contours exception in Connecticut

2023As we recognized in Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986), however, because of ‘‘the inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy, it is often difficult to define precisely the contours of the exception.’’ Id., 680 .

2023As we recognized in Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986), however, because of ‘‘the inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy, it is often difficult to define precisely the contours of the exception.’’ Id., 680 .

2026Therefore, in reviewing . . . claims of qualified immunity [Connecticut courts] are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of the immunity available to government officials.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735 , 742–43, 646 A.2d 152 (1994).

2026Therefore, in reviewing . . . claims of qualified immunity [Connecticut courts] are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of the immunity available to government officials.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735 , 742–43, 646 A.2d 152 (1994).

1996State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 573 , 638 A.2d 578 (1994) (Berdon, J., dissenting).

1996State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 573 , 638 A.2d 578 (1994) (Berdon, J., dissenting).

1996We look to see whether the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision . . . or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy." Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479 , 492 , Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 200 Conn. 680 .

1996We look to see whether the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision . . . or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy." Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479 , 492 , Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 200 Conn. 680 .

1992In Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 , 82 L.Ed.2d CT Page 2821 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901 (1984), the Court explained that although a "tactical" or "intentional" decision ( 486 U.S. 222 ) to forgo a procedural opportunity normal cannot constitute cause, id., at 13-14, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 , 104 S.Ct. 2901 , "the failure of counsel to raise a constitutional issue reasonably unknown to him is one situation in which the (cause) requirement is met." Id., at 14 , 82 L.Ed.2d 1 , 104 S.Ct. 2901 .

1992In Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 , 82 L.Ed.2d CT Page 2821 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901 (1984), the Court explained that although a "tactical" or "intentional" decision ( 486 U.S. 222 ) to forgo a procedural opportunity normal cannot constitute cause, id., at 13-14, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 , 104 S.Ct. 2901 , "the failure of counsel to raise a constitutional issue reasonably unknown to him is one situation in which the (cause) requirement is met." Id., at 14 , 82 L.Ed.2d 1 , 104 S.Ct. 2901 .

2022Furthermore, in applying fed- eral law in those instances where the United States Supreme Court has not spoken, we generally give spe- cial consideration to decisions of the Second Circuit . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn. App. 603, 625 , 975 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘Qualified immunity balances two important inter- ests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’’ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

2022Furthermore, in applying fed- eral law in those instances where the United States Supreme Court has not spoken, we generally give spe- cial consideration to decisions of the Second Circuit . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn. App. 603, 625 , 975 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘Qualified immunity balances two important inter- ests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’’ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

2022Since the court, in deciding a motion to dismiss, must consider the allegations in their most favorable light, it is evident that the plaintiff profess[es] to claim breaches of the statutory obligations of the commissioner that are in excess of the defendants’ statutory authority.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of their argument that the plaintiff was required to allege that the defendants acted solely to further their own illegal scheme and not to carry out government policy, the defendants cite our Supreme Court’s decision in Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 13

2022Since the court, in deciding a motion to dismiss, must consider the allegations in their most favorable light, it is evident that the plaintiff profess[es] to claim breaches of the statutory obligations of the commissioner that are in excess of the defendants’ statutory authority.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of their argument that the plaintiff was required to allege that the defendants acted solely to further their own illegal scheme and not to carry out government policy, the defendants cite our Supreme Court’s decision in Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 13

2022Since the court, in deciding a motion to dismiss, must consider the allegations in their most favorable light, it is evident that the plaintiff profess[es] to claim breaches of the statutory obligations of the commissioner that are in excess of the defendants’ statutory authority.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of their argument that the plaintiff was required to allege that the defendants acted solely to further their own illegal scheme and not to carry out government policy, the defendants cite our Supreme Court’s decision in Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 13

2022Since the court, in deciding a motion to dismiss, must consider the allegations in their most favorable light, it is evident that the plaintiff profess[es] to claim breaches of the statutory obligations of the commissioner that are in excess of the defendants’ statutory authority.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of their argument that the plaintiff was required to allege that the defendants acted solely to further their own illegal scheme and not to carry out government policy, the defendants cite our Supreme Court’s decision in Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 13

2022Furthermore, in applying fed- eral law in those instances where the United States Supreme Court has not spoken, we generally give spe- cial consideration to decisions of the Second Circuit . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn. App. 603, 625 , 975 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘Qualified immunity balances two important inter- ests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’’ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

2022Furthermore, in applying fed- eral law in those instances where the United States Supreme Court has not spoken, we generally give spe- cial consideration to decisions of the Second Circuit . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn. App. 603, 625 , 975 A.2d 59 (2009). ‘‘Qualified immunity balances two important inter- ests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’’ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

2021Employee job secu- rity, however, is protected against employer actions that contravene public policy.’’ Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986). ‘‘The ques- tion of whether a challenged discharge violates public policy . . . is a question of law to be decided by the court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 407 , 142 A.3d 227 (2016). ‘‘Given the inherent vagueness of the concept of pub- lic policy, it is often difficult to define precisely the contours of the exception.’’ Morris v. Hartfo

2021Employee job secu- rity, however, is protected against employer actions that contravene public policy.’’ Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986). ‘‘The ques- tion of whether a challenged discharge violates public policy . . . is a question of law to be decided by the court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 407 , 142 A.3d 227 (2016). ‘‘Given the inherent vagueness of the concept of pub- lic policy, it is often difficult to define precisely the contours of the exception.’’ Morris v. Hartfo

2021Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 , 107 S. Ct. 3034 , 97 L.

2021Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 , 107 S. Ct. 3034 , 97 L.

2020This court thoroughly explained the contours of the defense in State v. Hall-Davis, 177 Conn. App. 211 , 226–27, 172 A.3d 222 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 987 , 175 A.3d 43 (2017).

2020This court thoroughly explained the contours of the defense in State v. Hall-Davis, 177 Conn. App. 211 , 226–27, 172 A.3d 222 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 987 , 175 A.3d 43 (2017).

2020See Walsh v. Stonington Water Pollu- tion Control Authority, 250 Conn. 443, 459 , 736 A.2d 811 (1999) (‘‘[t]he conduct for which the utility is being weighed includes both the general activity and what is done about its consequences’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kostyal v. Cass, 163 Conn. 92, 99 , 302 A.2d 121 (1972) (‘‘[w]hether . . . the particular condition of which the plaintiffs complain constituted a nuisance does not depend merely upon the inherent nature of the condition, but involves also a consideration of all relevant facts, such as its location, its adaptation to the benef

2020See Walsh v. Stonington Water Pollu- tion Control Authority, 250 Conn. 443, 459 , 736 A.2d 811 (1999) (‘‘[t]he conduct for which the utility is being weighed includes both the general activity and what is done about its consequences’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kostyal v. Cass, 163 Conn. 92, 99 , 302 A.2d 121 (1972) (‘‘[w]hether . . . the particular condition of which the plaintiffs complain constituted a nuisance does not depend merely upon the inherent nature of the condition, but involves also a consideration of all relevant facts, such as its location, its adaptation to the benef

2020This court thoroughly explained the contours of the defense in State v. Hall-Davis, 177 Conn. App. 211 , 226–27, 172 A.3d 222 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 987 , 175 A.3d 43 (2017).

2020This court thoroughly explained the contours of the defense in State v. Hall-Davis, 177 Conn. App. 211 , 226–27, 172 A.3d 222 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 987 , 175 A.3d 43 (2017).

2017We note that we are disposing of this claim pursuant to State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R ., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

2017We note that we are disposing of this claim pursuant to State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R ., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

2007Id., 743 n.4; see also Szewczyk v. Dept. of Social Services, 275 Conn. 464 , 475 n.11, 881 A.2d 259 (2005); Turner v. Frowein, 253 Conn. 312, 341 , 752 A.2d 955 (2000).

2007Id., 743 n.4; see also Szewczyk v. Dept. of Social Services, 275 Conn. 464 , 475 n.11, 881 A.2d 259 (2005); Turner v. Frowein, 253 Conn. 312, 341 , 752 A.2d 955 (2000).

2005“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745, 762 , 878 A.2d 384 , cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920 , 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). *409 We agree with the police defendants that they reasonably could not have known that the plaintiff actually possessed the apartment on May 7 and 8,1998, because the Dixons and Terry stated

2005“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745, 762 , 878 A.2d 384 , cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920 , 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). *409 We agree with the police defendants that they reasonably could not have known that the plaintiff actually possessed the apartment on May 7 and 8,1998, because the Dixons and Terry stated

2005“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745, 762 , 878 A.2d 384 , cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920 , 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). *409 We agree with the police defendants that they reasonably could not have known that the plaintiff actually possessed the apartment on May 7 and 8,1998, because the Dixons and Terry stated

2005“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745, 762 , 878 A.2d 384 , cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920 , 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). *409 We agree with the police defendants that they reasonably could not have known that the plaintiff actually possessed the apartment on May 7 and 8,1998, because the Dixons and Terry stated

2005Although the United States Supreme Court never has articulated the contours of that exception, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized and elaborated on it in In re Application to Adjudge the Providence Journal Co. in Criminal Contempt, 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986) (In re Providence Journal Co. I), modified, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed sub nom.

2005Although the United States Supreme Court never has articulated the contours of that exception, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized and elaborated on it in In re Application to Adjudge the Providence Journal Co. in Criminal Contempt, 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986) (In re Providence Journal Co. I), modified, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed sub nom.

2005United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 , 108 S. Ct. 1502 , 99 L.

2005United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 , 108 S. Ct. 1502 , 99 L.

2002The court stated further: “Because we operate from the premise that such [a procedure] would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id.; Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 , 113 S. Ct. 892 , 122 L.

2002The court stated further: “Because we operate from the premise that such [a procedure] would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id.; Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 , 113 S. Ct. 892 , 122 L.