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13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Clark v. State, 307 Ga. 537, 544 (2) (c) (837 SE2d 265) (2019); Scott v. State, 227 Ga. App. 900, 903 (6) (490 SE2d 208) (1997). 2021See Clark v. State, 307 Ga. 537, 544 (2) (c) ( 837 SE2d 265 ) (2019); Scott v. State, 227 Ga. App. 900, 903 (6) ( 490 SE2d 208 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Clark v. State, 307 Ga. 537, 544 (2) (c) (837 SE2d 265) (2019); Scott v. State, 227 Ga. App. 900, 903 (6) (490 SE2d 208) (1997). 2021See Clark v. State, 307 Ga. 537, 544 (2) (c) (837 SE2d 265) (2019); Scott v. State, 227 Ga. App. 900, 903 (6) (490 SE2d 208) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Perez v. Stategreen1 sentence2020“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Perez v. State, 303 Ga. 188, 191 ( 811 SE2d 331 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See generally Johnson, 261 Ga. App. at 101 (3). | 1 | 1 |
Sanford v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Certainly, in order for a statement to be admissible as a dying declaration under former OCGA § 24-3-6, 3 the deceased must have been conscious of his condition; however, “it need only appear to the court from the circumstances of the case that there was a probability that the deceased was conscious of his condition at the time he made the statement.” Sanford v. State, 287 Ga. 351, 353 (2) ( 695 SE2d 579 ) (2010). 2014Certainly, in order for a statement to be admissible as a dying declaration under former OCGA § 24-3-6, 3 the deceased must have been conscious of his condition; however, “it need only appear to the court from the circumstances of the case that there was a probability that the deceased was conscious of his condition at the time he made the statement.” Sanford v. State, 287 Ga. 351, 353 (2) ( 695 SE2d 579 ) (2010). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rowellgreen1 sentence2014See State v. Rowell, 299 Ga. App 238, 239-240 ( 682 SE2d 343 ) (2009) (affirming trial court’s finding that an officer’s actions were not fair or reasonable when the defendant testified that she felt coerced when the officer told her if she blew under the legal limit, he’d let her go home to her son.) Humphries contends that, although she later consented to the Intoxilizer test, some of the officer’s statements before she changed her mind rose to the level of coercion, specifically the statements that the test was not optional and that it would 5 take longer to be processed out of jail if she | 1 | 1 |
Brockett Road Apartments v. Georgia Pacific Corp.green2 sentences2013In this case, however, the language of the claims of liens does not serve as factual allegations 12 See OCGA § 44-14-361.1 (a) (2). 13 Compare with Brockett Road Apartments, 138 Ga. App. at 198 (“material furnished to Piedmont Engineering & Construction, a contractor or builder . . .”) (emphasis omitted; emphasis supplied). 14 Id. at 199-200 . 2013In this case, however, the language of the claims of liens does not serve as factual allegations 12 See OCGA § 44-14-361.1 (a) (2). 13 Compare with Brockett Road Apartments, 138 Ga. App. at 198 (“material furnished to Piedmont Engineering & Construction, a contractor or builder . . .”) (emphasis omitted; emphasis supplied). 14 Id. at 199-200 . | 1 | 1 |
Atwater v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Thus, there was no evidence that Shirah could have physically gained entry to the house. 13 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 134 (II) (A) (99 SC 421, 58 LE2d 387) (1978). 14 Atwater v. State, 233 Ga. App. 339, 340 (2) ( 503 SE2d 919 ) (1998). 15 The defendants rely on the statements of defense counsel at the second suppression hearing that the defendants had been at a club the night before the arrest, that they spent the night at the house at the invitation of a woman named' “Red,” and that Mitchell engaged in sexual relations with another woman at the house. 2010Thus, there was no evidence that Shirah could have physically gained entry to the house. 13 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 134 (II) (A) (99 SC 421, 58 LE2d 387) (1978). 14 Atwater v. State, 233 Ga. App. 339, 340 (2) ( 503 SE2d 919 ) (1998). 15 The defendants rely on the statements of defense counsel at the second suppression hearing that the defendants had been at a club the night before the arrest, that they spent the night at the house at the invitation of a woman named' “Red,” and that Mitchell engaged in sexual relations with another woman at the house. | 1 | 1 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence2010Thus, there was no evidence that Shirah could have physically gained entry to the house. 13 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 134 (II) (A) (99 SC 421, 58 LE2d 387) (1978). 14 Atwater v. State, 233 Ga. App. 339, 340 (2) ( 503 SE2d 919 ) (1998). 15 The defendants rely on the statements of defense counsel at the second suppression hearing that the defendants had been at a club the night before the arrest, that they spent the night at the house at the invitation of a woman named' “Red,” and that Mitchell engaged in sexual relations with another woman at the house. | 1 | 1 |
Tyler v. Stategreen2 sentences1984Brawner v. State, 250 Ga. 125, 126 ( 296 SE2d 551 ) (1982); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 SE2d 549 ) (1981); Wisecup v. State, 157 Ga. App. 853 (2) ( 278 SE2d 682 ) (1981). 3. 1984Brawner v. State, 250 Ga. 125, 126 ( 296 SE2d 551 ) (1982); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 SE2d 549 ) (1981); Wisecup v. State, 157 Ga. App. 853 (2) ( 278 SE2d 682 ) (1981). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Brawner v. Stategreen2 sentences1984Brawner v. State, 250 Ga. 125, 126 ( 296 SE2d 551 ) (1982); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 SE2d 549 ) (1981); Wisecup v. State, 157 Ga. App. 853 (2) ( 278 SE2d 682 ) (1981). 3. 1984Brawner v. State, 250 Ga. 125, 126 ( 296 SE2d 551 ) (1982); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 SE2d 549 ) (1981); Wisecup v. State, 157 Ga. App. 853 (2) ( 278 SE2d 682 ) (1981). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Jewel Tea Co. v. City Councilgreen2 sentences1940One of the several statements of the rule and its application is found in Jewel Tea Co. v. Augusta, 183 Ga. 817, 818 ( 190 S. E. 1 ), where Mr. Justice Jenkins, referring to the Code section involved and speaking for the court, said: “This provision, embodying a fundamental equitable principle, is so clear and unequivocal as to permit no exception, as such, *844 to the rule. 1940One of the several statements of the rule and its application is found in Jewel Tea Co. v. Augusta, 183 Ga. 817, 818 ( 190 S. E. 1 ), where Mr. Justice Jenkins, referring to the Code section involved and speaking for the court, said: “This provision, embodying a fundamental equitable principle, is so clear and unequivocal as to permit no exception, as such, *844 to the rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Perez v. State
green
1 sentence2020“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Perez v. State, 303 Ga. 188, 191 ( 811 SE2d 331 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Isaacs v. State
green
1 sentence2015Isaacs v. State, [ 257 Ga. at 128 ]. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lawson v. State
green
2 sentences2000Lawson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 645 (3) (b) ( 481 SE2d 856 ) (1997). 2000Lawson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 645 (3) (b) ( 481 SE2d 856 ) (1997). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Grimes v. State
green
2 sentences1991In these circumstances, the trial court’s refusal to grant a recess in the middle of the State’s case to wait for the arrival of a defense witness from another town was not an abuse of discretion (Grimes v. State, 168 Ga. App. 372 ( 308 SE2d 863 )), particularly since the attorney did not even know what the witness would testify to or show. 1991In these circumstances, the trial court’s refusal to grant a recess in the middle of the State’s case to wait for the arrival of a defense witness from another town was not an abuse of discretion (Grimes v. State, 168 Ga. App. 372 ( 308 SE2d 863 )), particularly since the attorney did not even know what the witness would testify to or show. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Terry v. State
green
2 sentences1990Terry v. State, 190 Ga. App. 570 ( 379 SE2d 604 ) (1989). 1990Terry v. State, 190 Ga. App. 570 ( 379 SE2d 604 ) (1989). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Wisecup v. State
neutral
2 sentences1984Brawner v. State, 250 Ga. 125, 126 ( 296 SE2d 551 ) (1982); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 SE2d 549 ) (1981); Wisecup v. State, 157 Ga. App. 853 (2) ( 278 SE2d 682 ) (1981). 3. 1984Brawner v. State, 250 Ga. 125, 126 ( 296 SE2d 551 ) (1982); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 122 ( 274 SE2d 549 ) (1981); Wisecup v. State, 157 Ga. App. 853 (2) ( 278 SE2d 682 ) (1981). 3. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.