23 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Whitegreen1 sentence2013Legal Educ. 1999), citing Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407, 408-409 (1872). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Brittogreen1 sentence2013“An evidentiary hearing is required if the motion and affidavits raise a substantial issue.” Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 608 (2001), citing Mass. R. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Alvesgreen1 sentence1979See Kelly v. O’Neil, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 316-317 (1973); Cf. Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 528-530 (1978); Commonwealth v. Alves, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 582-583 (1978); Commonwealth v. Happnie, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 193, 199 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Happniegreen1 sentence1979See Kelly v. O’Neil, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 316-317 (1973); Cf. Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 528-530 (1978); Commonwealth v. Alves, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 582-583 (1978); Commonwealth v. Happnie, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 193, 199 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. O'NEILgreen1 sentence1979See Kelly v. O’Neil, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 316-317 (1973); Cf. Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 528-530 (1978); Commonwealth v. Alves, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 582-583 (1978); Commonwealth v. Happnie, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 193, 199 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Bouchie v. Murraygreen1 sentence1979See Kelly v. O’Neil, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 316-317 (1973); Cf. Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 528-530 (1978); Commonwealth v. Alves, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 582-583 (1978); Commonwealth v. Happnie, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 193, 199 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Nolingreen1 sentence1979Commonwealth v. Nolin, 373 Mass. 45, 49 (1977). 2. (a) The defendant assigns as error the judge’s denial of his motion to dismiss and his motion for a directed verdict. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cheekgreen1 sentence1978See Commonwealth v. Cheek, 374 Mass. 613, 618-619 (1978); Commonwealth v. Burke, 373 Mass. 569, 575 (1977); Commonwealth v. Baptiste, 372 Mass. 700, 713 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Watsongreen1 sentence1978The defendant claims those statements should have been suppressed as the fruits of his arrest which he contends was illegal because it was made (1) without probable cause (see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-418 [1976], and cases cited) and (2) in his home in alleged violation of the principle announced in Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 806 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fordegreen1 sentence1978The defendant claims those statements should have been suppressed as the fruits of his arrest which he contends was illegal because it was made (1) without probable cause (see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-418 [1976], and cases cited) and (2) in his home in alleged violation of the principle announced in Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 806 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Baptistegreen1 sentence1978See Commonwealth v. Cheek, 374 Mass. 613, 618-619 (1978); Commonwealth v. Burke, 373 Mass. 569, 575 (1977); Commonwealth v. Baptiste, 372 Mass. 700, 713 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Burkegreen1 sentence1978See Commonwealth v. Cheek, 374 Mass. 613, 618-619 (1978); Commonwealth v. Burke, 373 Mass. 569, 575 (1977); Commonwealth v. Baptiste, 372 Mass. 700, 713 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Vitellogreen1 sentence1977Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 236-239 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Starr v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1976The defendant assigns as error, based on due exception, that the judge, in illustrating or elucidating the meaning of several passages of his charge, drew on the evidence supporting the prosecution’s case but did not make corresponding or balancing references to the defendant’s evidence. 2 The result, according to the defendant, was that *206 the charge focused unduly on the prosecution’s theory and might thus have led the jury to believe that the judge was himself convinced of the defendant’s guilt. 3 See Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 624-626 (1894); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Louis Nazzarogreen1 sentence1976The defendant assigns as error, based on due exception, that the judge, in illustrating or elucidating the meaning of several passages of his charge, drew on the evidence supporting the prosecution’s case but did not make corresponding or balancing references to the defendant’s evidence. 2 The result, according to the defendant, was that *206 the charge focused unduly on the prosecution’s theory and might thus have led the jury to believe that the judge was himself convinced of the defendant’s guilt. 3 See Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 624-626 (1894); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David T. Dellingergreen1 sentence1976The defendant assigns as error, based on due exception, that the judge, in illustrating or elucidating the meaning of several passages of his charge, drew on the evidence supporting the prosecution’s case but did not make corresponding or balancing references to the defendant’s evidence. 2 The result, according to the defendant, was that *206 the charge focused unduly on the prosecution’s theory and might thus have led the jury to believe that the judge was himself convinced of the defendant’s guilt. 3 See Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 624-626 (1894); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. D'AGOSTINOgreen1 sentence1975The scope of hypothetical questions must be left to the discretion of the judge (Commonwealth v. D’Agostino, 344 Mass. 276, 279-280 [1962], cert. den. 371 U. S. 852 [1962]) and whether a question is objectionable as to form or relevancy is for him to decide. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Chalifouxgreen1 sentence1974He contends that this testimony placed him in a position of defending against charges not contained in the indictment and thereby prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. “ [W]hile evidence of other criminal or wrongful behavior may not be admitted to prove the character or propensity of the accused ..., it is admissible for other relevant probative purposes.” Commonwealth v. Chalifoux, 362 Mass. 811, 815-816 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bellinogreen1 sentence1974Commonwealth v. Spencer, supra. “The conclusion of the trial judge that a witness is competent to express an opinion upon a particular matter can be disturbed only where there is no evidence to warrant that conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Bellino, 320 Mass. 635, 638 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Rembiszewskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barker v. Wingogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Foleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Corcionegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Karl G. Eisen v. Philip J. Picardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth
green
1 sentence2025The defendant contends that the prosecutor impermissibly identified the defendant in the video recording, and that by "fronting" the video recording with the impermissible identification, the prosecutor "risked creating a cognitive bias," Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 477 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Young
green
1 sentence1998Relying on Commonwealth v. Young, 401 Mass. 390 (1987), the defendant contends that because this case involved an interracial murder, 3 he was entitled to the requested voir dire. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence1986Early in the charge, the judge gave lengthy instructions on identification based upon Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296 (1979), making clear that the jury had to find at the outset that the defendant was the intruder who entered the victims’ apartment. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Kirby v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1977He allowed the motion to suppress identifications made by Osgood at probable cause hearings in both the Peabody and Salem District Courts on the basis of “Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 (1972) .” 2 The defendant assigns as error the judge’s refusal to suppress the in-court identification, and his failure to charge the jury as he had requested. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Wrenn v. California
green
1 sentence1976The defendant assigns as error, based on due exception, that the judge, in illustrating or elucidating the meaning of several passages of his charge, drew on the evidence supporting the prosecution’s case but did not make corresponding or balancing references to the defendant’s evidence. 2 The result, according to the defendant, was that *206 the charge focused unduly on the prosecution’s theory and might thus have led the jury to believe that the judge was himself convinced of the defendant’s guilt. 3 See Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 624-626 (1894); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Commonwealth v. Foster
green
1 sentence1975We consider Commonwealth v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311 (1873), to be controlling on that point. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Klopfer v. North Carolina
green
1 sentence1975Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Cisneros v. California
green
1 sentence1975The scope of hypothetical questions must be left to the discretion of the judge (Commonwealth v. D’Agostino, 344 Mass. 276, 279-280 [1962], cert. den. 371 U. S. 852 [1962]) and whether a question is objectionable as to form or relevancy is for him to decide. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Commonwealth v. Horne
green
1 sentence1974We are of the opinion that the length of the delay here is not such as to be “presumptively prejudicial” (Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 [1972]), and therefore it is unnecessary to inquire into the other factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo and Commonwealth v. Horne, 362 Mass. 738 (1973). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Commonwealth v. Spencer
green
1 sentence1974Commonwealth v. Spencer, supra. “The conclusion of the trial judge that a witness is competent to express an opinion upon a particular matter can be disturbed only where there is no evidence to warrant that conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Bellino, 320 Mass. 635, 638 (1947). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Commonwealth v. Bouvier
green
1 sentence1974The defendant’s attack on the propriety of charging the jury on manslaughter relies on Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 363 Mass. 311, 320-321 (1973), in which the defendant complained that a charge of voluntary manslaughter had not been given and in which the Supreme Judicial Court said, “But the judge would have been wrong to charge on manslaughter without some supporting evidence of the commission of that crime. *690 [Citing cases.]” See Commonwealth v. Corcione, 364 Mass. 611, 618-619 (1974); Commonwealth v. Caine, 366 Mass. 374, 375 (1974), citing Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 316 Mass. 489 (1944 | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Picard v. Eisen green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Commonwealth v. Cutler green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Commonwealth v. Stone green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Commonwealth v. Valcourt green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Barnes v. Berkshire Street Railway Co. green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.