contours defense in New Jersey

2025"As a general rule, a third party may recover on a theory of implied indemnity from an employer only when a special legal relationship exists between the employer and the third party, and the liability of the third party is vicarious." Ibid. (quoting Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177 , 188- 89 (1986)).

1987“As a general rule, a third party may recover on a theory of implied indemnity from an employer only when a special legal relationship exists between the employer and the third party, and the liability of the third party is vicarious.” Id. at 189 .

2025"The contours of the doctrine [of implied indemnification] are somewhat narrow . . . ." Id. at 20 .

2025"As a general rule, a third party may recover on a theory of implied indemnity from an employer only when a special legal relationship exists between the employer and the third party, and the liability of the third party is vicarious." Ibid. (quoting Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177 , 188- 89 (1986)).

2021The judge relied extensively on our decision in Mercer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., in which future Justice Virginia Long, outlined the contours of the doctrine of apparent authority. 324 N.J.

2019California "revis[ed] the contours of the doctrine to reflect more accurately the basis on which the admissibility of such evidence should be evaluated." Id. at 959 .

2019To effectuate those aims, the Legislature prescribed that the Charitable Immunity Act shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally construed so as to afford immunity to the said corporations, societies and associations from liability as provided herein in furtherance of the public policy for the protection of nonprofit corporations, societies and associations organized for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes. [ N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10.] The Act sets out the contours of the immunity it grants to nonprofit entities as follows: No nonprofit corporation, society or associat

2019To effectuate those aims, the Legislature prescribed that the Charitable Immunity Act shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally construed so as to afford immunity to the said corporations, societies and associations from liability as provided herein in furtherance of the public policy for the protection of nonprofit corporations, societies and associations organized for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes. [ N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10.] The Act sets out the contours of the immunity it grants to nonprofit entities as follows: No nonprofit corporation, society or associat

2019To effectuate those aims, the Legislature prescribed that the Charitable Immunity Act shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally construed so as to afford immunity to the said corporations, societies and associations from liability as provided herein in furtherance of the public policy for the protection of nonprofit corporations, societies and associations organized for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes. [ N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10.] The Act sets out the contours of the immunity it grants to nonprofit entities as follows: No nonprofit corporation, society or associat

2019To effectuate those aims, the Legislature prescribed that the Charitable Immunity Act shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally construed so as to afford immunity to the said corporations, societies and associations from liability as provided herein in furtherance of the public policy for the protection of nonprofit corporations, societies and associations organized for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes. [ N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10.] The Act sets out the contours of the immunity it grants to nonprofit entities as follows: No nonprofit corporation, society or associat

2007In Hills Development Company v. Bernards Township, 103 N.J. 1 , 510 A. 2d 621 (1986), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to -329, which transferred primary responsibility for determination of municipal obligations to provide a fair share of lower income housing needs from the courts to a newly established administrative agency.

2007In Hills Development Company v. Bernards Township, 103 N.J. 1 , 510 A. 2d 621 (1986), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to -329, which transferred primary responsibility for determination of municipal obligations to provide a fair share of lower income housing needs from the courts to a newly established administrative agency.

2006See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 ; Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. at 355 , 419 A.2d 1123 (stating, “[t]he relevant facts, then, appear to be those which disclose what places the person under arrest presently could reach at the time the arrest is undertaken and how likely it is that he would attempt resistance or escape or destruction of evidence”); Pierce, supra, 136 N.J. at 211 , 642 A.2d 947 (stating, “[w]e reject not the rationale of Chimel, but Belton’s automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all arrests for motor-ve

2006See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 ; Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. at 355 , 419 A.2d 1123 (stating, “[t]he relevant facts, then, appear to be those which disclose what places the person under arrest presently could reach at the time the arrest is undertaken and how likely it is that he would attempt resistance or escape or destruction of evidence”); Pierce, supra, 136 N.J. at 211 , 642 A.2d 947 (stating, “[w]e reject not the rationale of Chimel, but Belton’s automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all arrests for motor-ve

2006See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 ; Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. at 355 , 419 A.2d 1123 (stating, “[t]he relevant facts, then, appear to be those which disclose what places the person under arrest presently could reach at the time the arrest is undertaken and how likely it is that he would attempt resistance or escape or destruction of evidence”); Pierce, supra, 136 N.J. at 211 , 642 A.2d 947 (stating, “[w]e reject not the rationale of Chimel, but Belton’s automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all arrests for motor-ve

2006See Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 ; Welsh, supra, 84 N.J. at 355 , 419 A.2d 1123 (stating, “[t]he relevant facts, then, appear to be those which disclose what places the person under arrest presently could reach at the time the arrest is undertaken and how likely it is that he would attempt resistance or escape or destruction of evidence”); Pierce, supra, 136 N.J. at 211 , 642 A.2d 947 (stating, “[w]e reject not the rationale of Chimel, but Belton’s automatic application of Chimel to authorize vehicular searches following all arrests for motor-ve

2003Over time, our courts have redefined the contours of that exception, expanding it to include not only those cases in which an employer manifests a "deliberate intention" to injure, Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 524 , 248 A. 2d 129 (App. Div.1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A. 2d 157 (1969), but also those in which irrespective of the presence or absence of a subjective intent to injure, an employer knows that harm to an employee is "substantially certain" to result from its conduct.

2003Over time, our courts have redefined the contours of that exception, expanding it to include not only those cases in which an employer manifests a "deliberate intention" to injure, Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 524 , 248 A. 2d 129 (App. Div.1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A. 2d 157 (1969), but also those in which irrespective of the presence or absence of a subjective intent to injure, an employer knows that harm to an employee is "substantially certain" to result from its conduct.

2003Over time, our courts have redefined the contours of that exception, expanding it to include not only those cases in which an employer manifests a "deliberate intention" to injure, Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 524 , 248 A. 2d 129 (App. Div.1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A. 2d 157 (1969), but also those in which irrespective of the presence or absence of a subjective intent to injure, an employer knows that harm to an employee is "substantially certain" to result from its conduct.

2003Over time, our courts have redefined the contours of that exception, expanding it to include not only those cases in which an employer manifests a “deliberate intention” to injure, Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 524 , 248 A.2d 129 (App.Div.1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A.2d 157 (1969), but also those in which irrespective of the presence or absence of a subjective intent to injure, an employer knows that harm to an employee is “substantially certain” to result from its conduct.

2003Over time, our courts have redefined the contours of that exception, expanding it to include not only those cases in which an employer manifests a "deliberate intention" to injure, Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 524 , 248 A. 2d 129 (App. Div.1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A. 2d 157 (1969), but also those in which irrespective of the presence or absence of a subjective intent to injure, an employer knows that harm to an employee is "substantially certain" to result from its conduct.

2003Over time, our courts have redefined the contours of that exception, expanding it to include not only those cases in which an employer manifests a “deliberate intention” to injure, Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 524 , 248 A.2d 129 (App.Div.1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A.2d 157 (1969), but also those in which irrespective of the presence or absence of a subjective intent to injure, an employer knows that harm to an employee is “substantially certain” to result from its conduct.

2000The Appellate Division recently summarized the contours of that doctrine: The purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine is to protect “the integrity of the judicial process.” Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.Super. 374, 387 , 685 A.2d 60 (App.Div.1996).

2000The Appellate Division recently summarized the contours of that doctrine: The purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine is to protect “the integrity of the judicial process.” Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.Super. 374, 387 , 685 A.2d 60 (App.Div.1996).

1994To quote Patton , "absent a clear indication to the contrary," we assume that the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-29 "with an understanding of the contours of the privilege against self-incrimination." Patton, supra, 133 N.J. at 402 , 627 A. 2d 1112 .

1994To quote Patton , "absent a clear indication to the contrary," we assume that the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-29 "with an understanding of the contours of the privilege against self-incrimination." Patton, supra, 133 N.J. at 402 , 627 A. 2d 1112 .

1992The entrapment defense based on due process reflects basic and distinctive state policies that have historically and consistently served principles of fundamental fairness, e.g., State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418 , 493 A. 2d 513 (1985), and preserved judicial integrity in the administration of criminal justice, e.g., State v. Sugar, supra, 100 N.J. at 228-29 , 495 A. 2d 90 (citing Molnar, supra, 81 N.J. at 484 , 410 A. 2d 37 ).

1992The entrapment defense based on due process reflects basic and distinctive state policies that have historically and consistently served principles of fundamental fairness, e.g., State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418 , 493 A. 2d 513 (1985), and preserved judicial integrity in the administration of criminal justice, e.g., State v. Sugar, supra, 100 N.J. at 228-29 , 495 A. 2d 90 (citing Molnar, supra, 81 N.J. at 484 , 410 A. 2d 37 ).

1992Federal principles of entrapment "are not controlling on the state courts which are free to formulate and establish the contours of the defense of entrapment for their own jurisdictions." Talbot, supra, 71 N.J. at 165-67 , 364 A. 2d 9 .

1992Federal principles of entrapment "are not controlling on the state courts which are free to formulate and establish the contours of the defense of entrapment for their own jurisdictions." Talbot, supra, 71 N.J. at 165-67 , 364 A. 2d 9 .

1992The entrapment defense based on due process reflects basic and distinctive state policies that have historically and consistently served principles of fundamental fairness, e.g., State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418 , 493 A. 2d 513 (1985), and preserved judicial integrity in the administration of criminal justice, e.g., State v. Sugar, supra, 100 N.J. at 228-29 , 495 A. 2d 90 (citing Molnar, supra, 81 N.J. at 484 , 410 A. 2d 37 ).

1992The entrapment defense based on due process reflects basic and distinctive state policies that have historically and consistently served principles of fundamental fairness, e.g., State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418 , 493 A. 2d 513 (1985), and preserved judicial integrity in the administration of criminal justice, e.g., State v. Sugar, supra, 100 N.J. at 228-29 , 495 A. 2d 90 (citing Molnar, supra, 81 N.J. at 484 , 410 A. 2d 37 ).

1992The entrapment defense based on due process reflects basic and distinctive state policies that have historically and consistently served principles of fundamental fairness, e.g., State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418 , 493 A. 2d 513 (1985), and preserved judicial integrity in the administration of criminal justice, e.g., State v. Sugar, supra, 100 N.J. at 228-29 , 495 A. 2d 90 (citing Molnar, supra, 81 N.J. at 484 , 410 A. 2d 37 ).

1992The entrapment defense based on due process reflects basic and distinctive state policies that have historically and consistently served principles of fundamental fairness, e.g., State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418 , 493 A. 2d 513 (1985), and preserved judicial integrity in the administration of criminal justice, e.g., State v. Sugar, supra, 100 N.J. at 228-29 , 495 A. 2d 90 (citing Molnar, supra, 81 N.J. at 484 , 410 A. 2d 37 ).

1975Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Mayor and Township Committeemen of Woodbridge, 25 N.J. 188 (1957).

1975In Summer v. Teaneck, supra , Chief Justice Weintraub outlined the contours of the doctrine of preemption: [25] A municipality may not contradict a policy the Legislature establishes.