proportionality analysis in California

2026The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ], italics added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ].) While this proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [ 1

2026The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ], italics added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ].) While this proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [ 1

2026The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ], italics added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ].) While this proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [ 1

2026The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ], italics added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ].) While this proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [ 1

2024Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728 ; see People v. Gutierrez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040 (conc. opn. of Benke, J.).) “While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.” 6 (Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070, citing Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 337- 338.) Here, we find that the minimum $300 restitution fine imposed in relation to Vargas’s assault with a deadly weapon on another inmate while incarcerated is not grossly disproportional to the level of harm and his culpability in this matter.

2021Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728 ; see [People v.] Gutierrez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040 (conc. opn. of Benke, J.).) While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor. ( Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 337-338.)” (People v. Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.) We review the excessiveness of a fine challenged under the Eighth Amendment de novo.

2016(Id. at pp. 429-437.) Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has observed that “a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” (Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 292 .) Hale only relies on the second factor concerning assertedly more lenient, “anomalous” punishment for more serious offenses in the same juris

2014Federal Constitution Under the federal proscription of “cruel and unusual punishment,” a “ ‘narrow proportionality principle’ . . . ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108, 117 ] (lead opn. of O’Connor, J.), quoting Hermelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 996-997 [ 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 866 ].) Objective factors guiding the proportionality analysis include “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission

2015(Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 997 (Harmelin) (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [Eighth Amendment “encompasses a narrow proportionality principle”]; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 (Dillon).) Because “in our tripartite system of government it is the function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishments” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 ), a defendant bears a “considerable burden” to show the requisite disproportionality.

2015As a result, '[f]indings of disproportionality have occurred with exquisite rarity in the case law.' " (Ibid.) Although California case law sets forth three factors to consider in conducting a proportionality analysis, "the sole test remains . . . whether the punishment 'shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' " (Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 487, fn. 38 .) "Successful challenges based on the traditional Lynch-Dillon line are extremely rare." (Perez, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 .) 36 Jones and Jordan do not argue that a prison sentence of 25 years to life

2026I, § 17.) The “ ‘touchstone of the constitutional inquiry’ ” for excessive fines “ ‘is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.’ ” (Kopp, at p. 23, quoting United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334 .) “While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.” (People v. Lowery (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1046 , 1057 (Lowery).) Under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), “[t]he restitution fine shall be set at the discretion of the court and commensu

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728 ; see [People v.] Gutierrez [(2019)] 35 Cal.App.5th [1027] 1040 (conc. opn. of Benke, J.).) While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor. ( Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 337-338.)” (People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1070.) We review the excessiveness of a fine challenged under the Eighth Amendment de novo.

2026The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ], italics added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ].) While this proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [ 1

2026The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ], italics added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ].) While this proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [ 1

2026The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ], italics added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ].) While this proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [ 1

2026The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishment” and “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ], italics added; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 72 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 144 ].) While this proportionality principle “ ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,’ ” it does prohibit “ ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, at p. 23; see Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 [ 1

2022Rather than rely upon the proportionality analysis required by In re Coley, supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 538 , defendant relies upon Associate Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk’s concurring opinion in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585 , noting that a sentence exceeding a human life span can serve no rational penological purpose and is inherently cruel and unusual.

2022Rather than rely upon the proportionality analysis required by In re Coley, supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 538 , defendant relies upon Associate Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk’s concurring opinion in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585 , noting that a sentence exceeding a human life span can serve no rational penological purpose and is inherently cruel and unusual.

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728 ; see [People v.] Gutierrez [(2019)] 35 Cal.App.5th [1027] 1040 (conc. opn. of Benke, J.).) While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor. ( Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 337-338.)” (People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1070.) We review the excessiveness of a fine challenged under the Eighth Amendment de novo.

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [applying Eighth Amendment analysis to both defendant’s federal and state excessive fines claims]; see also People v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334 [“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish”].) “While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.” (Aviles, at p. 1070, citing Bajakajian, at pp. 337-338.) 11 Here,

2026United States Constitution The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” It “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 , 59–60.) “This proportionality principle is narrow when applied in noncapital cases.” (People v. Wilson, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.) Indeed, successful challenges are “‘exceedingly rare’” in noncapital cases.

2024Federal Constitution The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” It “contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 , 59–60.) “This proportionality principle is narrow when applied in 8 In his concurrence, Justice Mosk indicated because a sentence of 111 years in prison is “impossible for a human being to serve,” it violates the cruel an

2025THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT The Eighth Amendment of the United States “‘prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual” punishment.’” (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 723 .) It “does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence, but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” (Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 959 .) “‘In non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment encompasses, at most, only a narrow proportionality principle.’” (United States v. Reynolds (11th Cir. 2000) 215 F.3d 1210 , 1214; People v. Wilson, supra, 56 Cal.A

2021(Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (Ewing).) This proportionality principle is narrow when applied in noncapital cases.11 (Ibid.) Under the California Constitution, a punishment is cruel or unusual “if, although not cruel or unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 ; see People v. Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128 , 167 (Wilson).) “Lynch describes three ‘techniques’ to determine whether a sentence is so disproportionate to

2024(See, e.g., People v. Cartwright (1995) 17. 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1132 , 1139–1141 [affirming sentence of 375 years to life plus 53 years after engaging in a proportionality analysis]; People v. Wallace (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 651 , 666–667 [affirming sentence of 283 years plus eight months after engaging in a proportionality analysis]; People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 532 [affirming sentence of 129 years after engaging in a proportionality analysis].) Defendant’s acts of molestation affected at least three children while they were under his care and at extremely vulnerable times

2022(See, e.g., People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1132 , 1139–1141 [affirming sentence of 375 years to life plus 53 years for sexual assault on three women pursuant to “Three Strikes Law” after engaging in a proportionality analysis]; People v. Wallace (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 651 , 666–667 [affirming sentence of 283 years plus eight months for multiple sex offenses after engaging in a proportionality analysis]; People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 47. 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 532 [affirming sentence of 129 years for sexual assault on children after engaging in a proportionality analysis].) Defenda

2021(E.g., U.S. v. Viloski (2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111 [ability to pay is relevant to the proportionality inquiry]; U.S. v. Levesque (1st Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 78, 83-85 [ability to pay should be considered, in addition to proportionality inquiry]; U.S. v. Dubose (9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 1141 , 1145-1146 [ability to pay has no bearing on analysis].) The United States Supreme Court has left this question open (see Timbs, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 688 ), but has noted the Eighth Amendment’s historical roots in prohibitions against monetary penalties that are “ ‘so large as to deprive [the defendant]

2021(E.g., U.S. v. Viloski (2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111 [ability to pay is relevant to the proportionality inquiry]; U.S. v. Levesque (1st Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 78, 83-85 [ability to pay should be considered, in addition to proportionality inquiry]; U.S. v. Dubose (9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 1141 , 1145-1146 [ability to pay has no bearing on analysis].) The United States Supreme Court has left this question open (see Timbs, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 688 ), but has noted the Eighth Amendment’s historical roots in prohibitions against monetary penalties that are “ ‘so large as to deprive [the defendant]

2021(Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (Ewing).) This proportionality principle is narrow when applied in noncapital cases.11 (Ibid.) Under the California Constitution, a punishment is cruel or unusual “if, although not cruel or unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 ; see People v. Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128 , 167 (Wilson).) “Lynch describes three ‘techniques’ to determine whether a sentence is so disproportionate to

2015(Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 997 (Harmelin) (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [Eighth Amendment “encompasses a narrow proportionality principle”]; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 (Dillon).) Because “in our tripartite system of government it is the function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishments” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 ), a defendant bears a “considerable burden” to show the requisite disproportionality.

2025This case law reflects the principle that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” ’ ([People v.] Contreras [(2018)] 4 Cal.5th [349,] 359 . . . , quoting Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 , 471 . . . .) However, ‘a defendant’s 18th birthday marks a bright line.’ (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183 , 190 . . . .)[7] And . . . ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment proportionality guarantee applies very differently to prison terms for adult offenders.’ (In re Bolton (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 611 , 622. . . .) Indeed, the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality princ

2021This case law reflects the principle that ‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.’ ” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 , quoting Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 407 ] (Miller), italics added.) However, “a defendant’s 18th birthday marks a bright line.” (People v. Edwards (2019) 15 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 190 (Edwards).) And as this court has noted, “The Eighth Amendment proportionality guarantee applies very differently to prison terms for adult offenders.” (In re Bolton (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 611 , 622.) Indeed, the Eighth Amen

2015(People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174 .) Consequently, such findings “have occurred with exquisite rarity in the case law.” (People v. Weddle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 .) Olivares’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s narrow proportionality principle forbidding extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.

2015(People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174 .) Consequently, such findings “have occurred with exquisite rarity in the case law.” (People v. Weddle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196 .) Olivares’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s narrow proportionality principle forbidding extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.

2024(Emanuel, supra, H049147, rev.gr.) We address the underlying facts to the extent necessary to analyze whether Emanuel’s punishment violates the Eighth Amendment under the proportionality principle described in Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at pages. 20–23. 12 by such factors as age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind. [Citation.]” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494 (Martinez).) The California Supreme Court has “distilled three analytical techniques to aid [a court’s] deferential review of excessiveness claims: (1) an examination of the nature of the offense

2023(Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 58-59 ; accord, In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 965 .) Whether any new sentence violates the proportionality rule in light of Senate Bill No. 567 will be for the trial court to determine on remand.

2021(E.g., U.S. v. Viloski (2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111 [ability to pay is relevant to the proportionality inquiry]; U.S. v. Levesque (1st Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 78, 83-85 [ability to pay should be considered, in addition to proportionality inquiry]; U.S. v. Dubose (9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 1141 , 1145-1146 [ability to pay has no bearing on analysis].) The United States Supreme Court has left this question open (see Timbs, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 688 ), but has noted the Eighth Amendment’s historical roots in prohibitions against monetary penalties that are “ ‘so large as to deprive [the defendant]

2021(E.g., U.S. v. Viloski (2d Cir. 2016) 814 F.3d 104, 111 [ability to pay is relevant to the proportionality inquiry]; U.S. v. Levesque (1st Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 78, 83-85 [ability to pay should be considered, in addition to proportionality inquiry]; U.S. v. Dubose (9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 1141 , 1145-1146 [ability to pay has no bearing on analysis].) The United States Supreme Court has left this question open (see Timbs, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 688 ), but has noted the Eighth Amendment’s historical roots in prohibitions against monetary penalties that are “ ‘so large as to deprive [the defendant]

2026I, § 17, italics added.) A punishment may violate this provision 4 “although not cruel or unusual in its method, [if] it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 .) The California Supreme Court has described three techniques to evaluate a claim under California Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment: “(1) an examination of the nature of the offense and the offender, with particular attention to the degree of danger both pose to soci

2013Although such intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons are relevant to a proportionality analysis (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 426, 427), "[i]t is only in the rare case where a comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality that [those] criteria come into play." (Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 707 ; accord, Haller, supra, 174 CalApp.4th at p. 1088.) 10 viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes.

2015As has long been acknowledged, "Dillon's application of a proportionality analysis to reduce a first degree felony-murder conviction must be viewed as representing an exception rather than a general rule." (People v. Munoz (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 999, 1014 .) We agree with the trial court that, unlike Dillon, this is not a case "that is so unusual and mitigating, either the crime or the defendants, that the statutory mandated sentence by the Legislature is unconstitutional." Therefore, we reject Jordan's and Jones's argument that their sentences are grossly disproportionate under either the fede

1986Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 19, 1986. 1 Dillon’s application of a proportionality analysis to reduce a first degree felony-murder conviction must be viewed as representing an exception rather than a general rule.” (People v. Munoz, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 999, 1014 ; see also People v. Laboa, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d 115, 122 ; People v. Harpool, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d 877, 889-890 .)

2025This case law reflects the principle that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” ’ ([People v.] Contreras [(2018)] 4 Cal.5th [349,] 359 . . . , quoting Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 , 471 . . . .) However, ‘a defendant’s 18th birthday marks a bright line.’ (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183 , 190 . . . .)[7] And . . . ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment proportionality guarantee applies very differently to prison terms for adult offenders.’ (In re Bolton (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 611 , 622. . . .) Indeed, the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality princ

2021This case law reflects the principle that ‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.’ ” (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359 , quoting Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 407 ] (Miller), italics added.) However, “a defendant’s 18th birthday marks a bright line.” (People v. Edwards (2019) 15 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 190 (Edwards).) And as this court has noted, “The Eighth Amendment proportionality guarantee applies very differently to prison terms for adult offenders.” (In re Bolton (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 611 , 622.) Indeed, the Eighth Amen

2022(Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660 , 666– 667.) The United States Supreme Court has seen fit to adopt “a narrow proportionality principle” for assessing Eighth Amendment challenges to noncapital sentences.

2022(See Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660 , 666–667.) The United States Supreme Court has adopted “ ‘a narrow proportionality principle’ ” for assessing Eighth Amendment challenges to noncapital sentences.

2025(Capistrano, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1499 .) Though concluding that tiered rates are generally consistent with the proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6(b)(3), Capistrano determined the city had failed to satisfy this requirement.

2016(See City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 926, 936-937 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 373 ] [“California Constitution, article X, section 2 is not at odds with article XIII D [Prop. 218] so long as, for example, conservation is attained in a manner that ‘shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.’ ”]; see id. at p. 928 [district failed to prove its water rate structure complied with the proportionality requirement of Prop. 218]; see also Capistrano, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 , quoting City of Palmdale with approval.) The Agency also