12 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Whitegreen1 sentence2026Nevertheless, while a judge "must be ever vigilant to make certain that his personal and private beliefs do not interfere with his judicial role," Mills, 436 Mass. at 401 , a judge may "freely place on record his sentencing philosophy and particularized sentencing rationale." Commonwealth v. White, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 658, 664 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Azargreen1 sentence2023A substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice exists where "we have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made." Commonwealth v. Sherman, 481 Mass. 464, 476 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Shermangreen1 sentence2023A substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice exists where "we have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made." Commonwealth v. Sherman, 481 Mass. 464, 476 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Salazargreen2 sentences2019See Commonwealth v. Salazar , 481 Mass. 105 , 116, 112 N.E.3d 781 (2018). 2019See Commonwealth v. Salazar , 481 Mass. 105 , 116, 112 N.E.3d 781 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Zukoskigreen1 sentence2015Prior consistent statements are “generally inadmissible to corroborate in-court testimony or a witness’s credibility, but they are admissible when offered in response to a claim of bias, inducement, or recent contrivance.” Commonwealth v. Saarela, 376 Mass. 720, 722 (1978), citing Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 370 Mass. 23, 26-27 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Saarelagreen1 sentence2015Prior consistent statements are “generally inadmissible to corroborate in-court testimony or a witness’s credibility, but they are admissible when offered in response to a claim of bias, inducement, or recent contrivance.” Commonwealth v. Saarela, 376 Mass. 720, 722 (1978), citing Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 370 Mass. 23, 26-27 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Durlinggreen1 sentence2013See Commonwealth v. Darling, 407 Mass. 108, 117-118 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Seabrooksgreen1 sentence2010See Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 451 (2001) (admission in evidence of defendant’s statements to psychologist did not violate privilege against self-incrimination where State did not compel defendant to speak to psychologist). 10 Nevertheless, disclosure to the prosecution of the defense expert’s reports and statements must still wait until the defendant decides whether the expert will testify at trial based in whole or in part on the defendant’s statements to the expert, because, until that decision is made, the defendant’s statements to a defense expert retained by his attorney a | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Watsongreen1 sentence1999Commonwealth v. Watson, 377 Mass. 814, 826, 830 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Valentingreen1 sentence1997See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 98 n.21 (1986); Commonwealth v. Valentin, 420 Mass. 263, 269 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence1997See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 98 n.21 (1986); Commonwealth v. Valentin, 420 Mass. 263, 269 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Raunela v. Hertz Corp.green2 sentences1987In reviewing the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts, we must consider whether "anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff." Raunela v. Hertz Corp., 361 Mass. 341, 343 (1972). 1987In reviewing the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts, we must consider whether “anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.” Raunela v. Hertz Corp., 361 Mass. 341, 343 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Campbellgreen1 sentence1981In his closing argument defense counsel cautioned the jury to keep separate the defendant’s treatment of the two children, but he made no request for limiting instructions. 8 See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 371 Mass. 40, 43 (1976) (curative instructions approved). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Mills
green
1 sentence2026Nevertheless, while a judge "must be ever vigilant to make certain that his personal and private beliefs do not interfere with his judicial role," Mills, 436 Mass. at 401 , a judge may "freely place on record his sentencing philosophy and particularized sentencing rationale." Commonwealth v. White, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 658, 664 (2000). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur
green
2 sentences2018As Chief Justice Gants (then Associate Justice) observed in his dissent in Sliech-Brodeur , 457 Mass. at 340 , 930 N.E.2d 91 , that right "does not apply to a defendant's statements to the psychiatrist [or psychologist] retained by his attorney because these statements were not compelled by the Commonwealth or the court; the defendant voluntarily chose to speak to his defense expert." "Nevertheless," the dissent explained, "disclosure to the prosecution of the defense expert's reports and statements must still wait until the defendant decides whether the expert will testify at trial based in w 2018As Chief Justice Gants (then Associate Justice) observed in his dissent in Sliech-Brodeur , 457 Mass. at 340 , 930 N.E.2d 91 , that right "does not apply to a defendant's statements to the psychiatrist [or psychologist] retained by his attorney because these statements were not compelled by the Commonwealth or the court; the defendant voluntarily chose to speak to his defense expert." "Nevertheless," the dissent explained, "disclosure to the prosecution of the defense expert's reports and statements must still wait until the defendant decides whether the expert will testify at trial based in w | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences2018In Simmons v. United States , 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's statements from a hearing on the suppression of evidence could not be admitted at the defendant's criminal trial for the purpose of determining guilt or innocence. 2018In Simmons v. United States , 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's statements from a hearing on the suppression of evidence could not be admitted at the defendant's criminal trial for the purpose of determining guilt or innocence. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Soares
green
1 sentence1997While the judge did not use the key words “bona fide” or “sham,” see Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 491 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), which we prefer because they aid us in our review, in the circumstances of this case, the judge’s statements that defense counsel’s explanations were “inappropriate” meets the standard of pretext or a sham which is entitled to deference. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Massachusetts v. Soares
green
1 sentence1997While the judge did not use the key words “bona fide” or “sham,” see Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 491 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), which we prefer because they aid us in our review, in the circumstances of this case, the judge’s statements that defense counsel’s explanations were “inappropriate” meets the standard of pretext or a sham which is entitled to deference. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mounsey v. Ellard
green
1 sentence1987Since we agree with the plaintiffs that Arco had a duty to use reasonable care to maintain a safe service station under Mounsey, supra, we conclude that the cases defining the duty to warn about dangerous products are not controlling. [1] I agree with the court's statements of our standard of review. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.