9 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Huntergreen1 sentence2003Because “Alabama law imputes to a prosecutor knowledge of the information supplied by an investigating officer’s testimony,” Ex parte Hunter, 777 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala.2000), as the majority acknowledges, the police officer’s late disclosure of the statement does not excuse the State’s failure to comply with Rule 16.1 and the trial court’s discovery order. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1991Jones v. State, 392 So.2d 1270 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, 392 So.2d 1273 (Ala.1981). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Ex Parte McKinnis
green
1 sentence1991Jones v. State, 392 So.2d 1270 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied, 392 So.2d 1273 (Ala.1981). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wilkey v. State
green
2 sentences1986In Wilkey v. State , 238 Ala. 595 , 597 , 192 So. 588 , 589 (1939), the court was called upon to determine whether certain remarks made by defense counsel in opening statements constituted admissions upon which a directed verdict could be based. 1986In Wilkey v. State , 238 Ala. 595 , 597 , 192 So. 588 , 589 (1939), the court was called upon to determine whether certain remarks made by defense counsel in opening statements constituted admissions upon which a directed verdict could be based. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State Realty Co. v. Ligon
green
2 sentences1985One of the better statements of this principle came in the decision of State Realty Company v. Ligon [ 218 Ala. 541 , 119 So. 672 (1929)] in which the Supreme Court stated: `In the practice of medicine, a diagnosis of the ailment may include a personal examination of the patient by all methods known to science . . . and also the history of the case, as given by the patient . . . 1985One of the better statements of this principle came in the decision of State Realty Company v. Ligon [ 218 Ala. 541 , 119 So. 672 (1929)] in which the Supreme Court stated: `In the practice of medicine, a diagnosis of the ailment may include a personal examination of the patient by all methods known to science . . . and also the history of the case, as given by the patient . . . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
McKinstry v. City of Tuscaloosa
green
2 sentences1980In fact, he is specifically charged with this duty by a statute which states: `The court must, by examination, decide upon the capacity of one alleged to be incompetent from idiocy, lunacy, insanity, drunkenness or infancy.' It has been held that a trial judge's ruling on this question stands on appeal unless there is strong evidence of an abuse of sound discretion." (footnotes omitted) One of the oldest and perhaps the best statements of the rule is found in Worthington Co. v. Mencer , 96 Ala. 310 , 314 , 11 So. 72 , 73 (1892). "`The general rule, therefore, is that a lunatic or a person affe 1980In fact, he is specifically charged with this duty by a statute which states: `The court must, by examination, decide upon the capacity of one alleged to be incompetent from idiocy, lunacy, insanity, drunkenness or infancy.' It has been held that a trial judge's ruling on this question stands on appeal unless there is strong evidence of an abuse of sound discretion." (footnotes omitted) One of the oldest and perhaps the best statements of the rule is found in Worthington Co. v. Mencer , 96 Ala. 310 , 314 , 11 So. 72 , 73 (1892). "`The general rule, therefore, is that a lunatic or a person affe | 1 | 1980–1980 |
District of Columbia v. Armes
green
2 sentences1980In fact, he is specifically charged with this duty by a statute which states: `The court must, by examination, decide upon the capacity of one alleged to be incompetent from idiocy, lunacy, insanity, drunkenness or infancy.' It has been held that a trial judge's ruling on this question stands on appeal unless there is strong evidence of an abuse of sound discretion." (footnotes omitted) One of the oldest and perhaps the best statements of the rule is found in Worthington Co. v. Mencer , 96 Ala. 310 , 314 , 11 So. 72 , 73 (1892). "`The general rule, therefore, is that a lunatic or a person affe 1980In fact, he is specifically charged with this duty by a statute which states: `The court must, by examination, decide upon the capacity of one alleged to be incompetent from idiocy, lunacy, insanity, drunkenness or infancy.' It has been held that a trial judge's ruling on this question stands on appeal unless there is strong evidence of an abuse of sound discretion." (footnotes omitted) One of the oldest and perhaps the best statements of the rule is found in Worthington Co. v. Mencer , 96 Ala. 310 , 314 , 11 So. 72 , 73 (1892). "`The general rule, therefore, is that a lunatic or a person affe | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Worthington & Co. v. Mencer
green
1 sentence1980In fact, he is specifically charged with this duty by a statute which states: `The court must, by examination, decide upon the capacity of one alleged to be incompetent from idiocy, lunacy, insanity, drunkenness or infancy.' It has been held that a trial judge's ruling on this question stands on appeal unless there is strong evidence of an abuse of sound discretion." (footnotes omitted) One of the oldest and perhaps the best statements of the rule is found in Worthington Co. v. Mencer , 96 Ala. 310 , 314 , 11 So. 72 , 73 (1892). "`The general rule, therefore, is that a lunatic or a person affe | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Stephenson v. Stephenson
neutral
2 sentences1948Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502 , 162 So. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 246 Ala. 107 , 19 So.2d 354 , 155 A.L.R. 130 ; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 213 Ala. 382 , 105 So. 183 ; Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453 , 175 So. 284 ; 17 Am.Jur. 306; 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 108, page 700; sections 20(3) and 36, Title 34, Code. 1948Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502 , 162 So. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 246 Ala. 107 , 19 So.2d 354 , 155 A.L.R. 130 ; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 213 Ala. 382 , 105 So. 183 ; Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453 , 175 So. 284 ; 17 Am.Jur. 306; 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 108, page 700; sections 20(3) and 36, Title 34, Code. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Campbell v. Campbell
green
2 sentences1948Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502 , 162 So. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 246 Ala. 107 , 19 So.2d 354 , 155 A.L.R. 130 ; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 213 Ala. 382 , 105 So. 183 ; Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453 , 175 So. 284 ; 17 Am.Jur. 306; 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 108, page 700; sections 20(3) and 36, Title 34, Code. 1948Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502 , 162 So. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 246 Ala. 107 , 19 So.2d 354 , 155 A.L.R. 130 ; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 213 Ala. 382 , 105 So. 183 ; Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453 , 175 So. 284 ; 17 Am.Jur. 306; 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 108, page 700; sections 20(3) and 36, Title 34, Code. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Perry v. Perry
neutral
2 sentences1948Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502 , 162 So. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 246 Ala. 107 , 19 So.2d 354 , 155 A.L.R. 130 ; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 213 Ala. 382 , 105 So. 183 ; Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453 , 175 So. 284 ; 17 Am.Jur. 306; 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 108, page 700; sections 20(3) and 36, Title 34, Code. 1948Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502 , 162 So. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 246 Ala. 107 , 19 So.2d 354 , 155 A.L.R. 130 ; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 213 Ala. 382 , 105 So. 183 ; Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453 , 175 So. 284 ; 17 Am.Jur. 306; 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 108, page 700; sections 20(3) and 36, Title 34, Code. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Miller v. Miller
green
2 sentences1948Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502 , 162 So. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 246 Ala. 107 , 19 So.2d 354 , 155 A.L.R. 130 ; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 213 Ala. 382 , 105 So. 183 ; Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453 , 175 So. 284 ; 17 Am.Jur. 306; 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 108, page 700; sections 20(3) and 36, Title 34, Code. 1948Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502 , 162 So. 101 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 246 Ala. 107 , 19 So.2d 354 , 155 A.L.R. 130 ; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 213 Ala. 382 , 105 So. 183 ; Miller v. Miller, 234 Ala. 453 , 175 So. 284 ; 17 Am.Jur. 306; 27 Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 108, page 700; sections 20(3) and 36, Title 34, Code. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson
green
2 sentences1930We also think that such statement is consistent with the case of Nebraska v. Iowa, supra. That case has been reaffirmed in Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 , 32 S. Ct. 340 , 56 L. 1930We also think that such statement is consistent with the case of Nebraska v. Iowa, supra. That case has been reaffirmed in Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 , 32 S. Ct. 340 , 56 L. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Thompson v. Stickney
neutral
1 sentence1925The statements of the rule in Upchurch v. Norsworthy, 15 Ala. 705 , and Thompson v. Stickney, 6 Ala. 579 , were where the agent receives money for his principal which the latter is not entitled to receive as, against a third person. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Upchurch v. Norsworthy
neutral
1 sentence1925The statements of the rule in Upchurch v. Norsworthy, 15 Ala. 705 , and Thompson v. Stickney, 6 Ala. 579 , were where the agent receives money for his principal which the latter is not entitled to receive as, against a third person. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Northern Alabama Ry. Co. v. Foster, Creighton, Gould Co.
neutral
1 sentence1919Co. v. Foster, etc., Co., 76 South. 979 , 1 are in conflict with the foregoing statements of principle, they must be pronounced unsound and overruled. [5] In the instant case the complaint does not count upon a willful or wanton wrong,- and hence all of those requested instructions relating to that theory of the case were abstract and properly refused. [6] It only remains to consider whether or not defendant was entitled to the general affirmative charge as requested; and, if not, whether the verdict was so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to require that it be sot aside, and a ne | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.