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16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dillon v. Legggreen2 sentences1975He cites Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 739 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ], which states; “‘. . . foreseeability of risk [is] of . . . primary importance in establishing the element of duty.’ [Citations.]. . . ‘The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.’ [Citation.]. . . ‘Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.’ ” And Diamond Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors, 16 Cal.App.3d 581, 596-597 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 200 ], where the court states: “Foreseeability of harm may be treated, 1975He cites Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 739 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ], which states; “‘. . . foreseeability of risk [is] of . . . primary importance in establishing the element of duty.’ [Citations.]. . . ‘The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.’ [Citation.]. . . ‘Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.’ ” And Diamond Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors, 16 Cal.App.3d 581, 596-597 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 200 ], where the court states: “Foreseeability of harm may be treated, | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2026I write to observe that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age, suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts 1 (See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 , 638 [psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”]; People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist “concluded defendant suffered from par | 1 | 1 |
People v. Powellgreen1 sentence2026I write to observe that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age, suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts 1 (See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 , 638 [psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”]; People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist “concluded defendant suffered from par | 1 | 1 |
People v. Steskalgreen1 sentence2026I write to observe that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age, suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts 1 (See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 , 638 [psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”]; People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist “concluded defendant suffered from par | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pottsgreen1 sentence2026I write to observe that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age, suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts 1 (See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 , 638 [psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”]; People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist “concluded defendant suffered from par | 1 | 1 |
People v. Milesgreen1 sentence2026I write to observe that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age, suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts 1 (See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 , 638 [psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”]; People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist “concluded defendant suffered from par | 1 | 1 |
People v. Avalosgreen1 sentence2024(See People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233 (Avalos) [applying the Watson standard to an improper dual use of facts].) Fernandez has not demonstrated such a reasonable probability, and the court’s explanations serve to foreclose such a probability. | 1 | 1 |
Furey v. Commission on Judicial Performancegreen2 sentences2015(Furey v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1297, 1307, fn. 2 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 743 P.2d 919 ].) First, we look to whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or whether there are a number of incidents demonstrating a pattern of misconduct. 2015(Furey v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1297, 1307, fn. 2 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 743 P.2d 919 ].) First, we look to whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or whether there are a number of incidents demonstrating a pattern of misconduct. | 1 | 1 |
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Bakergreen1 sentence2014(Cf. Exxon, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 493 [noting that “[u]nder the umbrellas of punishment and its aim of deterrence, degrees of relative blameworthiness are apparent” and noting that “[r]eckless conduct is not intentional or malicious, nor is it necessarily callous toward the risk of harming others . . . .” (italics added)].) On this record, we conclude the $1.5 million in punitive damages awarded to Jessica, when considered in light of the seriousness of her injuries and the amount of her compensatory damages award, is a reasonable and proportionate measure of the blameworthiness of BRP’s condu | 1 | 1 |
Rowland v. Christianred2 sentences2009(Staten, supra, 704 N.E.2d at p. 624 .) 6 In so concluding, we need not address the multiple factors to be considered in determining the existence and scope of a duty of care as set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ]. 2009(Staten, supra, 704 N.E.2d at p. 624 .) 6 In so concluding, we need not address the multiple factors to be considered in determining the existence and scope of a duty of care as set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Diamond Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructorsgreen2 sentences1975He cites Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 739 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ], which states; “‘. . . foreseeability of risk [is] of . . . primary importance in establishing the element of duty.’ [Citations.]. . . ‘The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.’ [Citation.]. . . ‘Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.’ ” And Diamond Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors, 16 Cal.App.3d 581, 596-597 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 200 ], where the court states: “Foreseeability of harm may be treated, 1975He cites Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 739 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ], which states; “‘. . . foreseeability of risk [is] of . . . primary importance in establishing the element of duty.’ [Citations.]. . . ‘The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.’ [Citation.]. . . ‘Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.’ ” And Diamond Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors, 16 Cal.App.3d 581, 596-597 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 200 ], where the court states: “Foreseeability of harm may be treated, | 1 | 1 |
Di Muro v. Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co.green2 sentences1972(See Di Muro v. Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co., 193 Cal.App.2d 784, 790-791 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 551 ].) Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that two factors relieved the manufacturer from liability for deficient design and compelled the nonsuit: (1) the long interval of time between the deficient design and the injury, and (2) the multiple warnings of safety deficiency given the owner of the press by the manufacturer. 1972(See Di Muro v. Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co., 193 Cal.App.2d 784, 790-791 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 551 ].) Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that two factors relieved the manufacturer from liability for deficient design and compelled the nonsuit: (1) the long interval of time between the deficient design and the injury, and (2) the multiple warnings of safety deficiency given the owner of the press by the manufacturer. | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc.green2 sentences1971(See Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739-742 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ]; Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 307-310 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 379 P.2d 513 ]; Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 687, 691-692 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 792 ].) A defendant may be liable if his negligence is a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the presence of independent causal forces does not relieve him of liability if those forces were foreseeable. 1971(See Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739-742 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ]; Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 307-310 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 379 P.2d 513 ]; Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 687, 691-692 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 792 ].) A defendant may be liable if his negligence is a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the presence of independent causal forces does not relieve him of liability if those forces were foreseeable. | 1 | 1 |
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.green2 sentences1971(See Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739-742 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ]; Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 307-310 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 379 P.2d 513 ]; Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 687, 691-692 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 792 ].) A defendant may be liable if his negligence is a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the presence of independent causal forces does not relieve him of liability if those forces were foreseeable. 1971(See Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739-742 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ]; Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 307-310 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 379 P.2d 513 ]; Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc. (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 687, 691-692 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 792 ].) A defendant may be liable if his negligence is a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the presence of independent causal forces does not relieve him of liability if those forces were foreseeable. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Falsetta
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 , 916–917 (Falsetta).) “Rather than admit or exclude every sex offense a defendant commits, trial judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, 2025(People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 , 916–917 (Falsetta).) “Rather than admit or exclude every sex offense a defendant commits, trial judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, | 2 | 2025–2025 |
The Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.
green
2 sentences1971App. Bd. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 327 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 442 ], “Because of the multiple factors which often result from injury, many cases require a ‘judgment’ rating, i.e., some degree of individual evaluation in applying the schedule to disabilities not precisely described therein. 1971App. Bd. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 327 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 442 ], “Because of the multiple factors which often result from injury, many cases require a ‘judgment’ rating, i.e., some degree of individual evaluation in applying the schedule to disabilities not precisely described therein. | 2 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Ghobrial
green
1 sentence2026I write to observe that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age, suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts 1 (See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 , 638 [psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”]; People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist “concluded defendant suffered from par | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Mendoza
green
1 sentence2026I write to observe that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age, suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts 1 (See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 , 638 [psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”]; People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist “concluded defendant suffered from par | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2026I write to observe that this case follows a familiar pattern: Like so many of our death penalty appeals, the record contains significant evidence that defendant Omar Richard Deen, starting at a young age, suffered from severe mental illness.1 Multiple defense experts 1 (See, e.g., People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622 , 638 [psychologist “diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” meaning “defendant exhibited schizophrenic features, such as hallucinations and delusions”]; People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 564 [a psychologist “concluded defendant suffered from par | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Carmony
green
1 sentence2025The fact that the court mentioned public safety concerns in its ruling does not mean that it considered only that factor. 8 continuous criminal history showed he “ ‘had failed or refused to learn his lesson’ ”].) And, as the trial court correctly noted, Rodriguez committed his prior strike for first degree burglary only a few years before his present offenses, indicating Rodriguez “did not learn and instead escalated his crime.” Rodriguez’s criminal history thus demonstrated he was “ ‘an exemplar of the “revolving door” career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed.’ ” (Carmony, s | 1 | 2025–2025 |
H. D. Arnaiz Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin
green
1 sentence2025Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1366 .) It is appropriate to treat an appeal as a writ where “requiring the parties to wait for a final judgment might lead to unnecessary trial proceedings, the briefs and record included in substance the necessary elements for a proceeding for a writ of mandate, there [is] no indication the trial court would appear as a party in a writ proceeding, the appealability of the order was not clear, and all the parties urged the court to decide the issue rather than dismiss the appeal.” (Id. at p. 1367 (citing Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Olson v. Cory
green
1 sentence2025Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1366 .) It is appropriate to treat an appeal as a writ where “requiring the parties to wait for a final judgment might lead to unnecessary trial proceedings, the briefs and record included in substance the necessary elements for a proceeding for a writ of mandate, there [is] no indication the trial court would appear as a party in a writ proceeding, the appealability of the order was not clear, and all the parties urged the court to decide the issue rather than dismiss the appeal.” (Id. at p. 1367 (citing Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024We presume the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978 ), and we may not substitute our judgment on how the circumstances should be weighed for that of the trial court. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Staten v. Ohio Exterminating Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2009(Staten, supra, 704 N.E.2d at p. 624 .) 6 In so concluding, we need not address the multiple factors to be considered in determining the existence and scope of a duty of care as set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ]. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Raley
red
1 sentence2006(See People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 894 .) Notably, my colleagues apply a spontaneous declaration rule devoid of all but a passing reference to the factors affecting Ana’s mental state, and appear to have limited People v. Raley, where reflection occurred, to its facts. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Biakanja v. Irving
green
2 sentences1975In California 3 the first case to recognize this concept was Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ], where a notary public prepared a will for his “client,” but negligently failed to have the will properly attested so that it was not admitted to probate. 1975In California 3 the first case to recognize this concept was Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ], where a notary public prepared a will for his “client,” but negligently failed to have the will properly attested so that it was not admitted to probate. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.