8 Tennessee opinions name it 1 courts 1968–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ruanegreen1 sentence2013The defendant contends that such “evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence” should be allowed to establish that “the victim was in fact the first aggressor.” In addition, although the argument on this point is unclear, it appears that the defendant assigns error to the trial court’s decision to exclude the victim’s prior felony conviction from evidence. -7- This court has stated that “[t]here is a distinction between evidence of prior acts of violence by the victim used to corroborate the defense theory that the victim was the first aggressor and that used to establish the defendant’s | 1 | 1 |
Mercer v. Vanderbilt University, Inc.green1 sentence2010See Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 121, 134 (Tenn. 2004). -12- The defendant assigns error to two interjections by the trial judge, during his cross- examination of Detective Hutchison and during the state’s closing arguments. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Henleygreen1 sentence2001See State v. Henley, 774 S.W.2d 908, 915 (Tenn. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1988The defendant argues that the procedure violates Art. 1, § 6 of the Tennessee Con- *714 stitutxon which provides “that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and no religious or political test shall be required as a qualification for jurors.” A jury chosen by excluding veniremen for cause based on a general objection to the death penalty is “uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 , 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). 1988The defendant argues that the procedure violates Art. 1, § 6 of the Tennessee Con- *714 stitutxon which provides “that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and no religious or political test shall be required as a qualification for jurors.” A jury chosen by excluding veniremen for cause based on a general objection to the death penalty is “uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 , 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bruton v. United States
green
2 sentences1977This turn of events occurred immediately after direct examination, but before cross-examination, of the State’s principal witness, an undercover agent working in conjunction with the informant and posing as the would-be “hit man.” The defendant contends that this situation is analogous to that in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), on the grounds that he was thereby deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine his alleged cohorts, whose statements had been introduced into evidence during direct examination of the undercover agent. 1977This turn of events occurred immediately after direct examination, but before cross-examination, of the State’s principal witness, an undercover agent working in conjunction with the informant and posing as the would-be “hit man.” The defendant contends that this situation is analogous to that in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), on the grounds that he was thereby deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine his alleged cohorts, whose statements had been introduced into evidence during direct examination of the undercover agent. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Vines v. State
green
2 sentences1977Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644 , 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310 , 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846 , 68 S.Ct. 659 , 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1948); Solomon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972). 1977Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644 , 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310 , 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846 , 68 S.Ct. 659 , 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1948); Solomon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Solomon v. State
green
1 sentence1977Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644 , 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310 , 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846 , 68 S.Ct. 659 , 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1948); Solomon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Grimes v. Capital Transit Co.
green
1 sentence1977Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644 , 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310 , 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846 , 68 S.Ct. 659 , 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1948); Solomon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Kennedy v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences1977Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644 , 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310 , 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846 , 68 S.Ct. 659 , 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1948); Solomon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972). 1977Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644 , 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310 , 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846 , 68 S.Ct. 659 , 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1948); Solomon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Kennedy v. State
green
2 sentences1977Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644 , 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310 , 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846 , 68 S.Ct. 659 , 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1948); Solomon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972). 1977Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644 , 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310 , 210 S.W.2d 132 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846 , 68 S.Ct. 659 , 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1948); Solomon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Durham v. State
green
1 sentence1976We have carefully reviewed the authorities cited and find persuasive the reasoning in Durham v. State, 128 Tenn. 636 , 163 S.W. 447 (1913), where the court held that “(t)he presumption of a good character may not be a basis of inference for the purpose of adding weight to the presumption of innocence or its logical resultant,” i. e., reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Foute v. State
neutral
1 sentence1968Foute v. State, 83 Tenn. 712 .” The defendant assigns as error that the Court erred in his examination of the prospective juror Bobby Lewis, and that he should have declared a mistrial when the prospective juror said in the presence of some already selected that he could not say the man was innocent *93 when he had already formed an opinion on the case. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.