16 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harmelin v. Michigangreen2 sentences2015Id. 212 ¶ 184 "The actions of the First Congress, which are of course persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means, belie any doctrine of proportionality." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 980 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citation omitted). 2015Id. 212 ¶ 184 "The actions of the First Congress, which are of course persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means, belie any doctrine of proportionality." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 980 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citation omitted). | 3 | 5 |
State v. Copelandgreen2 sentences2015See id. (citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (federal Eighth Amendment claim; citing, in turn, State v. Nance, 438 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1968) (articulating Eighth Amendment proportionality standard under Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910))). ¶ 144 There is one other authority cited in Herrera for the state standard of proportionality that it adopted. 2015See id. (citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (federal Eighth Amendment claim; citing, in turn, State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372 , 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968) (articulating Eighth Amendment proportionality standard under Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 , 30 S.Ct. 544 , 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)))). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Nancegreen2 sentences2015See id. (citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (federal Eighth Amendment claim; citing, in turn, State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372 , 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968) (articulating Eighth Amendment proportionality standard under Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 , 30 S.Ct. 544 , 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)))). 2015See id. (citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (federal Eighth Amendment claim; citing, in turn, State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372 , 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968) (articulating Eighth Amendment proportionality standard under Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 , 30 S.Ct. 544 , 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)))). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hansongreen2 sentences2015See id. (citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (federal Eighth Amendment claim; citing, in turn, State v. Nance, 438 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1968) (articulating Eighth Amendment proportionality standard under Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910))). ¶ 144 There is one other authority cited in Herrera for the state standard of proportionality that it adopted. 2015See id. (citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (federal Eighth Amendment claim; citing, in turn, State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372 , 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968) (articulating Eighth Amendment proportionality standard under Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 , 30 S.Ct. 544 , 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)))). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Alvarezgreen2 sentences2018Although Utah appellate courts did not explicitly address LeBeau 's application to aggravated sexual abuse cases until after Casper was sentenced, see State v. Alvarez , 2017 UT App 145 , ¶ 2, 402 P.3d 191 , for the purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that it applies. ¶13 Casper's argument that counsel should have provided evidence for a proportionality analysis under LeBeau fails because he cannot show that there was "no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." See State v. Clark , 2004 UT 25 , ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162 (quotation simplified). 2018Although Utah appellate courts did not explicitly address LeBeau 's application to aggravated sexual abuse cases until after Casper was sentenced, see State v. Alvarez , 2017 UT App 145 , ¶ 2, 402 P.3d 191 , for the purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that it applies. ¶13 Casper's argument that counsel should have provided evidence for a proportionality analysis under LeBeau fails because he cannot show that there was "no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." See State v. Clark , 2004 UT 25 , ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Lebeaugreen2 sentences2019And LeBeau itself implicitly acknowledges this limitation of the requirement to conduct a proportionality analysis, stating, "[C]ourts should consider all relevant facts raised by the parties about the defendant's crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty." LeBeau v. State , 2014 UT 39 , ¶ 42, 337 P.3d 254 (emphasis added); see also State v. Norton , 2018 UT App 82 , ¶ 79, 427 P.3d 312 ("[W]e will not fault the court for failing to conduct a sua sponte review of the Utah Code to identify similar offenses and then compare their sentencing schemes to the sentence it intended to impose on 2019And LeBeau itself implicitly acknowledges this limitation of the requirement to conduct a proportionality analysis, stating, "[C]ourts should consider all relevant facts raised by the parties about the defendant's crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty." LeBeau v. State , 2014 UT 39 , ¶ 42, 337 P.3d 254 (emphasis added); see also State v. Norton , 2018 UT App 82 , ¶ 79, 427 P.3d 312 ("[W]e will not fault the court for failing to conduct a sua sponte review of the Utah Code to identify similar offenses and then compare their sentencing schemes to the sentence it intended to impose on | 1 | 3 |
State v. Laffertygreen2 sentences2002The State further advocates that if this court decides to conduct a proportionality analysis, defendant's sentence is not disproportionate to his culpability and not outside of the general pattern of death penalty cases in Utah. ¶ 37 As we recently noted in State v. Lafferty , "proportionality review is not required under the federal constitution or under our state constitution." 2001 UT 19, ¶ 114 , 20 P.3d 342 (citations omitted). 2002The State further advocates that if this court decides to conduct a proportionality analysis, defendant's sentence is not disproportionate to his culpability and not outside of the general pattern of death penalty cases in Utah. ¶ 37 As we recently noted in State v. Lafferty , "proportionality review is not required under the federal constitution or under our state constitution." 2001 UT 19, ¶ 114 , 20 P.3d 342 (citations omitted). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2019State v. Clark , 2004 UT 25 , ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162 . ¶17 While not specifically identifying it as a separate issue on appeal, Coombs also advances the argument that the sentencing court "erred ... when it did not engage in the proportionality analysis" required by LeBeau . 2019State v. Clark , 2004 UT 25 , ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162 . ¶17 While not specifically identifying it as a separate issue on appeal, Coombs also advances the argument that the sentencing court "erred ... when it did not engage in the proportionality analysis" required by LeBeau . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Houstongreen2 sentences2018Associate Chief Justice Lee, concurring: ¶87 I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to register my continuing discomfort with the proportionality standard established in State v. Houston , 2015 UT 40 , 353 P.3d 55 . 14 In Houston I set forth my view that article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution, as originally understood, "does not deputize the courts to second-guess punishments they deem excessive or lacking in proportionality, but only to proscribe methods of punishment historically rejected as barbaric or torturous." Houston , 2015 UT 40 , ¶ 157, 353 P.3d 55 (Lee, A.C.J., 2018Associate Chief Justice Lee, concurring: ¶87 I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to register my continuing discomfort with the proportionality standard established in State v. Houston , 2015 UT 40 , 353 P.3d 55 . 14 In Houston I set forth my view that article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution, as originally understood, "does not deputize the courts to second-guess punishments they deem excessive or lacking in proportionality, but only to proscribe methods of punishment historically rejected as barbaric or torturous." Houston , 2015 UT 40 , ¶ 157, 353 P.3d 55 (Lee, A.C.J., | 1 | 2 |
Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 135 UT 32 , ¶ 19, 94 P.3d 217 (―The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions.‖ (internal (con‘t.) 30 Cite as: 2015 UT 36 Opinion of the Court find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty.136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether ―a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.‖137 We therefore look to the characteristics of juve 2015As a general rule, we decline to rule or opine on issues that are not briefed by the parties. 135 We therefore find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty. 136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether “a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.”137 We therefore look to the 135See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 19 , 94 P.3d 217 (“The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rende | 1 | 2 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2015The mitigating characteristics of youth must also inform a proportionality analysis under the Utah Constitution. ¶ 259 First, juveniles are less culpable because they exhibit ―a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 2015The mitigating characteristics of youth must also inform a proportionality analysis under the Utah Constitution. 1259 First, juveniles are less culpable because they exhibit "a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Nortongreen2 sentences2019And LeBeau itself implicitly acknowledges this limitation of the requirement to conduct a proportionality analysis, stating, "[C]ourts should consider all relevant facts raised by the parties about the defendant's crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty." LeBeau v. State , 2014 UT 39 , ¶ 42, 337 P.3d 254 (emphasis added); see also State v. Norton , 2018 UT App 82 , ¶ 79, 427 P.3d 312 ("[W]e will not fault the court for failing to conduct a sua sponte review of the Utah Code to identify similar offenses and then compare their sentencing schemes to the sentence it intended to impose on 2019And LeBeau itself implicitly acknowledges this limitation of the requirement to conduct a proportionality analysis, stating, "[C]ourts should consider all relevant facts raised by the parties about the defendant's crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty." LeBeau v. State , 2014 UT 39 , ¶ 42, 337 P.3d 254 (emphasis added); see also State v. Norton , 2018 UT App 82 , ¶ 79, 427 P.3d 312 ("[W]e will not fault the court for failing to conduct a sua sponte review of the Utah Code to identify similar offenses and then compare their sentencing schemes to the sentence it intended to impose on | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2019And LeBeau itself implicitly acknowledges this limitation of the requirement to conduct a proportionality analysis, stating, "[C]ourts should consider all relevant facts raised by the parties about the defendant's crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty." LeBeau v. State , 2014 UT 39 , ¶ 42, 337 P.3d 254 (emphasis added); see also State v. Norton , 2018 UT App 82 , ¶ 79, 427 P.3d 312 ("[W]e will not fault the court for failing to conduct a sua sponte review of the Utah Code to identify similar offenses and then compare their sentencing schemes to the sentence it intended to impose on | 1 | 1 |
Winward v. Stategreen2 sentences2015As a general rule, we decline to rule or opine on issues that are not briefed by the parties. 135 We therefore find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty. 136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether “a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.”137 We therefore look to the 135See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 19 , 94 P.3d 217 (“The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rende 2015As a general rule, we decline to rule or opine on issues that are not briefed by the parties. 135 We therefore find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty. 136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether “a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.”137 We therefore look to the 135See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 19 , 94 P.3d 217 (“The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rende | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ballgreen1 sentence2015As a general rule, we decline to rule or opine on issues that are not briefed by the parties. 135 We therefore find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty. 136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether “a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.”137 We therefore look to the 135See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 19 , 94 P.3d 217 (“The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rende | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Edgar Gomezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Mauricio Borrero-Isazagreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Fanta Kaba, A/K/A Odis Lnugreen1 sentence2014See Klein, supra note 2, at 693 & n. 4 (indicating that in the traditional scheme of discretionary sentencing, there are "no standards to assist or confine the judge in making his determination;" listing as limited exceptions the following: "(1) a sentence imposed using constitutional criteria, such as race or political viewpoint, Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985); (2) a vindictive sentence based upon a defendant's assertion of his constitutional right to appeal his conviction, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 ( | 1 | 1 |
| Ewing v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. a House & 1.37 Acres of Real Property Located at 392 South 600 Eastgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Alvarezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lorentzengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Espinosagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Normand v. Peoplegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Lynchred | 1 | 1 |
| Workman v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cannon v. Gladdengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Green v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Faulkner v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Miregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences2016Additionally, it requires that sentencing judges appropriately weigh a defendant's potential for rehabilitation." Id. ¶ 87. 1, Proportionality 189 Proportionality analysis requires the sentencing court to "consider 'the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty." LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 42 , 337 P.3d 254 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)). "[Clourts should consider all relevant facts raised by the parties about the defendan‘é’s crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty." Id. 2016Additionally, it requires that sentencing judges appropriately weigh a defendant's potential for rehabilitation." Id. ¶ 87. 1, Proportionality 189 Proportionality analysis requires the sentencing court to "consider 'the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty." LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 42 , 337 P.3d 254 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)). "[Clourts should consider all relevant facts raised by the parties about the defendan‘é’s crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty." Id. | 6 | 1997–2016 |
Weems v. United States
green
2 sentences2015See id. (citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (federal Eighth Amendment claim; citing, in turn, State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372 , 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968) (articulating Eighth Amendment proportionality standard under Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 , 30 S.Ct. 544 , 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)))). 2015See id. (citing State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (federal Eighth Amendment claim; citing, in turn, State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372 , 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968) (articulating Eighth Amendment proportionality standard under Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 , 30 S.Ct. 544 , 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)))). | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Trop v. Dulles
green
2 sentences2015There the Court formulated the principle endorsed by the dissent in this case—a proportionality inquiry rooted in ―evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.‖ Infra ¶ 213 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 ). ¶ 172 More recent decisions give at least a nod to history. 2015There the Court formulated the principle endorsed by the dissent in this case—a proportionality inquiry rooted in “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Infra ¶ 213 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 ). ¶ 172 More recent decisions give at least a nod to history. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Bajakajian
green
2 sentences2014See Klein, supra note 2, at 693 & n. 4 (indicating that in the traditional scheme of discretionary sentencing, there are "no standards to assist or confine the judge in making his determination;" listing as limited exceptions the following: "(1) a sentence imposed using constitutional criteria, such as race or political viewpoint, Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985); (2) a vindictive sentence based upon a defendant's assertion of his constitutional right to appeal his conviction, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 ( 2014See Klein, supra note 2, at 693 & n. 4 (indicating that in the traditional scheme of discretionary sentencing, there are "no standards to assist or confine the judge in making his determination;" listing as limited exceptions the following: "(1) a sentence imposed using constitutional criteria, such as race or political viewpoint, Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985); (2) a vindictive sentence based upon a defendant's assertion of his constitutional right to appeal his conviction, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 ( | 2 | 2000–2014 |
Leavitt v. Salt Lake City Corporation
green
2 sentences2024This list is nonexclusive and need not be “rigidly applied.” Leavitt v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2019 UT App 70, ¶ 19 , 442 P.3d 1217 . ¶26 Although the ALJ generally referenced these factors in discussing proportionality, with the exception of the fourth listed factor, he largely found other factors to be more helpful to the proportionality analysis in this case. 2024This list is nonexclusive and need not be “rigidly applied.” Leavitt v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2019 UT App 70, ¶ 19 , 442 P.3d 1217 . ¶26 Although the ALJ generally referenced these factors in discussing proportionality, with the exception of the fourth listed factor, he largely found other factors to be more helpful to the proportionality analysis in this case. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Larsen v. Davis County
green
2 sentences2024Failure to consider the full context of the violations thus “exceed[ed] the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.” Larsen v. Davis County, 2014 UT App 74, ¶ 17 , 324 P.3d 641 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 333 P.3d 365 (Utah 2014), and the ALJ’s proportionality analysis was therefore arbitrary and capricious. ¶29 Consistency. 2024Failure to consider the full context of the violations thus “exceed[ed] the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.” Larsen v. Davis County, 2014 UT App 74, ¶ 17 , 324 P.3d 641 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 333 P.3d 365 (Utah 2014), and the ALJ’s proportionality analysis was therefore arbitrary and capricious. ¶29 Consistency. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Burgess v. Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2019POST[] had attempted to take action against [Macfarlane’s] POST certification . . . , that argument might be compelling.” But the CSRO determined that that “is not what happened”; POST did not take action against Macfarlane’s certification but only became concerned that Macfarlane “had lied to them for some time” and “had violated a number of DPS and POST policies and rules.” POST then referred the matter to IA for an investigation, which confirmed that Macfarlane had violated a number of DPS policies. 20180199-CA 10 2019 UT App 133 Macfarlane v. CSRO ¶26 Finally, the CSRO went through the pro 2019POST[] had attempted to take action against [Macfarlane’s] POST certification . . . , that argument might be compelling.” But the CSRO determined that that “is not what happened”; POST did not take action against Macfarlane’s certification but only became concerned that Macfarlane “had lied to them for some time” and “had violated a number of DPS and POST policies and rules.” POST then referred the matter to IA for an investigation, which confirmed that Macfarlane had violated a number of DPS policies. 20180199-CA 10 2019 UT App 133 Macfarlane v. CSRO ¶26 Finally, the CSRO went through the pro | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Macfarlane v. CSRO
green
1 sentence2019POST[] had attempted to take action against [Macfarlane’s] POST certification . . . , that argument might be compelling.” But the CSRO determined that that “is not what happened”; POST did not take action against Macfarlane’s certification but only became concerned that Macfarlane “had lied to them for some time” and “had violated a number of DPS and POST policies and rules.” POST then referred the matter to IA for an investigation, which confirmed that Macfarlane had violated a number of DPS policies. 20180199-CA 10 2019 UT App 133 Macfarlane v. CSRO ¶26 Finally, the CSRO went through the pro | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon
green
2 sentences2019POST[] had attempted to take action against [Macfarlane’s] POST certification . . . , that argument might be compelling.” But the CSRO determined that that “is not what happened”; POST did not take action against Macfarlane’s certification but only became concerned that Macfarlane “had lied to them for some time” and “had violated a number of DPS and POST policies and rules.” POST then referred the matter to IA for an investigation, which confirmed that Macfarlane had violated a number of DPS policies. 20180199-CA 10 2019 UT App 133 Macfarlane v. CSRO ¶26 Finally, the CSRO went through the pro 2019POST[] had attempted to take action against [Macfarlane’s] POST certification . . . , that argument might be compelling.” But the CSRO determined that that “is not what happened”; POST did not take action against Macfarlane’s certification but only became concerned that Macfarlane “had lied to them for some time” and “had violated a number of DPS and POST policies and rules.” POST then referred the matter to IA for an investigation, which confirmed that Macfarlane had violated a number of DPS policies. 20180199-CA 10 2019 UT App 133 Macfarlane v. CSRO ¶26 Finally, the CSRO went through the pro | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Martin
green
2 sentences2019Second, we conclude that the presumption of appropriate sentencing considerations has not been overcome. ¶33 Affirmed. 1 Coombs does not challenge the sentences he received for sexual exploitation of a minor. 2 LeBeau requires sentencing courts to consider "(1) the seriousness of the defendant's conduct in relation to the severity of the sentence imposed" and "(2) the severity of the sentence imposed in light of sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction" when conducting a statutorily required "interests-of-justice analysis." LeBeau v. State , 2014 UT 39 , ¶ 41, 337 P.3d 254 . 2019Second, we conclude that the presumption of appropriate sentencing considerations has not been overcome. ¶33 Affirmed. 1 Coombs does not challenge the sentences he received for sexual exploitation of a minor. 2 LeBeau requires sentencing courts to consider "(1) the seriousness of the defendant's conduct in relation to the severity of the sentence imposed" and "(2) the severity of the sentence imposed in light of sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction" when conducting a statutorily required "interests-of-justice analysis." LeBeau v. State , 2014 UT 39 , ¶ 41, 337 P.3d 254 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Killpack
green
2 sentences2016In other words, "courts should consider the sentences imposed for more and less serious crimes in order to ensure that a particular defendant's sentence is not arbitrary." Id. 140 Here, the sentencing court appears not to have considered this comparative factor. 7 The court found that Jaramillo "terrorized" the grocery store clerk and that he “understood what [he was] domg” when *44 he committed the crimes, The court then "considered whether a lesser term of imprisonment [was] warranted in light of all-interactions." It "conclude[d] that the interest of justice would not be served by imposing 2016In other words, "courts should consider the sentences imposed for more and less serious crimes in order to ensure that a particular defendant's sentence is not arbitrary." Id. 140 Here, the sentencing court appears not to have considered this comparative factor. 7 The court found that Jaramillo "terrorized" the grocery store clerk and that he “understood what [he was] domg” when *44 he committed the crimes, The court then "considered whether a lesser term of imprisonment [was] warranted in light of all-interactions." It "conclude[d] that the interest of justice would not be served by imposing | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. MacE
green
1 sentence2015But where, as here, we find no constitutional violation, we may not “substitute our judgment for that of the legislature regarding the wisdom of a particular punishment.” 142 We therefore hold that Mr. Houston has not demonstrated that his LWOP sentence violates the cruel and unusual punishments clauses of either the Utah or United States Constitution. ¶ 68 Because we reject each of Mr. Houston’s constitutional challenges to his sentence of life without parole, we conclude that Mr. Houston has failed to demonstrate that his sentence was unconstitutional and therefore illegal under Utah Rule of | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Baker
green
2 sentences2015As a general rule, we decline to rule or opine on issues that are not briefed by the parties. 135 We therefore find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty. 136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether “a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.”137 We therefore look to the 135See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 19 , 94 P.3d 217 (“The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rende 2015As a general rule, we decline to rule or opine on issues that are not briefed by the parties. 135 We therefore find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty. 136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether “a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.”137 We therefore look to the 135See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 19 , 94 P.3d 217 (“The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rende | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Houston
green
1 sentence2015See Utah Safe to Learn–Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 135 UT 32 , ¶ 19, 94 P.3d 217 (―The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions.‖ (internal (con‘t.) 30 Cite as: 2015 UT 36 Opinion of the Court find no reason to depart from the proportionality standard employed in Lafferty.136 ¶ 66 Because we conclude that a punishment must be proportionate to the offense, we look to federal decisions as a guide in determining whether ―a particular punishment is cruelly inhumane or disproportionate.‖137 We therefore look to the characteristics of juve | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| North Carolina v. Pearce red | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Wayte v. United States green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Bott v. DeLand green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.