defendant assigns error in Virginia

1982Although a question of first impression in Virginia, 2 many courts elsewhere have considered the admissibility of such evidence, beginning with Hodge v. State, 98 Ala. 10 , 13 So. 385 (1893).

1974He underpins this argument by citing a number of cases including Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600 , 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S.E. 441 (1938); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687 , 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); and Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736 , 91 S.E.2d 648 (1956).

1974He underpins this argument by citing a number of cases including Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600 , 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S.E. 441 (1938); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687 , 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); and Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736 , 91 S.E.2d 648 (1956).

1974He underpins this argument by citing a number of cases including Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600 , 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S.E. 441 (1938); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687 , 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); and Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736 , 91 S.E.2d 648 (1956).

1974He underpins this argument by citing a number of cases including Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600 , 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S.E. 441 (1938); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687 , 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); and Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736 , 91 S.E.2d 648 (1956).

1974He underpins this argument by citing a number of cases including Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600 , 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S.E. 441 (1938); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687 , 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); and Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736 , 91 S.E.2d 648 (1956).

1974He underpins this argument by citing a number of cases including Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600 , 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S.E. 441 (1938); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687 , 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); and Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736 , 91 S.E.2d 648 (1956).

1974He underpins this argument by citing a number of cases including Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600 , 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S.E. 441 (1938); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687 , 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); and Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736 , 91 S.E.2d 648 (1956).

1974He underpins this argument by citing a number of cases including Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600 , 115 S.E. 679 (1923); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266 , 198 S.E. 441 (1938); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 687 , 47 S.E.2d 377 (1948); and Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736 , 91 S.E.2d 648 (1956).

1958The objection to this testimony did not state the grounds on which it was made as required by Rule 1:8 (see Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269 , 77 S. E. 2d 851 ), but in any event the evidence was clearly admissible as relating to similar transactions closely connected in time with the one under investigation and tending to show a general scheme or guilty knowledge and intent.

1958The objection to this testimony did not state the grounds on which it was made as required by Rule 1:8 (see Harlow v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 269 , 77 S. E. 2d 851 ), but in any event the evidence was clearly admissible as relating to similar transactions closely connected in time with the one under investigation and tending to show a general scheme or guilty knowledge and intent.

1958On the evidence as a whole it was proper for the court to give to the jury the instruction to which the defendant assigns error, which accurately stated in language approved in Horton v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 848, 863 , 38 S. E. 184, 185 , that principals in the first degree in every felony are those who are the immediate perpetrators of the crime; and that principals in the second degree are those who did not with their own hands commit the act, but were present, aiding and abetting it, and that principals in the second degree are liable to the *881 same punishment as principals in the first d

1958On the evidence as a whole it was proper for the court to give to the jury the instruction to which the defendant assigns error, which accurately stated in language approved in Horton v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 848, 863 , 38 S. E. 184, 185 , that principals in the first degree in every felony are those who are the immediate perpetrators of the crime; and that principals in the second degree are those who did not with their own hands commit the act, but were present, aiding and abetting it, and that principals in the second degree are liable to the *881 same punishment as principals in the first d

1958Section 18-3 of the Code provides that every principal in the second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree. “ ‘Every person who is present at the commission of a trespass, encouraging or inciting the same by words, gestures, looks or signs, or who in any way, or by any means, countenances or approves the same, is, in law, assumed to be an aider and abettor, and is liable as principal’ ” Brown v. Commonwealth, 130 Va. 733, 736 , 107 S. E. 809, 810 .

1958Section 18-3 of the Code provides that every principal in the second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree. “ ‘Every person who is present at the commission of a trespass, encouraging or inciting the same by words, gestures, looks or signs, or who in any way, or by any means, countenances or approves the same, is, in law, assumed to be an aider and abettor, and is liable as principal’ ” Brown v. Commonwealth, 130 Va. 733, 736 , 107 S. E. 809, 810 .

1952The giving of Instruction 6 for the Commonwealth “that a mortal wound given with a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the slayer, without any provocation or even with slight provocation, is prima facie wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and throws upon the accused the necessity of showing extenuating circumstances.” As we said in the former opinion, Bailey v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 510, 517 , 62 S. E. (2d) 28, 31 , that is an established principle of our criminal law.

1952The giving of Instruction 6 for the Commonwealth “that a mortal wound given with a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the slayer, without any provocation or even with slight provocation, is prima facie wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and throws upon the accused the necessity of showing extenuating circumstances.” As we said in the former opinion, Bailey v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 510, 517 , 62 S. E. (2d) 28, 31 , that is an established principle of our criminal law.