results of a blood test (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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results of a blood test in Pennsylvania

17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1974–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
Com. v. Banko, D.green
pasuperct · 2022 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024In order to determine whether a report detailing the results of a blood test is testimonial, “a court must determine whether the primary purpose [] was to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 175 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Banko, 268 A.3d 484, 492 (Pa. Super. 2022) (reiterating that evidence is testimonial in nature where its primary purpose was to support an arrest and “create an out-of-court substitute for trial -17- J-S44041-23 testimony”).

2024See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009). - 11 - J-S36023-23 In order to determine whether a report detailing the results of a blood test is testimonial, “a court must determine whether the primary purpose [] was to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 175 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Banko, 268 A.3d 484, 492 (Pa. Super. 2022) (reiterating that evidence is testimonial in nature where its primary purpose was to support an arrest and “create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”).

22
Commonwealth v. Allshousegreen
pa · 2012 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024In order to determine whether a report detailing the results of a blood test is testimonial, “a court must determine whether the primary purpose [] was to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 175 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Banko, 268 A.3d 484, 492 (Pa. Super. 2022) (reiterating that evidence is testimonial in nature where its primary purpose was to support an arrest and “create an out-of-court substitute for trial -17- J-S44041-23 testimony”).

2024See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009). - 11 - J-S36023-23 In order to determine whether a report detailing the results of a blood test is testimonial, “a court must determine whether the primary purpose [] was to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 175 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Banko, 268 A.3d 484, 492 (Pa. Super. 2022) (reiterating that evidence is testimonial in nature where its primary purpose was to support an arrest and “create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”).

22
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen
scotus · 2016 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2018
2 sentences

2018Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2186 (reversing judgment of conviction where petitioner Birchfield was threatened with an unlawful search). 12 Birchfield further held that when the results of a blood test are obtained based on a threat that the motorist will be criminally penalized for refusing, the voluntariness of the motorist's consent, both in any criminal prosecution or civil license suspension proceeding, must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances, taking into account the fact that the motorist was given partially inaccurate advice.

2018Defendant's statement of complaints on appeal consists of one issue; namely, he claims that the suppression court erred in failing to suppress the results of a blood test in violation of Birchfield v. Norlh Dakota, _US_, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016).

14
Commonwealth v. Vassiljevgreen
pasuperct · 1971 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974
2 sentences

1974“A police officer may only make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor ‘where he has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being committed in his presence.’ Commonwealth v. Vas *370 siljev, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 215, 219-220 , 275 A. 2d 852 (1971) (emphasis added).” Id. at 52-58, 271 A. 2d at 143 . 2 Since the defendant did not commit a misdemeanor in the officer’s presence, he was illegally arrested and the results of the blood test were properly suppressed as administered incident to an illegal arrest.

1974“A police officer may only make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor ‘where he has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being committed in his presence.’ Commonwealth v. Vas *370 siljev, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 215, 219-220 , 275 A. 2d 852 (1971) (emphasis added).” Id. at 52-58, 271 A. 2d at 143 . 2 Since the defendant did not commit a misdemeanor in the officer’s presence, he was illegally arrested and the results of the blood test were properly suppressed as administered incident to an illegal arrest.

12
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusettsgreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009). - 11 - J-S36023-23 In order to determine whether a report detailing the results of a blood test is testimonial, “a court must determine whether the primary purpose [] was to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 175 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Banko, 268 A.3d 484, 492 (Pa. Super. 2022) (reiterating that evidence is testimonial in nature where its primary purpose was to support an arrest and “create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”).

11
Commonwealth v. Bartongreen
pasuperct · 1997 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 237 A.3d 528 , 536 n.13 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Seibert, 799 A.2d 54, 64 (Pa. Super. 2002) (explaining that an “officer is entitled to the release of [chemical] test results” if he “determines there is probable cause to believe a person operated a motor vehicle under the influence . . . and requests that hospital personnel withdraw blood” even though “medical staff previously drew the blood and a request by the police . . . came after the blood was drawn”)); see also Commonwealth v. Hipp, 551 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (holding

11
Commonwealth v. Hippgreen
pa · 1988 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 237 A.3d 528 , 536 n.13 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Seibert, 799 A.2d 54, 64 (Pa. Super. 2002) (explaining that an “officer is entitled to the release of [chemical] test results” if he “determines there is probable cause to believe a person operated a motor vehicle under the influence . . . and requests that hospital personnel withdraw blood” even though “medical staff previously drew the blood and a request by the police . . . came after the blood was drawn”)); see also Commonwealth v. Hipp, 551 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (holding

11
Commonwealth v. Seibertgreen
pasuperct · 2002 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 237 A.3d 528 , 536 n.13 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Seibert, 799 A.2d 54, 64 (Pa. Super. 2002) (explaining that an “officer is entitled to the release of [chemical] test results” if he “determines there is probable cause to believe a person operated a motor vehicle under the influence . . . and requests that hospital personnel withdraw blood” even though “medical staff previously drew the blood and a request by the police . . . came after the blood was drawn”)); see also Commonwealth v. Hipp, 551 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (holding

11
Commonwealth v. Morrisongreen
pasuperct · 2017 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020However, where, as here, an appellant pleads guilty, he waives “all defects and defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of the sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea.” Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d 286, 290 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

11
Commonwealth v. Neysmithgreen
pasuperct · 2018 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Id. (where motorist submitted to blood test on pain of criminal prosecution and his license was then suspended as a result of the high level of concentration of alcohol in his blood, the matter was remanded to state court to determine whether motorist's consent to the test was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, including the fact his consent followed a partially inaccurate warning); see Commonwealth v. Neysmith , 192 A.3d 184 , 187-88, 2018 WL 3153691 (Pa. Super. 2018) (affirming denial of the suppression of blood test results based on defendant having voluntarily consented, gi

11
Commonwealth v. Danforthgreen
pa · 1990 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Commonwealth v. Danforth, 395 Pa. Super. 1, 10-11 , 576 A.2d 1013, 1018 (1990) (Police officer did not suspect intoxication and the typical indicators of intoxication were not present and the results of a blood test taken during the appellant’s medical treatment for injuries he suffered were inadmissible.).

2007Commonwealth v. Danforth, 395 Pa. Super. 1, 10-11 , 576 A.2d 1013, 1018 (1990) (Police officer did not suspect intoxication and the typical indicators of intoxication were not present and the results of a blood test taken during the appellant’s medical treatment for injuries he suffered were inadmissible.).

11
Commonwealth v. Trefrygreen
pasuperct · 1977 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
2 sentences

1988The remedy of suppression is thus not applicable.” 249 Pa. Super. at 129 , 375 A.2d at 792-3 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

1988The remedy of suppression is thus not applicable.” 249 Pa. Super. at 129 , 375 A.2d at 792-3 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Com. v. Jones-Williams, A. green
pasuperct · 2020
1 sentence

2022Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 237 A.3d 528 , 536 n.13 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Seibert, 799 A.2d 54, 64 (Pa. Super. 2002) (explaining that an “officer is entitled to the release of [chemical] test results” if he “determines there is probable cause to believe a person operated a motor vehicle under the influence . . . and requests that hospital personnel withdraw blood” even though “medical staff previously drew the blood and a request by the police . . . came after the blood was drawn”)); see also Commonwealth v. Hipp, 551 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (holding

12022–2022
Commonwealth v. Ennels green
pasuperct · 2017
1 sentence

2017Ennels, 167 A.3d at 724 .

12017–2017
Commonwealth v. Riedel green
pa · 1994
2 sentences

2001Today the majority concludes, consistent with Justice Zappala's concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Riedel, 539 Pa. 172 , 651 A.2d 135 (1994), that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, *300 the police cannot obtain the results of a blood test pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755(a) without a search warrant if: (1) the police did not request that a blood sample be taken for purposes of determining the BAC of the defendant; and (2) the emergency health care provider(s) who performed the blood test did so for purely medical reasons, rather than out of a perceived duty to do so

2001Today the majority concludes, consistent with Justice Zappala's concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Riedel, 539 Pa. 172 , 651 A.2d 135 (1994), that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, *300 the police cannot obtain the results of a blood test pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755(a) without a search warrant if: (1) the police did not request that a blood sample be taken for purposes of determining the BAC of the defendant; and (2) the emergency health care provider(s) who performed the blood test did so for purely medical reasons, rather than out of a perceived duty to do so

12001–2001
Christianson v. Ely green
pa · 1990
2 sentences

1995Christianson v. Ely, 390 Pa.Super. 398 , 568 A.2d 961 (1990).

1995Christianson v. Ely, 390 Pa.Super. 398 , 568 A.2d 961 (1990).

11995–1995
Commonwealth v. Brozik green
pasuperct · 1987
2 sentences

1988Our Superior Court, following this same rationale, held the results of a blood test were admissible in Commonwealth v. Brozik, 364 Pa. Super. 80 , 527 A.2d 161 (1987).

1988Our Superior Court, following this same rationale, held the results of a blood test were admissible in Commonwealth v. Brozik, 364 Pa. Super. 80 , 527 A.2d 161 (1987).

11988–1988
North Carolina v. Pearce red
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

1979The issue presented on appeal is whether Mr. Hlavsa was under arrest at the time the blood test was performed, which would have made the blood test a lawful search incident to arrest under the doctrine of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

1979The issue presented on appeal is whether Mr. Hlavsa was under arrest at the time the blood test was performed, which would have made the blood test a lawful search incident to arrest under the doctrine of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

11979–1979
Chimel v. California red
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

1979The issue presented on appeal is whether Mr. Hlavsa was under arrest at the time the blood test was performed, which would have made the blood test a lawful search incident to arrest under the doctrine of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

1979The issue presented on appeal is whether Mr. Hlavsa was under arrest at the time the blood test was performed, which would have made the blood test a lawful search incident to arrest under the doctrine of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

11979–1979
Commonwealth v. Reeves green
pasuperct · 1972
2 sentences

1974In Commonwealth v. Reeves, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 51 , 297 A. 2d 142 (1972), this court *397 suppressed, the results of a blood test where the defendant had been arrested at a hospital for misdemeanors connected with the automobile accident for which he was receiving treatment.

1974In Commonwealth v. Reeves, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 51 , 297 A. 2d 142 (1972), this court *397 suppressed, the results of a blood test where the defendant had been arrested at a hospital for misdemeanors connected with the automobile accident for which he was receiving treatment.

11974–1974
Schmerber v. California green
scotus · 1966
1 sentence

1974Under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the seizure of the defendant’s blood would have been constitutional if taken incident to a lawful arrest, but since the defendant was not placed under arrest until thirteen days after the accident, the results of the blood test were suppressed.

11974–1974
Commonwealth v. Murray green
pa · 1970
2 sentences

1974Relying on Schmerber , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Murray, 441 Pa. 22 , 271 A. 2d 500 (1970), held that the results of a blood test taken under similar circumstances should have been suppressed.

1974Relying on Schmerber , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Murray, 441 Pa. 22 , 271 A. 2d 500 (1970), held that the results of a blood test taken under similar circumstances should have been suppressed.

11974–1974

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1547 (4) PA § 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3731 (3) PA § 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3755 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 34 (1961–2024) PA 17 (1974–2024) IL 16 (1960–2023) NY 15 (1960–2022) IA 7 (1972–2024) FL 6 (1979–2007) ME 6 (1978–2022) CA 6 (1966–2014) MN 5 (1991–2016) VA 5 (1971–2009) KS 5 (1969–2020) GA 4 (1963–2009) KY 4 (1972–2021) NE 4 (1996–2023) AK 3 (1995–2012) MO 3 (1985–2011) WI 3 (1984–2017) MS 3 (1987–2008) NC 3 (1956–1992) ND 3 (1985–2017) OK 3 (1965–1980) MI 3 (1979–1987) OH 2 (2004–2018) DE 2 (1991–2021) WV 2 (2020–2021) SD 2 (1966–1976) RI 2 (1998–2000) IN 2 (1984–2012) LA 2 (1987–1989) NM 2 (1996–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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