expected to testify to it; and (4) there is a substantial basis that the statements are true.” D.S.H., 562 S.W.3d at 369 (quo

1998State v. Luton, (quoting State v. Willis, 706 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo.App.1986)), on which the state relies, does say, “defense witnesses’ statements are not a part of the material which the rule [25.03] requires be disclosed.” Luton, 795 S.W.2d at 477 .

1996Hendricks v. Motor Freight Corp., 570 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.App.1978).

1991In State v. Johnston, 670 S.W.2d 552 , Judge Crow, speaking for the Southern District in approving the admission of the defendant’s statement, said: It is ... well-established in Missouri that unless there is independent proof, either circumstantial or direct, of the essential elements of the corpus delicti, extrajudicial admissions, statement or confessions of the accused are not admissible in evidence.

1973Sander v. Callahan, Mo., 351 S.W.2d 691 ; Monical v. Armour and Co., Mo., 307 S.W.2d 389 ; McKenzie Transport Leasing Co. v. St.

1973Sander v. Callahan, Mo., 351 S.W.2d 691 ; Monical v. Armour and Co., Mo., 307 S.W.2d 389 ; McKenzie Transport Leasing Co. v. St.

1967One of the best statements of the rule and its exceptions is found in the case of State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304 , at loc. cit. 307: “ ‘The well established general rule is that proof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible, unless such proof has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial. * * * Evidence of other crimes, when not properly related to the cause on trial, violates defendant’s right to be tried for the offense for which he is indicted.’ State v. Shilkett, 356 Mo. 1081 , 204

1967One of the best statements of the rule and its exceptions is found in the case of State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304 , at loc. cit. 307: “ ‘The well established general rule is that proof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible, unless such proof has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial. * * * Evidence of other crimes, when not properly related to the cause on trial, violates defendant’s right to be tried for the offense for which he is indicted.’ State v. Shilkett, 356 Mo. 1081 , 204

1967Civil Rule 83.13(a), V.A.M.R.; Dudeck v. Ellis, Mo., 399 S.W.2d 80 .

1967One of the best statements of the rule and its exceptions is found in the case of State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304 , at loc. cit. 307: “ ‘The well established general rule is that proof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible, unless such proof has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial. * * * Evidence of other crimes, when not properly related to the cause on trial, violates defendant’s right to be tried for the offense for which he is indicted.’ State v. Shilkett, 356 Mo. 1081 , 204

1967One of the best statements of the rule and its exceptions is found in the case of State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304 , at loc. cit. 307: “ ‘The well established general rule is that proof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible, unless such proof has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial. * * * Evidence of other crimes, when not properly related to the cause on trial, violates defendant’s right to be tried for the offense for which he is indicted.’ State v. Shilkett, 356 Mo. 1081 , 204

1960One of the statements of the rule is made in Dierks & Sons Lumber Co. v. Morris, supra, 156 S.W. 75 , loc. cit. 77: “So that, in order to make such covenant constitute an agency between the lessor and lessee, we are necessarily bound to look at the facts to determine whether there was an agency or not. .

1959The rules governing the scope of judicial review in unemployment compensation cases are the same as those applicable in workmen’s compensation cases, Union-May-Stern Co. v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, Mo.App., 273 S.W.2d 766 .

1950Co. v. Wilcox, supra. We believe that the statements of the claim agent concerning the standing and trustworthiness of Dr. Miller were expressions of opinion rather than statements of fact.

1939At page 767 of the opinion, the following language appears: “In Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426 , 31 N. E. 128 , 32 Am.

1939At page 767 of the opinion, the following language appears: “In Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426 , 31 N. E. 128 , 32 Am.

1939The distinction between the- duty owed to a licensee and the duty owed to an invitee is clearly set forth in the case of Foster Lumber Co. v. Rodgers (Texas), 184 S. W. 761 , wherein the court reviews and comments upon the statements of the rule by various courts and text-book writers.

1933Dec. 709 , 714, 718; Rayburn v. Day, 27 Ill. 46 ; Brown v. Dunckel, 46 Mich. 29 ; Chamberlain Banking House v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516 .] Furthermore, it also is well settled that on default in the payment of a note accepted as conditional payment, the creditor may tender the note into court for cancellation and sue upon the original transaction. [Holland v. Rongey, 168 Mo. 16 , 67 S. W. 568 ; McMurray v. Taylor, 30 Mo. 263 ; Bertiaux v. Dillon, 20 Mo. App. 603 ; Schepflin v. Dessar, 20 Mo. App. 569 ; Bank v. Peterman, 21 Mo. App. 512 ; O’Bryan v. Jones, 38 Mo. App. 90, 94 .] Defendant does not c

1933Dec. 709 , 714, 718; Rayburn v. Day, 27 Ill. 46 ; Brown v. Dunckel, 46 Mich. 29 ; Chamberlain Banking House v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516 .] Furthermore, it also is well settled that on default in the payment of a note accepted as conditional payment, the creditor may tender the note into court for cancellation and sue upon the original transaction. [Holland v. Rongey, 168 Mo. 16 , 67 S. W. 568 ; McMurray v. Taylor, 30 Mo. 263 ; Bertiaux v. Dillon, 20 Mo. App. 603 ; Schepflin v. Dessar, 20 Mo. App. 569 ; Bank v. Peterman, 21 Mo. App. 512 ; O’Bryan v. Jones, 38 Mo. App. 90, 94 .] Defendant does not c

1933Dec. 709 , 714, 718; Rayburn v. Day, 27 Ill. 46 ; Brown v. Dunckel, 46 Mich. 29 ; Chamberlain Banking House v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516 .] Furthermore, it also is well settled that on default in the payment of a note accepted as conditional payment, the creditor may tender the note into court for cancellation and sue upon the original transaction. [Holland v. Rongey, 168 Mo. 16 , 67 S. W. 568 ; McMurray v. Taylor, 30 Mo. 263 ; Bertiaux v. Dillon, 20 Mo. App. 603 ; Schepflin v. Dessar, 20 Mo. App. 569 ; Bank v. Peterman, 21 Mo. App. 512 ; O’Bryan v. Jones, 38 Mo. App. 90, 94 .] Defendant does not c

1933Dec. 709 , 714, 718; Rayburn v. Day, 27 Ill. 46 ; Brown v. Dunckel, 46 Mich. 29 ; Chamberlain Banking House v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516 .] Furthermore, it also is well settled that on default in the payment of a note accepted as conditional payment, the creditor may tender the note into court for cancellation and sue upon the original transaction. [Holland v. Rongey, 168 Mo. 16 , 67 S. W. 568 ; McMurray v. Taylor, 30 Mo. 263 ; Bertiaux v. Dillon, 20 Mo. App. 603 ; Schepflin v. Dessar, 20 Mo. App. 569 ; Bank v. Peterman, 21 Mo. App. 512 ; O’Bryan v. Jones, 38 Mo. App. 90, 94 .] Defendant does not c

1933Dec. 709 , 714, 718; Rayburn v. Day, 27 Ill. 46 ; Brown v. Dunckel, 46 Mich. 29 ; Chamberlain Banking House v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516 .] Furthermore, it also is well settled that on default in the payment of a note accepted as conditional payment, the creditor may tender the note into court for cancellation and sue upon the original transaction. [Holland v. Rongey, 168 Mo. 16 , 67 S. W. 568 ; McMurray v. Taylor, 30 Mo. 263 ; Bertiaux v. Dillon, 20 Mo. App. 603 ; Schepflin v. Dessar, 20 Mo. App. 569 ; Bank v. Peterman, 21 Mo. App. 512 ; O’Bryan v. Jones, 38 Mo. App. 90, 94 .] Defendant does not c

1933Dec. 709 , 714, 718; Rayburn v. Day, 27 Ill. 46 ; Brown v. Dunckel, 46 Mich. 29 ; Chamberlain Banking House v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516 .] Furthermore, it also is well settled that on default in the payment of a note accepted as conditional payment, the creditor may tender the note into court for cancellation and sue upon the original transaction. [Holland v. Rongey, 168 Mo. 16 , 67 S. W. 568 ; McMurray v. Taylor, 30 Mo. 263 ; Bertiaux v. Dillon, 20 Mo. App. 603 ; Schepflin v. Dessar, 20 Mo. App. 569 ; Bank v. Peterman, 21 Mo. App. 512 ; O’Bryan v. Jones, 38 Mo. App. 90, 94 .] Defendant does not c