carrier standard in Illinois

2020In explaining the distinction between the Jackson standard and the Carrier standard adopted in Schlup (and subsequently by our supreme court in Edwards), the Schlup Court explained “though under Jackson the mere existence of sufficient evidence to convict would be determinative of [the] petitioner’s claim, that is not true under Carrier.” Id. -9- 1-16-1067 “Indeed, our adoption of the phrase ‘more likely than not’ reflects this distinction.

2020In explaining the distinction between the Jackson standard and the Carrier standard adopted in Schlup (and subsequently by our supreme court in Edwards), the Schlup Court explained “though under Jackson the mere existence of sufficient evidence to convict would be determinative of [the] petitioner’s claim, that is not true under Carrier.” Id. -9- 1-16-1067 “Indeed, our adoption of the phrase ‘more likely than not’ reflects this distinction.

2026This court noted that “[p]ublic transportation carriers owe the highest standard of care to its passengers—a standard of care higher than that owed by other public entities.” Id. ¶ 26 (citing Cooper v. Bi-State Development Agency, 158 Ill. App. 3d 19, 24 (1987)).

2026However, the fallacy in [the plaintiff’s] reasoning is that the common carrier doctrine only applies to passengers of the common carrier at the time of an accident.” Id. (citing Hubble, 238 Ill. 2d at 269 -70 n.4).

2020However, our supreme court has subsequently clarified that in Edwards it “merely cited the Schlup case. [Our supreme court] did not hold that the trial court could effectively assess the credibility of witnesses and affiants by judging the reliability of their statements.” Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 37 . ¶ 28 In Sanders, the appellate court affirmed the second-stage dismissal of a second successive postconviction petition.

2020However, our supreme court has subsequently clarified that in Edwards it “merely cited the Schlup case. [Our supreme court] did not hold that the trial court could effectively assess the credibility of witnesses and affiants by judging the reliability of their statements.” Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 37 . ¶ 28 In Sanders, the appellate court affirmed the second-stage dismissal of a second successive postconviction petition.

1980App. 3d 321, 325 , 403 N.E.2d 1239 . 4 Carrier error is recognized as a defense in certain actions having the effect of reducing or eliminating a shipper’s liability for demurrage charges accrued through the fault of a carrier or where demurrage charges are unjust.

1950Where claims are not filed or suits are not instituted thereon in accordance with the foregoing provisions, no carrier hereunder shall be liable, and such claims will not be paid.” We believe that the case of Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway Co. v. Blish Milling Co. 241 U.S. 190 , 60 L. ed. 948, is controlling.

1950(Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 262 Ill. 400 .) The provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act (U.S.C.A., title 49, sec. 20(11), authorizes a carrier to require a claim in writing within nine months, and the institution of suit within two years, and upon a failure to comply with this limitation the carrier does not become liable for failure to make delivery; and the uniform bill of lading adopted and on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission (sec. 2(B)) provides as follows: “As a condition precedent to recovery, claims must be filed in writing with the receiving or deli

1941(Moline Consumers Co. v. Commerce Com. 353 Ill. 119 ; Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co. v. Commerce Com. supra; Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com. 340 Ill. 304 .) When schedules of new rates are posted by a carrier no presumption of wrong arises* from the change, or that it was not rightfully done.

1941(Moline Consumers Co. v. Commerce Com. 353 Ill. 119 ; Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co. v. Commerce Com. supra; Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com. 340 Ill. 304 .) When schedules of new rates are posted by a carrier no presumption of wrong arises* from the change, or that it was not rightfully done.

1941(Interstate Commerce Com. v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co. 209 U. S. 108 , 52 L. ed., 705.) On matters not coming within the jurisdiction of the commission, a utility, as defined by the statute, has a right to use managerial discretion in the conduct of its own business.

1924Co., 310 Ill. 524, 530 , a similar provision .in the Uniform Bills of Lading Act of this State was held to deprive the carrier of the defense, formerly available, that it never received the goods mentioned in a bill of lading issued by it.

1923(Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Live Stock Bank, 178 Ill. 506 .) Section 23 deprived the carrier of that defense.

1916State v. Goss, 59 Vt. 266 ; 4 R.

1916(Milwaukee Malt Extract Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. 73 Iowa, 98 .) Under the circumstances here indicated, if the milk could not be cooled to a proper temperature after it was received, and if there were any practicable way for the common carrier to test the temperature of the milk before accepting it for transportation, the carrier would be justified in refusing to accept it if it were not at the proper temperature.

1881To hold under such a bill of lading that if there happened by mistake in weighing at Buffalo to be 500 bushels more than was specified, the carrier could claim this quantity, and the shipper would be precluded from showing any mistake, would violate principles of law and equity.” In Meyer v. Peck, 28 N. Y. 590 , the bill of lading contained, these words: “Any damage or deficiency in quantity the consignee will deduct from the balance of freight due the captain.” The suit was brought to recover for freight, and the defendants sought to recoup a claim for one hundred and twenty-five bushels defi