proportionality analysis in Florida

2019“In performing a proportionality review, a reviewing court must never lose sight of the fact that the death penalty has long been reserved for only the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders.” Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998).

2019“In performing a proportionality review, a reviewing court must never lose sight of the fact that the death penalty has long been reserved for only the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders.” Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998).

2016While the absence of HAC or CCP alone does not render a death sentence disproportionate, this Court has stated that “while their absence is not controlling, it is also not without some relevance to a proportionality analysis.” Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).

2016While the absence of HAC or CCP alone does not render a death sentence disproportionate, this Court has stated that “while their absence is not controlling, it is also not without some relevance to a proportionality analysis.” Larkins v. State, 739 So.2d 90, 95 (Fla.1999).

2014See Simpson v. State, 3 So.3d 1135, 1148 (Fla.2009); Sexton v. State, 775 So.2d 923, 935 (Fla.2000).

2014See Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1148 (Fla. 2009); Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000).

2020A proportionality analysis includes analyzing three objective criteria: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).

2016The proportionality analysis criteria included "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 .

2020“Further, in a proportionality analysis, this Court will accept the weight assigned by the trial court to the aggravating and mitigating factors.” Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 46 (Fla. 2009).

2019Taylor v. State, 937 So. 2d 590, 601 (Fla. 2006). - 16 - “Further, in a proportionality analysis, this Court will accept the weight assigned by the trial court to the aggravating and mitigating factors.” Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 46 (Fla. 2009).

2013Proportionality analysis “is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Sexton, 775 So.2d at 935 (citing Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990)).

2013However, the proportionality analysis “is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Sexton v. State, 775 So.2d 923, 935 (Fla.2000) (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990)).

2013Proportionality analysis “is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Sexton, 775 So.2d at 935 (citing Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990)).

2013However, the proportionality analysis “is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Sexton v. State, 775 So.2d 923, 935 (Fla.2000) (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990)).

2008See generally Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 957 (Fla.2007) ("When a defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support an aggravator, this Court reviews the record to determine . . . whether competent, substantial evidence supports [the trial court's] finding." (citing Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997))), cert. denied, No. 07-9402, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2056 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (U.S. 2008). [20] See Buzia v. State, 926 So.2d 1203, 1216 (Fla.2006) ("We have held that both the HAC and CCP aggravators are `two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory

2008See generally Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 957 (Fla.2007) ("When a defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support an aggravator, this Court reviews the record to determine ... whether competent, substantial evidence supports [the trial court’s] finding.” (citing Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla.1997))), cer t. denied, No. 07-9402, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2056 , 170 L.Ed.2d 799 (2008). .

2008See generally Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 957 (Fla.2007) ("When a defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support an aggravator, this Court reviews the record to determine . . . whether competent, substantial evidence supports [the trial court's] finding." (citing Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997))), cert. denied, No. 07-9402, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2056 , ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (U.S. 2008). [20] See Buzia v. State, 926 So.2d 1203, 1216 (Fla.2006) ("We have held that both the HAC and CCP aggravators are `two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory

2008See generally Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 957 (Fla.2007) ("When a defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support an aggravator, this Court reviews the record to determine ... whether competent, substantial evidence supports [the trial court’s] finding.” (citing Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla.1997))), cer t. denied, No. 07-9402, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2056 , 170 L.Ed.2d 799 (2008). .

2002Moreover, the codefendant should not only be convicted of the same crime but should also be otherwise eligible to receive a death sentence, i.e., be of the requisite age and not mentally retarded. [6] We have decided numerous cases where we have addressed the proportionality of defendants' death sentences based on the argument that an equally culpable codefendant received a lesser sentence. [7] However, in only ten of those cases did the proportionality analysis involve codefendants who received immunity or codefendants whose lesser sentences were based on convictions for second-degree murder

1996Thus, an equally or more culpable codefendant's sentence is relevant to a proportionality analysis. *407 Cardona v. State, 641 So.2d 361 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1122 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1995).

2002Moreover, the codefendant should not only be convicted of the same crime but should also be otherwise eligible to receive a death sentence, i.e., be of the requisite age and not mentally retarded. [6] We have decided numerous cases where we have addressed the proportionality of defendants' death sentences based on the argument that an equally culpable codefendant received a lesser sentence. [7] However, in only ten of those cases did the proportionality analysis involve codefendants who received immunity or codefendants whose lesser sentences were based on convictions for second-degree murder

1999The State urges that we should find that the imposition of the death sentence constitutional and also proportional because we have upheld the death penalty in other cases involving similar circumstances, citing to cases such as Sliney v. State, 699 *11 So.2d 662 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1129 , 118 S.Ct. 1079 , 140 L.Ed.2d 137 (1998); Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1994), and Hayes v. State, 581 So.2d 121 (Fla.1991).

2020But the proportionality analysis does not focus on “the specific facts of a particular case.” Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832, 850 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Edwards v. State, 885 So. 2d 1039, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).

2015While it is unclear to what extent a court may consider the facts of a particular case in the analysis of whether the sentence for a particular charge is considered to be cruel and unusual punishment, see Edwards v. State, 885 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that "a proportionality analysis focuses on the crime charged and the legislatively imposed punishment for the crime, not the specific facts of a particular case”), the evidence of the surrounding circumstances presented at trial in this case would clearly support a lengthy term of years sentence which would put appellant in his ei

2014The Supreme Court noted that “the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the penalty.” Id. at 203 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 .

2014The Supreme Court noted that “the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the penalty.” Id. at 203 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 .

2010These, of course, are two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme, and, while their absence is not controlling, it is also not without some relevance to a proportionality analysis.”); Hawk v. State, 718 So.2d 159, 163 (Fla.1998) (“In the present case, the two aggravating circumstances (i.e., pecuniary gain, and the contemporaneous attempted murder of Matthew Gray) are arrayed against copious mitigation.”); Robertson v. State, 699 So.2d 1343, 1345 (Fla.1997) (“The trial court found two aggravating factors: (1) the capital felony was committed during the course

1993Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1988).

2025See Sickels v. Sickels, 221 So. 3d 778, 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); Hindle, 33 So. 3d at 786–87.

2025Nonetheless, because our case law requires trial courts to determine whether the time expended in any given case is reasonable when deciding on an award of fees, see Spanakos v. Hawk Systems, Inc., 362 So. 3d 226 , 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), proportionality should play a role in deciding that issue. 3 “inequitable conduct doctrine.” O’Boyle, 341 So. 3d at 340 (first citing Schneider v. Schneider, 32 So. 3d 151, 158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); then citing Waverly, 88 So. 3d at 389 ; and then citing Bennett v. Berges, 50 So. 3d 1154, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).

2025Nonetheless, because our case law requires trial courts to determine whether the time expended in any given case is reasonable when deciding on an award of fees, see Spanakos v. Hawk Systems, Inc., 362 So. 3d 226 , 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), proportionality should play a role in deciding that issue. 3 “inequitable conduct doctrine.” O’Boyle, 341 So. 3d at 340 (first citing Schneider v. Schneider, 32 So. 3d 151, 158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); then citing Waverly, 88 So. 3d at 389 ; and then citing Bennett v. Berges, 50 So. 3d 1154, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).

2020This Court first recognized the doctrine of proportionality in 1973 in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), superseded on other grounds by ch. 74-383, - 20 - § 14, Laws of Fla., as stated in State v. Dene, 533 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 1988), in which this Court explained: It must be emphasized that the procedure to be followed by the trial judges and juries is not a mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of mitigating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the imposition of death and which can be satisfied

2020This Court first recognized the doctrine of proportionality in 1973 in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973), superseded on other grounds by ch. 74-383, - 20 - § 14, Laws of Fla., as stated in State v. Dene, 533 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 1988), in which this Court explained: It must be emphasized that the procedure to be followed by the trial judges and juries is not a mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of mitigating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the imposition of death and which can be satisfied

2020This is because the legislature generally retains the authority to “prohibit any act, determine the class of an offense, and prescribe punishment.” Id. (quoting Iacovone v. State, 639 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)).

2020But the proportionality analysis does not focus on “the specific facts of a particular case.” Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832, 850 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Edwards v. State, 885 So. 2d 1039, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).

2020But the proportionality analysis does not focus on “the specific facts of a particular case.” Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832, 850 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Edwards v. State, 885 So. 2d 1039, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).

2019Taylor v. State, 937 So. 2d 590, 601 (Fla. 2006). - 16 - “Further, in a proportionality analysis, this Court will accept the weight assigned by the trial court to the aggravating and mitigating factors.” Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 46 (Fla. 2009).

2017See Miller v. State, 42 So.3d 204, 229 (Fla. 2010); see also Fla. R.

2017See Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 229 (Fla. 2010); see also Fla. R.

2016See Brown v. State, 143 So. 3d 392, 407 (Fla.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 726 (2014); Muehleman v. State, 3 So. 3d 1149, 1166 (Fla. 2009).

2016See Brown v. State, 143 So.3d 392, 407 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. , 135 S.Ct. 726 , 190 L.Ed.2d 453 (2014); Muehleman v. State, 3 So.3d 1149, 1166 (Fla.2009).

2016First, as the Florida Supreme Court has consistently stated: “death is different.” Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 956, 964 (Fla. 2002) (“This Court has long adhered to the idea that ‘[I]n the field of criminal law, there is no doubt that ‘death is different[.]’”) (quoting Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 804 (Fla. 1988)).

2016First, as the Florida Supreme Court has consistently stated: “death is different.” Ocha v. State, 826 So.2d 956, 964 (Fla.2002); (“This Court has long adhered to the idea that ‘[I]n the field of criminal law, there is no doubt that ‘death is different[.]’”) (quoting Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800, 804 (Fla.1988)).

2016The Florida Supreme Court unequivocally stated in Sanders that “the judge would only be justified in departing downward to meet a codefendant’s sentence if the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that the culpability of the defendant was no greater than that of the codefendant.” 510 So. 2d at 298 (emphasis added).

2016The Florida Supreme Court unequivocally stated in Sanders that “the judge would only be justified in departing downward to meet a codefendant’s sentence if the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that the culpability of the defendant was no greater than that of the codefen-dant.” 510 So.2d at 298 (emphasis added).

2016See Brown v. State, 143 So. 3d 392, 407 (Fla.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 726 (2014); Muehleman v. State, 3 So. 3d 1149, 1166 (Fla. 2009).

2016See Brown v. State, 143 So.3d 392, 407 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. , 135 S.Ct. 726 , 190 L.Ed.2d 453 (2014); Muehleman v. State, 3 So.3d 1149, 1166 (Fla.2009).