proportionality clause in Illinois

2021Given that Brewer was five months past his 18th birthday, these factors are equally applicable. ¶ 37 Minniefield points to “our evolving standard of decency” underlying both the proportionality clause and the eighth amendment and expressed in People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 339 (2002) (“as our society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which shape the ‘moral sense’ of the community”).

2020See People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 339 (2002) (“as our society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which shape the ‘moral sense’ of the community” underlying both the proportionality clause and the eighth amendment).

2022See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that “in extreme cases [the proportionality principle] could apply to invalidate a punishment for a term of years.”). ¶ 22 In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), a case cited extensively by Mr. Ashford, the 6 No. 1-19-1923 Supreme Court delineated certain objective factors that courts can weigh when considering a penalty’s relative proportionality.

2020“A proportionality challenge contends that the penalty in question was not determined according to the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005). ¶ 25 To evaluate this issue, defendant would have us apply a test first espoused by the United -6- No. 1-17-2094 States supreme court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983), with respect to proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment of the United States constitution (U.S. Const., amend.

2004Though courts have found that the “15/20/25-to-life” sentence enhancement provision violated the proportionality clause when applied to offenses other than first degree murder (see Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 531 (finding enhancement unconstitutional when applied to armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking); People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 491-92 , 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003) (finding enhancement unconstitutional when applied to attempted first degree murder); Walden, 199 Ill. 2d at 396-97 (15-year enhancement added to armed robbery conviction unconstitutional); People v. Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d 401

2004Though courts have found that the "15/20/25-to-life" sentence enhancement provision violated the proportionality clause when applied to offenses other than first degree murder, (see Moss, 206 Ill.2d at 531 , 276 Ill.Dec. 855 , 795 N.E.2d 208 (finding enhancement unconstitutional when applied to armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking); People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 491-92 , 272 Ill.Dec. 160 , 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003) (finding enhancement unconstitutional when applied to attempted first degree murder); Walden, 199 Ill.2d at 396-97 , 264 Ill.Dec. 91 , 769 N.E.2d 928 (15-year enhancemen

2025“A proportionality challenge contends that the penalty in question was not determined according to the seriousness of the offense ***.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005).

2025“A proportionality challenge [to a sentence under the state constitution] contends that the penalty in question was not determined according to the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005).

2022See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that “in extreme cases [the proportionality principle] could apply to invalidate a punishment for a term of years.”). ¶ 22 In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), a case cited extensively by Mr. Ashford, the 6 No. 1-19-1923 Supreme Court delineated certain objective factors that courts can weigh when considering a penalty’s relative proportionality.

2018People v. Jackson, 2017 IL App (3d) 150154, ¶ 19 . ¶ 47 The Eight Amendment states that “cruel and unusual punishment” shall not be inflicted and has been interpreted to include “a narrow proportionality principle.” U.S. Const., amend VIII; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991).

2020Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (“the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes”). ¶ 16 Defendant argued, second, that the automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 violates the federal and state due process clauses, the eighth amendment, and the proportionality clause of the Illinois Constitution, particularly when combined with the firearm enhancement (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2002)) 7 and the truth in sentencing statutes (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)

2017Miller, 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (“the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes”). ¶ 11 Defendant argued, second, that the automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 violates federal and state due process, the eighth amendment and the proportionality clause of the Illinois Constitution, particularly when combined with the firearm enhancement (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2002)),7 and the truth in sentencing statutes (730 ILCS 5/

2020See Carlson, 2016 IL App (2d) 151248, ¶ 69 (failure to apply balancing test required by proportionality rule is error of law and abuse of discretion). ¶ 89 Having concluded that the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering Continental to produce the workers’ compensation claims requested in paragraph 1 of the subpoena because the evidence established the burden to produce them was disproportionate to the benefit anticipated by their production and abused its discretion by ordering Continental to produce the injury reports requested in paragraphs 1 and 4 of the subpoena without first con

2020See Carlson, 2016 IL App (2d) 151248, ¶ 69 (failure to apply balancing test required by proportionality rule is error of law and abuse of discretion). ¶ 89 Having concluded that the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering Continental to produce the workers’ compensation claims requested in paragraph 1 of the subpoena because the evidence established the burden to produce them was disproportionate to the benefit anticipated by their production and abused its discretion by ordering Continental to produce the injury reports requested in paragraphs 1 and 4 of the subpoena without first con

2019Tetter, 2018 IL App (3d) 150243 , ¶ 73; see also Kochevar, 2018 IL App (3d) 140660, ¶ 64 (applying the same test). - 11 - We adhere to that conclusion and adopt the same approach here.

2018Tetter , 2018 IL App (3d) 150243 , ¶ 73, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ---- ; see also Kochevar , 2018 IL App (3d) 140660 , ¶ 64, --- Ill.Dec. ----, --- N.E.3d ---- (applying the same test).

2014People v. Cummings, 375 Ill.

2014People v. Cummings, 375 Ill.

2012See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (after finding that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to minors, the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the state supreme court's decision to resentence minor defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole). ¶ 74 We find such circumstances present here, where the evidence established that defendant was an admitted gang member with a significant criminal history and that he was aware of the robbery plan before he traveled to G-Red's home, knew that Mr. Singleton's gun was loaded

2012See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (after finding that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to minors, the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the state supreme court's decision to resentence minor defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole). ¶ 74 We find such circumstances present here, where the evidence established that defendant was an admitted gang member with a significant criminal history and that he was aware of the robbery plan before he traveled to G-Red's home, knew that Mr. Singleton's gun was loaded

2016With those qualifications, we address the proportionate penalty issue. ¶ 28 As this court recently observed in People v. Williams, 2015 IL 117470, ¶ 9 , a proportionality challenge derives from article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

2016With those qualifications, we address the proportionate penalty issue. ¶ 28 As this court recently observed in People v. Williams, 2015 IL 117470, ¶ 9 , a proportionality challenge derives from article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

2022The Judgment does not include guidance on how to handle interrelated sections, if any, as would be relevant under Fidel’s argument that the RSUs and PSUs are part of a trust account that the circuit court awarded to him and him alone, not to be divided with Victoria. ¶ 16 Furthermore, in In re Marriage of Wisniewski, the Appellate Court reviewed the trial court’s utilization of the proportionality rule, under which each party’s interest in the ex-husband’s pension benefits was equal to the total pension benefit times the ratio of years of marriage in which -7- 1-21-0452 there was participation

2007The order stated: “[Patricia’s] TRS plan will be divided by a Qualified Illinois Domestic Relations Order [(QILDRO)] in accordance with the proportionality rule propounded in Marriage of Wisniewski, 286 Ill.

2012In Graham, 560 U.S. at ___ , 130 S. Ct. at 2034 , for the first time, the Supreme Court recognized a categorical limitation on a term-of-years sentence, holding that life without parole sentences were necessarily unconstitutional when imposed upon juvenile, nonhomicide offenders.” ¶ 58 Thus, defendant asks this court to conduct a proportionality analysis of his life sentence in light of the Graham decision.

2012In Graham, 560 U.S. at ___ , 130 S.Ct. at 2034 , for the first time, the Supreme Court recognized a categorical limitation on a term-of-years sentence, *1019 holding that life without parole sentences were necessarily unconstitutional when imposed upon juvenile, nonhomicide offenders." ¶ 58 Thus, defendant asks this court to conduct a proportionality analysis of his life sentence in light of the Graham decision.

2012Id. at 1276-77. [2] ¶ 34 In sum, we find no inconsistency between the identical elements test and the plain language of article I, section 11. ¶ 35 The State makes the further argument that our proportionate penalties clause offers the same protections as the eighth amendment (see People v. McDonald, 168 Ill.2d 420, 455-56 , 214 Ill.Dec. 125 , 660 N.E.2d 832 (1995)), and that the eighth amendment contains only a narrow proportionality principle (see Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (plurality op.)) which does not require that crimes with identical

2012Id. at 1276-77 .2 ¶ 34 In sum, we find no inconsistency between the identical elements test and the plain language of article I, section 11. ¶ 35 The State makes the further argument that our proportionate penalties clause offers the same protections as the eighth amendment (see People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 455-56 (1995)), and that the eighth amendment contains only a narrow proportionality principle (see Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (plurality op.)) which does not require that crimes with identical elements carry identical sentences (see United States v. Batchelder, 442

2012Id. at 1276-77. [2] ¶ 34 In sum, we find no inconsistency between the identical elements test and the plain language of article I, section 11. ¶ 35 The State makes the further argument that our proportionate penalties clause offers the same protections as the eighth amendment (see People v. McDonald, 168 Ill.2d 420, 455-56 , 214 Ill.Dec. 125 , 660 N.E.2d 832 (1995)), and that the eighth amendment contains only a narrow proportionality principle (see Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (plurality op.)) which does not require that crimes with identical

2012Id. at 1276-77. [2] ¶ 34 In sum, we find no inconsistency between the identical elements test and the plain language of article I, section 11. ¶ 35 The State makes the further argument that our proportionate penalties clause offers the same protections as the eighth amendment (see People v. McDonald, 168 Ill.2d 420, 455-56 , 214 Ill.Dec. 125 , 660 N.E.2d 832 (1995)), and that the eighth amendment contains only a narrow proportionality principle (see Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (plurality op.)) which does not require that crimes with identical