defendant assigns error in Washington

2019State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47 , 56, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017); State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn.

1993The defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling admitting DNA [17] evidence linking him to the rape of C.F. *540 Defendant does not raise issues regarding the general acceptance of forensic DNA evidence, the RFLP test or the statistical components of that test. [18] Rather, defendant argues that the specific laboratory procedures utilized in this case to analyze the DNA samples were so flawed by human error as to make the results inadmissible as a matter of law. [13] We recently addressed this issue at length in State v. Cauthron, 120 Wn.2d 879 , 846 P.2d 502 (1993), wherein we conclud

1993The defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling admitting DNA [17] evidence linking him to the rape of C.F. *540 Defendant does not raise issues regarding the general acceptance of forensic DNA evidence, the RFLP test or the statistical components of that test. [18] Rather, defendant argues that the specific laboratory procedures utilized in this case to analyze the DNA samples were so flawed by human error as to make the results inadmissible as a matter of law. [13] We recently addressed this issue at length in State v. Cauthron, 120 Wn.2d 879 , 846 P.2d 502 (1993), wherein we conclud

1986The defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling that impeachment of these two prosecution witnesses would open the door to evidence on redirect that the defendant participated in the uncharged robbery. [7] The scope of cross examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. [39] The accused in a criminal prosecution is, of course, afforded considerable latitude in cross-examining an essential state witness to *711 show bias, [40] and has the right to cross-examine a witness to elicit facts showing the w

1986The defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling that impeachment of these two prosecution witnesses would open the door to evidence on redirect that the defendant participated in the uncharged robbery. [7] The scope of cross examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. [39] The accused in a criminal prosecution is, of course, afforded considerable latitude in cross-examining an essential state witness to *711 show bias, [40] and has the right to cross-examine a witness to elicit facts showing the w

1985The first sentence of this instruction is based on State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 501 , 647 P.2d 6 (1982), cert. denied sub nom.

1985The first sentence of this instruction is based on State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 501 , 647 P.2d 6 (1982), cert. denied sub nom.

1982He contends that the confession would be admissible as a statement against interest, citing ER 804(b)(3), and its admission is constitutionally mandated by Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 35 L.

1982He contends that the confession would be admissible as a statement against interest, citing ER 804(b)(3), and its admission is constitutionally mandated by Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 35 L.

1981The defendant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to include in its accomplice instruction the defendant's proposed additional definition of the term "aid" which is based on language found in State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584, 593 , 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), quoted with approval in In re Wilson, 91 Wn.2d 487, 491 , 588 P.2d 1161 (1979).

1981The defendant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to include in its accomplice instruction the defendant's proposed additional definition of the term "aid" which is based on language found in State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584, 593 , 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), quoted with approval in In re Wilson, 91 Wn.2d 487, 491 , 588 P.2d 1161 (1979).

1981The defendant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to include in its accomplice instruction the defendant's proposed additional definition of the term "aid" which is based on language found in State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584, 593 , 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), quoted with approval in In re Wilson, 91 Wn.2d 487, 491 , 588 P.2d 1161 (1979).

1981The defendant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to include in its accomplice instruction the defendant's proposed additional definition of the term "aid" which is based on language found in State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584, 593 , 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), quoted with approval in In re Wilson, 91 Wn.2d 487, 491 , 588 P.2d 1161 (1979).

1979He relies on National School Studios, Inc. v. Superior School Photo Serv., Inc., 40 Wn.2d 263 , 242 P.2d 756 (1952), as support for his argument that Organon must prove it lost profits as a result of the defendant's activity before it can collect damages.

1979He relies on National School Studios, Inc. v. Superior School Photo Serv., Inc., 40 Wn.2d 263 , 242 P.2d 756 (1952), as support for his argument that Organon must prove it lost profits as a result of the defendant's activity before it can collect damages.

1977The law is that The validity of the identification procedure is a question of fact for the jury's determination and appellate courts may reverse a determination of the identification issue adverse to the defendant only where the facts establish "[t]he photographic identification procedure . . . [is] so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 , 19 L.

1977The law is that The validity of the identification procedure is a question of fact for the jury's determination and appellate courts may reverse a determination of the identification issue adverse to the defendant only where the facts establish "[t]he photographic identification procedure . . . [is] so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 , 19 L.

1966The defendant first contends that he was entitled to pursue such an examination of the witness for the purpose of impeaching her credibility, relying on State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99 , 28 Pac. 28 (1891), as affirmed in State v. Cooper, 26 Wn.2d 405 , 174 P.2d 545 (1946) and Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn.2d 412 , 213 P.2d 627 , 19 A.L.R.2d 462 (1950).

1966The defendant first contends that he was entitled to pursue such an examination of the witness for the purpose of impeaching her credibility, relying on State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99 , 28 Pac. 28 (1891), as affirmed in State v. Cooper, 26 Wn.2d 405 , 174 P.2d 545 (1946) and Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn.2d 412 , 213 P.2d 627 , 19 A.L.R.2d 462 (1950).

1966The defendant first contends that he was entitled to pursue such an examination of the witness for the purpose of impeaching her credibility, relying on State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99 , 28 Pac. 28 (1891), as affirmed in State v. Cooper, 26 Wn.2d 405 , 174 P.2d 545 (1946) and Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn.2d 412 , 213 P.2d 627 , 19 A.L.R.2d 462 (1950).

1966The defendant first contends that he was entitled to pursue such an examination of the witness for the purpose of impeaching her credibility, relying on State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99 , 28 Pac. 28 (1891), as affirmed in State v. Cooper, 26 Wn.2d 405 , 174 P.2d 545 (1946) and Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn.2d 412 , 213 P.2d 627 , 19 A.L.R.2d 462 (1950).

1966The defendant first contends that he was entitled to pursue such an examination of the witness for the purpose of impeaching her credibility, relying on State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99 , 28 Pac. 28 (1891), as affirmed in State v. Cooper, 26 Wn.2d 405 , 174 P.2d 545 (1946) and Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn.2d 412 , 213 P.2d 627 , 19 A.L.R.2d 462 (1950).

1966The defendant first contends that he was entitled to pursue such an examination of the witness for the purpose of impeaching her credibility, relying on State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99 , 28 Pac. 28 (1891), as affirmed in State v. Cooper, 26 Wn.2d 405 , 174 P.2d 545 (1946) and Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn.2d 412 , 213 P.2d 627 , 19 A.L.R.2d 462 (1950).

1963In support of his contention, the defendant relies on State v. Rader, 118 Wash. 198 , 203 Pac. 68 (1922). *62 We do not find the Rader case applicable to the contention raised in the instant case.

1963In support of his contention, the defendant relies on State v. Rader, 118 Wash. 198 , 203 Pac. 68 (1922). *62 We do not find the Rader case applicable to the contention raised in the instant case.

1962Co. (Mo.), 302 S.W. (2d) 924 (1957). [4] The defendant assigns error to the plaintiff's use of medical treatises on redirect examination of certain expert witnesses.

1959He forthrightly admits that his theory was rejected in State v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194 , 122 Pac. 995 (1912), but urges this court to overrule our previous holding in view of the recent case of Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 , 2 L.

1959He forthrightly admits that his theory was rejected in State v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194 , 122 Pac. 995 (1912), but urges this court to overrule our previous holding in view of the recent case of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , 2 L.Ed. (2d) 199, 78 S.Ct. 221 (1957).

1959He forthrightly admits that his theory was rejected in State v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194 , 122 Pac. 995 (1912), but urges this court to overrule our previous holding in view of the recent case of Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 , 2 L.

1959He forthrightly admits that his theory was rejected in State v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194 , 122 Pac. 995 (1912), but urges this court to overrule our previous holding in view of the recent case of Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 , 2 L.