contours exception in Michigan

2014The origin of the first exception predates Teague, as that decision drew the contours of this exception from Justice Harlan’s partial concurrence and partial dissent in Mackey v United States, 401 US 667 ; 91 S Ct 1160 ; 28 L Ed 2d 404 (1971).

2014The origin of the first exception predates Teague, as that decision drew the contours of this exception from Justice Harlan’s partial concurrence and partial dissent in Mackey v United States, 401 US 667 ; 91 S Ct 1160 ; 28 L Ed 2d 404 (1971).

2018The dissent states, “A common thread in the line of sentencing cases both before and after Lockridge is that a court may not depart from the guidelines range based on factors already taken into account by the guidelines unless the court articulates a legitimate reason for doing so.” The dissent’s approach seems to fly in the face of Lockridge’s holding that “[w]e also strike down the requirement in MCL 769.34(3) that a sentencing court that departs from the applicable guidelines range must articulate a substantial and compelling reason for that departure.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364-365 .

2018The dissent states, “A common thread in the line of sentencing cases both before and after Lockridge is that a court may not depart from the guidelines range based on factors already taken into account by the guidelines unless the court articulates a legitimate reason for doing so.” The dissent’s approach seems to fly in the face of Lockridge’s holding that “[w]e also strike down the requirement in MCL 769.34(3) that a sentencing court that departs from the applicable guidelines range must articulate a substantial and compelling reason for that departure.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364-365 .

2024“Consequently, we strongly encourage the adoption of a court rule to precisely define the contours of the rule.” Id. 8 See Bronson Methodist Hosp, 298 Mich App at 199 (“An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give [an issue] only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State, 280 Mich App 477 , -5- agreement with Judge Wilson.

2017Id. at 836 . “[T]he term recklessness is not self-defining,” the Court began, and its characteristics differ depending on whether the underlying case is civil or criminal: The civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.

2015In Lockridge , the Supreme Court traced the evolution of the United States Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence in considerable detail, beginning with that Court’s decision in McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79; 106 S Ct 2411 ; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986), and culminating in Alleyne.

2015In Lockridge , the Supreme Court traced the evolution of the United States Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence in considerable detail, beginning with that Court’s decision in McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79; 106 S Ct 2411 ; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986), and culminating in Alleyne.