proportionality requirement in Massachusetts

2019In so doing, we remain mindful of our determination that under art. 26, "the 'unique characteristics of juvenile offenders' should **405 weigh more heavily in the proportionality calculus than the United States Supreme Court required under the Eighth Amendment." Perez I , 477 Mass. at 683, 80 N.E.3d 967 , quoting Diatchenko I , 466 Mass. at 671, 1 N.E.3d 270 .

2015See note 6, supra. 9 Our decision in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013) (Diatchenko I), that art. 26 prohibits not only mandatory but judicially set discretionary sentences of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders provides even broader protection for these offenders than Miller did. 14 beyond sentences of life without parole, we do not read Miller as a whole to indicate that the proportionality principle at the core of the Eighth Amendment10 would bar a mandatory sentence of life with parole eligibility after fifteen years for a juven

2024See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986 ("the proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective values").

2022See Bettencourt, 474 Mass. at 72 .

2022The second step in the proportionality analysis is to assess "the gravity of the underlying offenses ... [and] to gauge the degree of [Bisignani]'s culpability." Bettencourt, 474 Mass. at 72 .

2016Our cases have defined principles that guide our analysis: “A constitutional amendment should be ‘interpreted in the light of the conditions under which it . . . [was] framed, the ends which it was designed to accomplish, the benefits which it was expected to confer, and the evils which it was hoped to remedy.’ ” Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 515, 526 (2000), quoting Tax Comm’r v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 524 (1917).

2016Our cases have defined principles that guide our analysis: “A constitutional amendment should be ‘interpreted in the light of the conditions under which it . . . [was] framed, the ends which it was designed to accomplish, the benefits which it was expected to confer, and the evils which it was hoped to remedy.’ ” Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 515, 526 (2000), quoting Tax Comm’r v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 524 (1917).

2016Their argument might have more force if it were directed at the language of a statute rather than a constitutional amendment; we have certainly stated that “[e]x-ceptions to statutory provisions are construed narrowly.” See LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 336 (1999).

2003In responding to the arguments by the PL Capital Group that this Court should either import the proportionality doctrine in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985), or aspects of the Massachusetts common law relating to fiduciary duties of directors, as a gloss on the protective reach of Sec. 65, the Court is reminded of Justice Cardozo’s eloquent comments on the role of the judge, particularly at the trial level: The judge, even when he is free, still is not wholly free.

2002See Dade County v. Eldridge, 229 Ga. App. 401 (1997); Thorpe v. Benham, 161 Ga. App. 116 (1982).

1981See Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 623-625 (1915); P. Nichols, Taxation in Massachusetts 466-467 (3d ed. 1938).

1981Opinion of the Justices, 270 Mass. 593, 599 (1930).

1981See Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 724, 731-733 (1949), where exemptions from local property taxes are classified and discussed.

1981See Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 724, 727 (1949). 28 In the discussion that we next undertake concerning the stricter standard of art. 44, we note that support for the reasonableness of the renter’s *241 deduction may not as easily be found by reference to the operation of the Federal income tax law and the Commonwealth’s system of local taxation of real estate. 29 In the matter of the assessment of local real estate taxes, there are numerous statements concerning the impropriety of imposing taxes on one class of property at a different rate from that applied to other classes.