defendant assigns error in Georgia

1968This court in Ivy v. State, 220 Ga. 699, 705 ( 141 SE2d 541 ), approved the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Bargeman v. State, 17 Ga. App. 807 (1) ( 88 SE 591 ), as follows: “In a criminal case in which the defendant makes no statement at the trial, it is not error for the court to fail to instruct the jury that that fact should not be considered by them in determining as to the guilt or the innocence of the accused, where there is no request for such an instruction.” The defendant relies on this case, asserting that it indicates that it would be error to refuse to charge on the subject, if

1968This court in Ivy v. State, 220 Ga. 699, 705 ( 141 SE2d 541 ), approved the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Bargeman v. State, 17 Ga. App. 807 (1) ( 88 SE 591 ), as follows: “In a criminal case in which the defendant makes no statement at the trial, it is not error for the court to fail to instruct the jury that that fact should not be considered by them in determining as to the guilt or the innocence of the accused, where there is no request for such an instruction.” The defendant relies on this case, asserting that it indicates that it would be error to refuse to charge on the subject, if

1967This court in June of 1964, in Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132 ( 137 SE2d 463 ) held: “That portion of Ga. L. 1960, pp. 1122, 1123 (Code Ann. § 68-406.2) which requires an operator of a motor vehicle to drive it upon the scales when ordered to do so by a State agent, or failing, to pay a fine of $200, is, in view of the provisions of Ga. L. 1941, p. 449, as amended (Ga. L. 1951, p. 772; 1955, p. 392; 1956, p. 83; 1959, p. 27; ■Code Arm. §§ 68-405 and 68-9921), making the operator of a vehicle weighing more than therein provided, guilty of a crime, offensive to Art.

1967This court in June of 1964, in Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132 ( 137 SE2d 463 ) held: “That portion of Ga. L. 1960, pp. 1122, 1123 (Code Ann. § 68-406.2) which requires an operator of a motor vehicle to drive it upon the scales when ordered to do so by a State agent, or failing, to pay a fine of $200, is, in view of the provisions of Ga. L. 1941, p. 449, as amended (Ga. L. 1951, p. 772; 1955, p. 392; 1956, p. 83; 1959, p. 27; ■Code Arm. §§ 68-405 and 68-9921), making the operator of a vehicle weighing more than therein provided, guilty of a crime, offensive to Art.

1965Held: The denial of the defendant’s petition for change of venue on the ground that a fair and impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county where the crime was committed must, for the reasons stated in Blevins v. State, 108 Ga. App. 738 (2) ( 134 SE2d 496 ), await the trial of the case to be resolved.

1965Held: The denial of the defendant’s petition for change of venue on the ground that a fair and impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county where the crime was committed must, for the reasons stated in Blevins v. State, 108 Ga. App. 738 (2) ( 134 SE2d 496 ), await the trial of the case to be resolved.

1961Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199 ( 114 SE 185 ); Hilburn v. Hilburn, 210 Ga. 497, 500 ( 81 SE2d 1 ).

1961Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199 ( 114 SE 185 ); Hilburn v. Hilburn, 210 Ga. 497, 500 ( 81 SE2d 1 ).

1961It has been insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that while the prenuptial agreement was void as a bar to alimony by the wife, it was admissible in evidence to show the consideration she received under the agreement for the purpose of showing her separate estate, and counsel cite Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 SE2d 393 ); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 SE2d 431 ); and Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233 ( 78 SE2d 516 ), in support of this contention.

1961It has been insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that while the prenuptial agreement was void as a bar to alimony by the wife, it was admissible in evidence to show the consideration she received under the agreement for the purpose of showing her separate estate, and counsel cite Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 SE2d 393 ); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 SE2d 431 ); and Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233 ( 78 SE2d 516 ), in support of this contention.

1961It has been insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that while the prenuptial agreement was void as a bar to alimony by the wife, it was admissible in evidence to show the consideration she received under the agreement for the purpose of showing her separate estate, and counsel cite Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 SE2d 393 ); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 SE2d 431 ); and Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233 ( 78 SE2d 516 ), in support of this contention.

1961It has been insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that while the prenuptial agreement was void as a bar to alimony by the wife, it was admissible in evidence to show the consideration she received under the agreement for the purpose of showing her separate estate, and counsel cite Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 SE2d 393 ); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 SE2d 431 ); and Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233 ( 78 SE2d 516 ), in support of this contention.

1961It has been insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that while the prenuptial agreement was void as a bar to alimony by the wife, it was admissible in evidence to show the consideration she received under the agreement for the purpose of showing her separate estate, and counsel cite Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 SE2d 393 ); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 SE2d 431 ); and Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233 ( 78 SE2d 516 ), in support of this contention.

1961It has been insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that while the prenuptial agreement was void as a bar to alimony by the wife, it was admissible in evidence to show the consideration she received under the agreement for the purpose of showing her separate estate, and counsel cite Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694 ( 27 SE2d 393 ); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8 ( 36 SE2d 431 ); and Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233 ( 78 SE2d 516 ), in support of this contention.

1955The certificate of the trial court to the bill of exceptions contains the following: “I further certify that the assignments of error made in the motion for a new trial do not require the consideration by the court of the evidence in said case, and a brief of the evidence is not necessary to a consideration of the errors complained of.” It is here contended by the plaintiff in error in the main bill of exceptions that, under the act of 1947 and the decision in Huguley v. Huguley, 204 Ga. 692 , no brief of evidence is necessary to determine the sole assignment of error relating to the qualifica

1955The certificate of the trial court to the bill of exceptions contains the following: "I further certify that the assignments of error made in the motion for a new trial do not require the consideration by the court of the evidence in said case, and a brief of the evidence is not necessary to a consideration of the errors complained of." It is here contended by the plaintiff in error in the main bill of exceptions that, under the act of 1947 and the decision in Huguley v. Huguley, 204 Ga. 692 , no brief of evidence is necessary to determine the sole assignment of error relating to the qualifica

1951You would not be authorized to consider his failure to make any statement as evidence against him or as any evidence of his guilt.” This is certainly a correct statement of the law as set out in Bird v. State, 50 Ga. 585 (6).

1951“Where in a petition for certiorari from an inferior court to a superior court, based solely on the general grounds, it appears that the evidence supports the verdict and no other error of law is assigned, the superior court does not err in overruling the certiorari.” Jackson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 149 ( 53 S. E. 2d, 120 ); Wells v. McMahon, 26 Ga. App. 397 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Skipper v. Mayor &c. of Brunswick, 29 Ga. App. 185 ( 114 S. E. 725 ).

1951“Where in a petition for certiorari from an inferior court to a superior court, based solely on the general grounds, it appears that the evidence supports the verdict and no other error of law is assigned, the superior court does not err in overruling the certiorari.” Jackson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 149 ( 53 S. E. 2d, 120 ); Wells v. McMahon, 26 Ga. App. 397 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Skipper v. Mayor &c. of Brunswick, 29 Ga. App. 185 ( 114 S. E. 725 ).

1951“Where in a petition for certiorari from an inferior court to a superior court, based solely on the general grounds, it appears that the evidence supports the verdict and no other error of law is assigned, the superior court does not err in overruling the certiorari.” Jackson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 149 ( 53 S. E. 2d, 120 ); Wells v. McMahon, 26 Ga. App. 397 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Skipper v. Mayor &c. of Brunswick, 29 Ga. App. 185 ( 114 S. E. 725 ).

1951“Where in a petition for certiorari from an inferior court to a superior court, based solely on the general grounds, it appears that the evidence supports the verdict and no other error of law is assigned, the superior court does not err in overruling the certiorari.” Jackson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 149 ( 53 S. E. 2d, 120 ); Wells v. McMahon, 26 Ga. App. 397 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Skipper v. Mayor &c. of Brunswick, 29 Ga. App. 185 ( 114 S. E. 725 ).

1951"Questions as to diligence and negligence, including contributory negligence and what negligence constitutes the proximate cause of the injury complained of, are questions peculiarly for the jury, such as this court will decline to solve on demurrer except in palpably clear, plain, and indisputable cases." Tybee Amusement Co. v. Odum, 51 Ga. App. 1 (3) ( 179 S. E. 415 ).

1951"Questions as to diligence and negligence, including contributory negligence and what negligence constitutes the proximate cause of the injury complained of, are questions peculiarly for the jury, such as this court will decline to solve on demurrer except in palpably clear, plain, and indisputable cases." Tybee Amusement Co. v. Odum, 51 Ga. App. 1 (3) ( 179 S. E. 415 ).

1951“Where in a petition for certiorari from an inferior court to a superior court, based solely on the general grounds, it appears that the evidence supports the verdict and no other error of law is assigned, the superior court does not err in overruling the certiorari.” Jackson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 149 ( 53 S. E. 2d, 120 ); Wells v. McMahon, 26 Ga. App. 397 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Skipper v. Mayor &c. of Brunswick, 29 Ga. App. 185 ( 114 S. E. 725 ).

1951“Where in a petition for certiorari from an inferior court to a superior court, based solely on the general grounds, it appears that the evidence supports the verdict and no other error of law is assigned, the superior court does not err in overruling the certiorari.” Jackson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 149 ( 53 S. E. 2d, 120 ); Wells v. McMahon, 26 Ga. App. 397 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Skipper v. Mayor &c. of Brunswick, 29 Ga. App. 185 ( 114 S. E. 725 ).

1950It is alleged that this was error because: “(a) If the jury was convinced from the evidence that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover it was not furnished the form for a verdict in favor of the defendant, (b) That the jury was without instruction as to how to write their verdict all of which was confusing and misleading to the jury, (c) That said failure to charge the form of the verdict was erroneous because the law directs that the court shall charge the jury giving it the law upon all issues of fact made in the case and the form of the verdict.” In support of this ground of the motion

1950It is alleged that this was error because: “(a) If the jury was convinced from the evidence that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover it was not furnished the form for a verdict in favor of the defendant, (b) That the jury was without instruction as to how to write their verdict all of which was confusing and misleading to the jury, (c) That said failure to charge the form of the verdict was erroneous because the law directs that the court shall charge the jury giving it the law upon all issues of fact made in the case and the form of the verdict.” In support of this ground of the motion

1950It is alleged that this was error because: “(a) If the jury was convinced from the evidence that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover it was not furnished the form for a verdict in favor of the defendant, (b) That the jury was without instruction as to how to write their verdict all of which was confusing and misleading to the jury, (c) That said failure to charge the form of the verdict was erroneous because the law directs that the court shall charge the jury giving it the law upon all issues of fact made in the case and the form of the verdict.” In support of this ground of the motion

1950It is alleged that this was error because: “(a) If the jury was convinced from the evidence that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover it was not furnished the form for a verdict in favor of the defendant, (b) That the jury was without instruction as to how to write their verdict all of which was confusing and misleading to the jury, (c) That said failure to charge the form of the verdict was erroneous because the law directs that the court shall charge the jury giving it the law upon all issues of fact made in the case and the form of the verdict.” In support of this ground of the motion

1946In Anderson v. State, 117 Ga. 258 ( 43 S. E. 835 ), the court said: “The law, in cases of homicide, does not take into account the actual fears of the slayer, but considers all the circumstances, with reference to a determination as to whether they were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person.” In the second special ground, the defendant assigns error on the following charge: “Now there is another basis upon which justifiable homicide may rest, and that is a case of self-defense where there existed a condition of mutual combat, as I have defined that to you, between the parties.

1946The defendant assigns as error, “that after the court charged the section of the Code relating to larceny after trust, it failed to go further and charge the jury that before a conviction could be had in this case a violation of this section of the Code would have to be shown to the jury to their satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt.” “Where in a criminal case the judge has fully and fairly charged the jury concerning the law of reasonable doubt, he is not bound to repeat the instructions upon that subject when charging with reference to some particular or specially enumerated fact or fa

1946In Caswell v. State, 5 Ga. App. 483 ( 63 S. E. 566 ), it was said: “A trial judge may properly ask questions for the purpose of informing himself as to the truth of any matter material to a cause on trial, provided, in asking the questions, no intimation of his opinion upon the merits is conveyed . . by the questions asked.” In special ground 2, the defendant assigns error because the court permitted Powell to testify: “The only way I knew this man had anything to do with or any connection with the crime was from what Hiram Jesse Gaskins, called Boojem Gaskins, told me, *126 this is the only w

1946In Caswell v. State, 5 Ga. App. 483 ( 63 S. E. 566 ), it was said: “A trial judge may properly ask questions for the purpose of informing himself as to the truth of any matter material to a cause on trial, provided, in asking the questions, no intimation of his opinion upon the merits is conveyed . . by the questions asked.” In special ground 2, the defendant assigns error because the court permitted Powell to testify: “The only way I knew this man had anything to do with or any connection with the crime was from what Hiram Jesse Gaskins, called Boojem Gaskins, told me, *126 this is the only w

1931The petition and the demurrer in this case are substantially and almost identically the same as those in the case of Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Michael, 43 Ga. App. 703 ( 160 S. E. 93 ), in which this court held that “the petition set out a cause of action, and was good as against the general and special demurrer.” There is nothing in the instant case that renders this ruling inapplicable; and the court did not err in overruling certain paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the demurrer to the petition in the instant case.

1931The petition and the demurrer in this case are substantially and almost identically the same as those in the case of Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Michael, 43 Ga. App. 703 ( 160 S. E. 93 ), in which this court held that “the petition set out a cause of action, and was good as against the general and special demurrer.” There is nothing in the instant case that renders this ruling inapplicable; and the court did not err in overruling certain paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the demurrer to the petition in the instant case.

1917Civil Code of 1910, § 5183; Papworth v. Fitzgerald, 111 Ga. 54 ( 36 S. E. 311 ) ; Harrell v. Quitman, 17 Ga. App. 299 ( 86 S. E. 662 ), and cases there cited.

1917Civil Code of 1910, § 5183; Papworth v. Fitzgerald, 111 Ga. 54 ( 36 S. E. 311 ) ; Harrell v. Quitman, 17 Ga. App. 299 ( 86 S. E. 662 ), and cases there cited.

1917Civil Code of 1910, § 5183; Papworth v. Fitzgerald, 111 Ga. 54 ( 36 S. E. 311 ) ; Harrell v. Quitman, 17 Ga. App. 299 ( 86 S. E. 662 ), and cases there cited.

1917Civil Code of 1910, § 5183; Papworth v. Fitzgerald, 111 Ga. 54 ( 36 S. E. 311 ) ; Harrell v. Quitman, 17 Ga. App. 299 ( 86 S. E. 662 ), and cases there cited.