results of a blood test in New York

1995C., supra; Matter of Niagara County Dept, of Social Servs. [Kimmie W.J v Randy M., 206 AD2d 878, 878-879 ).

1995The testimony of petitioner and a witness called by petitioner, as well as the results of a blood test indicating a 99.59% probability that respondent is the child’s father, provide clear and convincing evidence of respondent’s paternity (see, Matter of Niagara County Dept. of Social Servs. [Kimmie W.] v Randy M., 206 AD2d 878, 878-879 ).

2022Contrary to defendant's further contention, the evidence at the suppression hearing supports the court's determination that defendant's consent to submit to the blood test was voluntary ( see generally Palmer , 204 AD3d at 1514 ).

2022Inasmuch as the court properly refused to suppress the statements made by defendant at the accident scene, we reject defendant's contention that the statements he made after waiving his Miranda rights and the results of a blood test conducted with defendant's consent should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful custodial interrogation ( see generally Palmiere , 124 AD2d at 1016 ).

2017Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied, without a hearing, that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress the results of a blood test, since the defendant failed to provide a sufficient legal basis for suppression (see CPL 710.60 [3] [a]; People v Garcia, 57 AD3d 918 , *752 919 [2008]).

2017The court also properly denied, without a hearing, that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to controvert a search warrant issued by the court, as the defendant failed to make the necessary substantial preliminary showing that the warrant was based upon an affidavit containing false statements made knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth (see People v Moshier, 110 AD3d 832, 833 [2013]; People v McGeachy, 74 AD3d 989, 990 [2010]; People v Rhodes, 49 AD3d 668, 669 [2008]; People v Tordella, 37 AD3d 500 [2007]).

2009Even before Atkins , in People v Mills ( 124 AD2d 600 [2d Dept 1986]), the defendant, who had been involved in a fatal automobile accident, moved to suppress the results of a blood test administered with his consent because the People had failed to establish that the test was administered within two hours of his arrest.

2009The Second Department upheld the denial of the motion, holding that “[t]he requirement that the blood sample be obtained within two hours after arrest... is relevant only with regard to blood samples obtained in cases where no express consent has been given.” ( 124 AD2d at 601 .) Not surprisingly, “since Atkins , appellate courts have consistently ruled that the two-hour rule has no application where actual, uncoerced consent is given.” (People v Burns, 13 Misc 3d 1208[A] , 2006 NY Slip Op 51731[U] , *4 [Nassau Dist Ct 2006] [citations omitted]; see People v Zawacki, 244 AD2d 954 , 955 [4th De

2007In People v Dixon, this Court determined that the results of a blood test conducted on an unconscious defendant pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 were admissible at trial with respect to not only the Vehicle and Traffic Law violations but also the charges under the Penal Law arising from the same incident (see People v Dixon, 149 AD2d at 79 ).

2006The Court stated that since “the blood test was performed in the course of attending defendant in a professional capacity” (People v Petro, supra, 122 AD2d at 310 ), the results of the blood test are protected by the physician-patient privilege and are inadmissable unless waived by defendant.

1997On appeal, we reversed and remitted the matter to Family Court, directing that William be joined as a necessary party so that all claims with respect to the child’s paternity could be adjudicated and all of the relevant circumstances considered in a single proceeding ( 212 AD2d 89 ).

1995C., supra; Matter of Niagara County Dept, of Social Servs. [Kimmie W.J v Randy M., 206 AD2d 878, 878-879 ).

1986Consent, in this context, be taken to mean, that the defendant’s assent was not the product of duress or coercion, express or implied (see, United States v Ramey, 711 F2d 104, 107 [8th Cir, 1983]), so that the ultimate issue to be determined herein is whether the defendants’ will in acquiesc ing to the blood tests was sufficiently overborne to render their results inadmissible at their upcoming trial. * In this regard, the court is not unmindful of the fact that the bulk of the case law regarding the subsequently acquired incriminating evidence has arisen in the context of alleged violations o

1986Consent, in this context, be taken to mean, that the defendant’s assent was not the product of duress or coercion, express or implied (see, United States v Ramey, 711 F2d 104, 107 [8th Cir, 1983]), so that the ultimate issue to be determined herein is whether the defendants’ will in acquiesc ing to the blood tests was sufficiently overborne to render their results inadmissible at their upcoming trial. * In this regard, the court is not unmindful of the fact that the bulk of the case law regarding the subsequently acquired incriminating evidence has arisen in the context of alleged violations o

1986Consent, in this context, be taken to mean, that the defendant’s assent was not the product of duress or coercion, express or implied (see, United States v Ramey, 711 F2d 104, 107 [8th Cir, 1983]), so that the ultimate issue to be determined herein is whether the defendants’ will in acquiesc ing to the blood tests was sufficiently overborne to render their results inadmissible at their upcoming trial. * In this regard, the court is not unmindful of the fact that the bulk of the case law regarding the subsequently acquired incriminating evidence has arisen in the context of alleged violations o

1986We find no error in the trial court’s rulings that would have allowed the People, had the defendant taken the stand and testified that he was neither intoxicated nor impaired, to impeach him with (1) the results of a blood test taken 3Vz hours after the accident showing a blood alcohol level of 0.07%, and (2) the fact that the defendant refused to take a "breathalyzer” test (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [4]; § 1195 [2] [b]; People v Thomas, 46 NY2d 100 , appeal dismissed 444 US 891 ; People v Johnson, 27 NY2d 119 , cert denied 401 US 966 ).

1986We find no error in the trial court’s rulings that would have allowed the People, had the defendant taken the stand and testified that he was neither intoxicated nor impaired, to impeach him with (1) the results of a blood test taken 3Vz hours after the accident showing a blood alcohol level of 0.07%, and (2) the fact that the defendant refused to take a "breathalyzer” test (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [4]; § 1195 [2] [b]; People v Thomas, 46 NY2d 100 , appeal dismissed 444 US 891 ; People v Johnson, 27 NY2d 119 , cert denied 401 US 966 ).

1986We find no error in the trial court’s rulings that would have allowed the People, had the defendant taken the stand and testified that he was neither intoxicated nor impaired, to impeach him with (1) the results of a blood test taken 3Vz hours after the accident showing a blood alcohol level of 0.07%, and (2) the fact that the defendant refused to take a "breathalyzer” test (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [4]; § 1195 [2] [b]; People v Thomas, 46 NY2d 100 , appeal dismissed 444 US 891 ; People v Johnson, 27 NY2d 119 , cert denied 401 US 966 ).

1986It is, by now, a well-established proposition of law in New York that the results of a blood test taken, as here, without an authorizing court order are inadmissible against a defendant in any subsequent Penal Law prosecution, unless taken in accordance with the latter’s "consent” (People v Moselle, 57 NY2d 97 ; People v Magiera, 97 AD2d 963 ; People v Curran, 90 AD2d 661 ).

1986Consent, in this context, be taken to mean, that the defendant’s assent was not the product of duress or coercion, express or implied (see, United States v Ramey, 711 F2d 104, 107 [8th Cir, 1983]), so that the ultimate issue to be determined herein is whether the defendants’ will in acquiesc ing to the blood tests was sufficiently overborne to render their results inadmissible at their upcoming trial. * In this regard, the court is not unmindful of the fact that the bulk of the case law regarding the subsequently acquired incriminating evidence has arisen in the context of alleged violations o