proportionality principle in Maryland

2026App. 612 , 657 (2021), aff’d, 479 Md. 84 (2022) (citing Stewart, 368 Md. at 31 ) (further citation omitted).

2024P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv) on the ground that the subpoena imposes an “undue burden[,]” the federal courts apply “[a] more demanding variant of the proportionality analysis . . . when determining whether . . . [the] subpoena . . . must be quashed or modified.” Id. (quoting Fed.

2017The “sentences, viewed individually and in the aggregate, further Arizona’s penological goals and thus reflect a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference.” Id. at 416 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 11 Louisiana (2013): State v. Brown, 118 So.3d at 332 The defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated kidnapping, for which he was sentenced to life, and four counts of armed robbery, for which he was sentenced to four concurrent terms of 10 years.

2006Excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment are expressly prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions have also been interpreted by the Supreme Court as encompassing a narrow proportionality principle, which forbids sentences “that are ‘grossly5 or ‘significantly5 disproportionate in length to the crime being punished.” State v. Bolden, 356 Md. 160, 165 , 737 A.2d 1086 (1999)(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287-88 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)).

2006Excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment are expressly prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions have also been interpreted by the Supreme Court as encompassing a narrow proportionality principle, which forbids sentences “that are ‘grossly5 or ‘significantly5 disproportionate in length to the crime being punished.” State v. Bolden, 356 Md. 160, 165 , 737 A.2d 1086 (1999)(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287-88 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)).

2003In Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578 , 106 S.Ct. 2686 , 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986), for example, the Supreme Court held that, “[a] rule of proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious ... claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the courts.” Id. at 578 , 106 S.Ct. 2686 .

2003In Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578 , 106 S.Ct. 2686 , 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986), for example, the Supreme Court held that, “[a] rule of proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious ... claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the courts.” Id. at 578 , 106 S.Ct. 2686 .

1995Borromeo held that the proportionality analysis espoused in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), does not apply to civil forfeiture actions where the property forfeited was an instrument of the crime.

1995Borromeo held that the proportionality analysis espoused in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), does not apply to civil forfeiture actions where the property forfeited was an instrument of the crime.

1995After that decision was filed, the Supreme Court decided Austin v. U.S., 506 U.S. 1074 , 113 S.Ct. 1036 , 122 L.Ed.2d 347 (1993).

1995After that decision was filed, the Supreme Court decided Austin v. U.S., 506 U.S. 1074 , 113 S.Ct. 1036 , 122 L.Ed.2d 347 (1993).

1987A sentence of seventy-five years without parole was imposed on a thirty-eight year old drug dealer under a federal statute and sustained against eighth amendment attack in the post Helm case of United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2916 , 91 L.Ed.2d 545 (1986).

1987Nevertheless, the West Virginia court held: We decline to apply the proportionality doctrine in the present case, since we believe the crime of breaking and entering carries the potentiality of violence and danger to life as well as to property. [ 262 S.E.2d at 432 .] If life with parole is proportionate following the third conviction for the crimes involved in Griffin and in Vance , it would seem that life without parole is proportionate for a fourth housebreaking conviction, following three separate and unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation through incarceration.

1987In order to demonstrate that courts “can identify and apply objective criteria that reflect constitutional standards of punishment and minimize the risk of judicial subjectivity,” the dissent pointed out that its suggested objective factors had been applied in a line of decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit led by Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 , 94 S.Ct. 1577 , 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974).

1987In order to demonstrate that courts “can identify and apply objective criteria that reflect constitutional standards of punishment and minimize the risk of judicial subjectivity,” the dissent pointed out that its suggested objective factors had been applied in a line of decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit led by Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 , 94 S.Ct. 1577 , 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974).

1987In order to demonstrate that courts “can identify and apply objective criteria that reflect constitutional standards of punishment and minimize the risk of judicial subjectivity,” the dissent pointed out that its suggested objective factors had been applied in a line of decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit led by Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 , 94 S.Ct. 1577 , 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974).

1987In order to demonstrate that courts “can identify and apply objective criteria that reflect constitutional standards of punishment and minimize the risk of judicial subjectivity,” the dissent pointed out that its suggested objective factors had been applied in a line of decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit led by Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 , 94 S.Ct. 1577 , 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974).

1987Writing for the dissenters Justice Powell said that the eighth amendment included a proportionality principle, the violation of which could be determined by objective factors including “(i) the nature of the offense ... (ii) the sentence imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions ... and (iii) the sentence imposed upon other criminals in the same jurisdiction.” Rummel v. Estelle, supra, 445 U.S. at 295 , 100 S.Ct. at 1150 .

1987Writing for the dissenters Justice Powell said that the eighth amendment included a proportionality principle, the violation of which could be determined by objective factors including “(i) the nature of the offense ... (ii) the sentence imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions ... and (iii) the sentence imposed upon other criminals in the same jurisdiction.” Rummel v. Estelle, supra, 445 U.S. at 295 , 100 S.Ct. at 1150 .

1987A sentence of seventy-five years without parole was imposed on a thirty-eight year old drug dealer under a federal statute and sustained against eighth amendment attack in the post Helm case of United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2916 , 91 L.Ed.2d 545 (1986).

1987A sentence of seventy-five years without parole was imposed on a thirty-eight year old drug dealer under a federal statute and sustained against eighth amendment attack in the post Helm case of United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 2916 , 91 L.Ed.2d 545 (1986).

1985Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2353 , 80 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984), holding that a proportionality analysis was not necessary and that life imprisonment was not unconstitutional for a conviction of aggravated assault in light of two previous felony convictions; Tombrello v. State, 421 So.2d 1319 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), holding that life imprisonment is not cruel and unusual punishment for a first degree burglary conviction after previous convictions; Arizona v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474 , 690 P.2d 775 (1984), holding, after a Solem proportionality review,

1985Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2353 , 80 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984), holding that a proportionality analysis was not necessary and that life imprisonment was not unconstitutional for a conviction of aggravated assault in light of two previous felony convictions; Tombrello v. State, 421 So.2d 1319 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), holding that life imprisonment is not cruel and unusual punishment for a first degree burglary conviction after previous convictions; Arizona v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474 , 690 P.2d 775 (1984), holding, after a Solem proportionality review,